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FOREWORD


FOR some years past the members of the Board of Directors of the Academy have been convinced that a great national service could be performed if the Academy, in addition to the regular publications, were to undertake special investigations on questions of national interest and place the results of such investigations at the disposal of our members and of the general public. It was with this end in view that the Board decided to undertake a survey of the economic, social and political conditions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The public discussions relating to these two republics have contained so much of a political and partisan nature that the Board deemed it important that the public opinion of the country should be enlightened by an impartial and unbiased study of the situation.

The study is one that required a man of mature judgment and thorough scientific preparation. By unanimous agreement, the Board selected Dr. Carl Kelsey, Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, to undertake the investigation. Dr. Kelsey has spent nine months traveling through Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and has placed before the members of the Academy the results of a careful and searching analysis of the situation. The members of the Board feel convinced that the results of this first appointment to an Academy Research Fellowship fully justify enlarging the scope of the Academy's activities along the lines of such special investigations, and it is the hope of the Board that through the coöperation of our members it will be possible to establish an endowment fund which will enable the Academy to provide for a series of research fellowships; thus placing at the disposal of the country the results of careful and impartial investigation of the problems concerning which the public opinion of the country is called upon to make momentous decisions.

L. S. ROWE,
President.

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Introduction

I REACHED Haiti about the first of February, 1921, and remained until July the second, when I went to the Dominican Republic, staying there until October 22. I saw every important town of Haiti with the exception of Jacmel, and spent two weeks on a trip through the interior. In the Dominican Republic I got a glimpse, at least, of nearly every province. During this time I had opportunity to talk to people in all walks of life. I had no fixed itinerary or set program. I roamed about as opportunity presented trying to see things for myself. I had no official connection of any sort with the government though it was difficult to persuade the natives that an American civilian traveling about was not on some secret mission. While there I read all the best available books written by Haitians or Dominicans, and kept in touch with the newspapers. Perhaps I might add here that if some of my strictures seem severe they can be duplicated from the works of reliable native writers.

Everywhere I was received with courtesy and friendly attentions. Every opportunity was given me to meet men or see conditions. This applies to all the United States officials, both civilian and military, to foreign residents and to the Haitians and Dominicans. I was welcomed in the local clubs of all the larger towns. It is my own fault, therefore, if I failed to get an accurate picture of the situation. Of course, there were many men whom I wanted to meet but failed to see for one reason or another.

It is utterly impossible to try here to thank by name all those who generously gave me their time. Nor can I

even name many of those who opened their hearts to me, lest I be the indirect cause of harm to them. I tried to show them all that I was appreciative of their aid, and to them all I again express my gratitude.

On my return I am again struck by our ignorance. Too many educated people here confuse Haiti and Tahiti. The two islands of Haiti and Santo Domingo appear in questions put to me. "Is the United States in any way involved in Santo Domingo?" was asked the other day by a man of wide reputation. Unfortunately much of the material which has appeared in our press is so grotesque, or deliberately twisted, that the reader gets a very false impression. Our future relations with these countries are destined to be closer than they have been and it is important that we should come to know the essential facts. Is it too much to hope that in the day of the new diplomacy even our public departments may tell us of their operations and their problems instead of waiting until the attacks of enemies put them on the defensive? I shall be well content if I have in any way thrown light on the situation, and shall be grateful to any who will call my attention to errors.

Some of my Haitian and Dominican friends will not only disagree with my judgments but may feel hurt at some of my statements. From this there is no escape and even they will be glad that I have tried to tell the truth as it appeared to me. Some things impress the foreigner differently from the native. I am confident that all will find running through these lines the same friendly feeling which I find in my heart.

Obviously one cannot enumerate the many individual exceptions to all general statements. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are struggling with an age-old problem, the attainment of civilization. No people can

guarantee the financial success of another, or its political success, but we may by our policies help or hinder and my sole desire is in some way to help.

Philadelphia, January 5, 1922.

The Island

ABOUT 1,200 miles south of New York City one will find on the map the island of Haiti or Santo Domingo, considered one of the most beautiful in the world, lying directly between Cuba and Porto Rico to which it is intermediate in size as well. It is some 400 miles in length and 170 in width, but of very irregular shape. The total area is over 28,000 square miles, or a little less than that of Ireland. There are a number of dependent islets, some of considerable size but of little value today, though a few thousand people manage to eke out a precarious existence on the island of Gonâve in the bay of Port-au-Prince.

Topography. As a whole, the island is extremely mountainous, the chains running from the west with a southerly trend with intervening valleys in which rivers are found. The mountain slopes range from steep to precipitous, rising often to more than 3,000 feet, a few peaks reaching 8 or 10,000 feet. These ranges constitute serious obstacles to travel and make roadbuilding both difficult and expensive. Thus the whole southwestern peninsula is a mountain range rising abruptly from the ocean on both sides, with no level ground on the south except the plain of Cayes, and with none on the north until one reaches the neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. Save in a couple of places it is nearly impossible to cross the peninsula. At some recent time, geologically speaking, this peninsula seems to have been separated from the larger island to the north. Southeast from Port-au-Prince there is a low plain extending into the Dominican Republic with sulphur springs on the northern border, and two considerable lakes of brackish and salt water, one

of which is below sea level. Near St. Marc is the mouth of the Artibonite River, the largest in the island. The central ranges which stretch from Môle St. Nicholas on the northwest almost to the most eastern coast form the backbone of the island. These die down in the Dominican Republic, and offer one good pass at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet. South of this range, at its eastern end is a considerable coastal plain, largely of coral formation. North of this range, from Monte Cristi to Samana is a large valley divided into two parts, the eastern section being that to which Columbus gave the name of Vega Real, rich and well-watered, while west of Santiago is found the Yaque del Norte running through an arid region to its mouth at Monte Cristi. There is another low range between the valley and the coast. Although there are many rivers and streams these are the only two in which boats of any draught may run. As a matter of fact, they have never been useful as waterways and such use in the future is doubtful. All the rivers are subject to sudden flood, thus making fording problematical as well as sometimes dangerous. Their availability for purposes of irrigation will be mentioned later.

Rainfall. The influence of the mountains on rainfall is most marked and places only a few miles apart may vary greatly, one being humid, the other arid. The southwestern peninsula is well watered while the northwestern is largely barren desert. The actual rainfall varies from 12 to 150 inches per year. At one place in 1919 rain fell on 16 days only; at another there was rain on 124; while in certain mountain districts 12 inches was the lowest

record for any month and rain fell nearly every day of the year. As a rule the rains are local rather than general and are also of short duration, an all day's rain being a great exception. Most of the rain falls in late afternoon or evening,—little in the morning. In most of the island the natives expect a longer rainy season in the spring, and a shorter one in autumn, the intervening periods being dry. These terms do not have fixed values and the periods are more or less fluctuating.

Climate. Although the island is within the tropics lying just south of the 20 parallel, the proximity of the ocean, the contrast of mountain and valley, the daily winds modify the temperature and the nights are usually delightful. Here again local conditions vary, but taking Port-au-Prince as typical we find that the hottest day of 1919 was on August 6 when the thermometer registered 95° at 1.00 p.m., while at 9.00 that evening it stood at 71°. The lowest temperature recorded for the year was 68° on January 18, and the average was 77°. In the high mountain valley of Constanza frosts are reported during the winter and many an American in the hills at night after being caught in a rain has been convinced that he was about to freeze. The intense glare of the sun coupled with the steady heat makes advisable the use of colored glasses by visitors from the north, while the towns with paved streets seem like furnaces during the days of summer. Violent storms and electrical disturbances are not common although great damage is occasionally done along the coasts by hurricanes, as the wreck of the Memphis lying against the sea wall of Santo Domingo City testifies.

Resources. Most of the reports on the island speak of the wealth of mineral resources. It is true that the

Spaniards found some gold in the possession of the Indians and that today, in a few places, peasants can make thirty or forty cents a day washing gravel. It is true that one can find pretty good specimens of copper and other metals. It is true that small deposits of lignite are known. It is also true that more or less constant prospecting since the time of Columbus has failed to pay its own cost, let alone reveal any great deposit. If there are minerals worth mining their location is not known. Just now there is a possibility of the discovery of oil in paying quantities. The opinion of the best informed men seems to be that the fertile soil rather than metallic deposits will be the source of the wealth of the future.

Animal Life. There are no large wild animals. In some districts the goats run practically wild. Bird life is fairly abundant and practically every kind of bird that can be killed is eaten. Doves of several species are abundant and are highly esteemed as food. Ducks are common locally. The guinea hen is now widely distributed and sometimes becomes a nuisance to the gardener, particularly since the elimination of firearms by the American forces. There are hawks but no buzzards. Other than scorpions, centipedes and tarantulas there are no animals whose bite is at all poisonous. Flies are not numerous but mosquitoes are, and malaria is a prevalent disease. The mongoose has been introduced from Jamaica and, though little known as yet, may be a source of trouble in the future. Fishing is not a well developed industry, largely no doubt because of the absence of ice, yet there are many fishermen along the coast, and the kingfish and red snapper are seen in the markets. Lobsters are common enough though seldom eaten by natives who catch them only for

sale to foreigners. Turtles and crabs abound. Little lizards are everywhere in evidence but the great iguana is now very rare. There are crocodiles in the lakes.

Vegetation. Mahogany and other desirable trees are scattered about, not, however, in large quantities, and most of the remaining specimens are so difficult of access that they hardly repay costs of transportation. There is a promise that some trees little used heretofore may prove available for ties for American railroads. In some of the mountain areas, particularly in the Dominican Republic, there are considerable stands of yellow pine. Most of this is unused. An owner of timber land in Haiti told me that he could afford to cut timber when he could get \$120 per hundred feet. There are a few mills in the Dominican Republic, but lack of transportation still blocks any marked development. Most of the building lumber is therefore imported from the United States. Dyewoods are fairly abundant and in pros-

perous times are exported. No attempt has ever been made to plant valuable trees.

Wild fruit trees of many sorts are found, the mango being the most important. Citrus fruits do well but are very irregularly distributed. Many grapefruit are seen in the markets of Port-au-Prince but in the city of Santo Domingo all the grapefruit are imported from Porto Rico. There are no real orchards on the island, though there are large plantations of bananas and plantains. The coconut palm grows freely but is used locally only, no copra being dried for export. At the altitude of about 1,500 feet a subtropical zone is reached where all sorts of vegetables and fruits of the temperate zone prosper. I have seen Irish potatoes of excellent quality which were grown in the hills near Santiago.

The island is divided between two countries, the Dominican Republic occupying the eastern two-thirds, some 18,000 square miles, Haiti, the western part with some 10,000 square miles.

CHAPTER I

The Haitians

POPULATION. No census has ever been taken but the estimated population of Haiti is 2,000,000, or about 200 per square mile. As a matter of fact there are large areas almost uninhabited, like the arid district from Mole St. Nicholas to Gonaives, the San Michel Valley and parts of the eastern border; in some places the population is dense, very dense when considered in relation to the agricultural development. There are no reliable figures as to birth and death rates but the estimated population in 1800 was about 550,000 and there has been little immigration. Children are everywhere in evidence but the death rate appears to be very high and the aged do not seem numerous.

Origin. The overwhelming mass of the people, at least 90 per cent I should say, seem to be of pure Negro stock. The upper classes are notably lighter in color and there are small areas where a relatively light color tone prevails. We know that there was a considerable mixture in colonial days and since that time there has been considerable intermarriage between the incoming Europeans and the Haitians so that there are no pure white families save those of recent immigrants. The original Indian stock seems to have left no trace. At first one gets the impression that there are twice as many women as men. This is probably due to the fact that the women go to market, or because the men are working in the fields away from the house. In the old days the men who entered the towns were often seized and made to serve in the "volunteer army," so the women carried the produce to town.

The Syrians. About 1890 there came into Haiti the first of a group destined to play a considerable part in the retail business, the Syrians. At first they bought largely from German merchants and peddled their wares through country districts. Later, finding they could buy more cheaply from the United States they did so. Being shrewed merchants they were disliked by their Haitian competitors and by the Germans. Although they never numbered more than a few hundred they were ordered out of the country by a law of 1913, passed, they claim, at the instigation of the German merchants. Since the Occupation some 200 of them have returned. They claim to do \$3,000,000 business yearly with the United States. A few of them are American citizens. Save stragglers from other islands these represent the only immigrant group which has entered Haiti in many years. This, of course, leaves out of account the marines, French priests and sisters, and other foreigners temporarily resident in the country. Barring these, there are only a few hundred whites in Haiti. The foreigners are all in the towns.

Distribution. All the large towns of Haiti are on the seacoast. The Capital, Port-au-Prince, has about 100,000 inhabitants; Cape Haitien, 17,000; the rest are much smaller. The bulk of the population live in villages scattered through the interior or in isolated cabins. Go where one will in the country, provided agriculture is possible (and in many places where it seems impossible), he will find the "cayes" of the peasants. These are often temporary

rather than permanent structures, for a considerable percentage of the peasants seem to migrate rather freely, clearing a little patch and cultivating it for a couple of years and then wandering to some new location.

Towns. Wherever possible the towns of Haiti are laid out in squares. The streets of Port-au-Prince in the business section are well paved with concrete. Many of its streets are macadamized as are some of the streets in Cape Haitien and elsewhere. In every town there is some central square, often decorated with shrubs and flowers, and a market place, the latter being usually the most interesting spot in town to the stranger. The water systems are not very adequate but the officials tell me that there is difficulty in keeping them in good condition owing to the acquisitive habits of citizens who need pipes and spigots. In older days the towns are said by old residents to have been extremely filthy and one had to walk in the middle of the street and keep a sharp lookout to avoid unexpected shower baths from the second story. The Americans are praised for having "cleaned-up" and for prohibiting the dumping of refuse in the streets. The stores are usually one or two story structures looking like warehouses, and such they are, for the stock on display is generally a small part of that on hand. There are practically no sewers. Surface drainage is all but universal.

Health. The prevailing diseases in Haiti are gonorrhea, syphilis and yaws (which are said to be very common), tuberculosis, malaria, filariasis and intestinal parasites. The country has been very free from epidemics such as yellow fever and bubonic plague. Yet these would probably run through the population like wildfire if they ever got a start owing to the hordes of mosquitoes in many districts and the armies

of rats which infest all the towns and much of the country. Much fun was poked at the Financial Adviser for installing a couple of rat-catchers at Port-au-Prince when the bubonic plague was reported in New Orleans.

Throughout 1921 an epidemic of smallpox swept the country, having been introduced from another island. The efforts of the American doctors to check it at the start were rendered futile by the ignorance of the masses and the foolish prejudice of local physicians. The papers everywhere denounced the Americans saying that it was nothing but chicken pox: but when the deaths began to increase, the criticism became that the Americans were incompetent. Several hundred thousand persons were vaccinated. Thousands on thousands suffered. I have seen smallpox patients deathly sick lying by the roadside soliciting alms from passers-by. Often they were left in their cabins without food and drink. The ignorant peasants were seen vaccinating themselves from virus drawn from active cases. I was a guest at lunch in the home of a merchant in one town only to find later that there was a convalescent case of smallpox upstairs. The death rate in the hospitals was about 6 per cent and no one knows what it was in the hills.

The country is very inadequately supplied with doctors. There are physicians in the towns but none in rural districts. Even the town physicians are often incompetent. One doctor, for instance, in a maternity case was observed taking the only sterile towel he had and spreading it on a chair to protect his clothes. The natives are said to have a good knowledge of local remedies for fevers, but one questions the efficacy in a case of cancer of the stomach of killing and disembowelling a cat and placing the carcass on the patient's stomach. A priest told an

American physician that a woman who feared a miscarriage was placed on a table, a lighted candle placed in the umbilicus and allowed to burn out. One girl under quarantine was observed to take down the flag, carry it with her while she visited a friend across the street, and replace it on her return home. Hospital facilities are inadequate. Exorbitant fees are charged for making country visits. The number of lepers is estimated at 500 or 600, the insane at about 600. There is no special provision for these. Sanitation is unknown and a Minister of the State was indignant when compelled to clean his latrine.

Amusements. The favored pleasures of Haiti are cock-fighting and dancing. Cock pits are found everywhere. Gambling is universal. Dancing in the country is to the thumping of the drum, almost the only music of rural Haiti. These dances get pretty hilarious at times if the rum supply is adequate. The tourist hails every simple dance as "Voodoo," but he exaggerates. In the clubs of the upper class, chess, billiards, poker, whist, all have their advocates, while orchestras provide the music.

Domestic Animals. The average peasant has few domestic animals. He may own a few pigs which are allowed to support themselves and which develop tail, nose and legs at the expense of fat. The burro (worth from \$5 to \$10) is the common work-animal and is also the most valuable for he carries a large part of the goods to market, with the owner perched on top of the load. Cattle are scarce. The horses are small. Save on large plantations, the animals are seldom used for draught purposes. Chickens abound and are all of the small Mediterranean breeds. To judge from casual observation, they are quite as common in the towns as in the country, in part because they

are being kept alive until time to cook. There are a good many turkeys which sell for \$1 to \$1.50 in the Port-au-Prince market. Goats are common.

Land Ownership. There is great, almost endless confusion, with reference to the ownership of the land. There has never been a survey. The government claims to own large tracts but it seems to have no maps or adequate descriptions. There are some titles coming down from early days and the plains appear to be held by relatively few people. Many families profess to have large holdings in the hills but from these little revenue is derived as land is seldom rented but is managed directly by the owner. Inasmuch as squatter titles are admitted under the law any attempt of these supposed owners to take full possession would be most difficult. It seems to be the practice for the peasant to settle wherever he finds land not in use. The settlement of this land question is one of the most fundamental prerequisites to any improvement of conditions in Haiti. Foreigners were forbidden to own real estate until the adoption of the last constitution in 1918.

Agriculture. While there is a good deal of fishing along the coast, and a certain amount of cattle raising in the San Michel Valley and the upper Artibonite Valley and locally elsewhere, agriculture is for most Haitians not only the fundamental but also the sole means of gaining a livelihood. The fact that there are in the country no nurseries, no seed houses, no regular dealers in stock, indicates that conditions are very primitive. A prominent man asked me one day if I had seen one of the many beautiful mountain places. I said "No" and added that I wished he would take me to see some of the best farms. He replied, "There are none," and his answer was almost literally correct. There is no

agricultural school save a rather pathetic beginning near the Capital. Outside of the large sugar plantations, largely though not wholly under foreign control, there is no real agricultural development.

Of course, there are in fact well located and prosperous farmers who may be contrasted with others poorly located and shiftless, but their methods are much the same. A plough is rarely seen even in the plains and would be valueless on most of the steep hillsides. The one universal tool of the Haitian peasant is the machete (almost identical with our corn knife). With this he clears the ground, piling and burning the brush. Then with his machete he digs up the soil a little in just the place where he is to put his seed or plant. He cultivates with his machete by cutting the weeds or stirring the soil about the plants. Axes, hoes, etc., are known but seldom seen. The farmer saves his own seed or gets it from neighbors. Much time and energy are consumed in these processes. Arriving at Port-au-Prince early in February one finds the hills back of the town almost deserted, few cabins being visible. By the middle of March the hills are dotted with dark spots, which are the cleared areas being prepared for the spring planting. Trees are rarely planted. There are not even coffee plantations. All the natives do is to pick the berries from the wild plants descended from those brought in by the French after 1738. A competent observer said that in 1915 not over 1,000 acres in the entire country were well cultivated.

Marketing. The roads of Haiti are lined with women and burros bringing produce to village or town. These women often walk from fifteen to twenty-five miles and seem satisfied if they sell fifty cents worth of provisions. Indeed they might refuse to

sell all their load should you meet them ten miles out for they would thus lose the joy of barter and chatter afforded in the town. All night long they walk, en route to arrive at daylight. Picturesque? Yes, but the waste of human effort in such a system is enormous. At the market they must pay a small fee for the privilege of displaying their wares.

Home Industries. The making of a few sweets like the crude brown sugar called "rapadou," some candles of beeswax to be burned in church by the faithful, some mats of palm, or simple baskets, practically exhausts the list of home manufactures.

Houses. In the towns, the houses range from the crudest of hovels to fine villas and residences, oftentimes with very attractive grounds. At Cape Haitien the houses show the Spanish influence which is not seen in the South. In the country, the cabins are of two types. The more common is a framework of poles interwoven with splints and plastered with mud, with a roof of palms. More substantial structures are made of split palm boards. The acme of style is represented by the metal roof, possessed only by the fortunate. The floor is usually of earth. Doors are of wood, as are the windows, glass being unknown outside of the towns, where it is rare, shutters generally taking its place. All doors and windows are closed at night, but as the house is seldom ventilation-proof no great harm results. In the house there is practically no furniture. Beds are seldom seen and even in the towns are not found in the poorer houses.

Outside the cabin, the ground is very likely to be swept clean and, except in wet weather, present a neat appearance. Often there is some flowering plant, perhaps a cactus hedge. Very likely there is a little shed with thatched roof where the cooking is done,

food eaten, the siesta taken. Ovens are not unknown but the open fire on the ground is more common. In the country brush is used for fuel; charcoal in the towns. The burning of charcoal is quite an industry. For water, dependence is placed on streams. Even in the plains cisterns and wells are very rare. Many of the cabins are a mile or more from any water supply and the water is carried in calabashes. Needless to say that under such circumstances it is not wasted. There are no latrines except in the towns. Near the cabin is probably a little clump of bananas or plantains (almost identical but the plantain is not sweet) and a little garden close by so that it may be watched.

Language. The official language of the government is French but the actual language is "Creole," which is spoken by every Haitian whereas only a small minority can speak French. The number who can understand it is greater. Nearly all the families use Creole in the house whatever else they use in company. Creole is made up of a few hundred French and a few dozen other words from English or Spanish and African, all with an African type of construction. At first it is no more intelligible to the Frenchman than to the American. It is not particularly difficult but varies a great deal in different sections. Creole can be written but its transcription is difficult. In the schools, French is used. In time, as education develops, Creole will be supplanted by French, or will be modified into a French dialect. As it is now, one appreciates the story told in Haiti that the Lord was not satisfied that the French had been adequately punished when driven out of the country so left their beautiful tongue in the mouths of the Haitians to be crucified anew each day.

Religion. The official religion of

Haiti is the Christian (Roman Catholic) and the State assumes the support of the Church. During most of the nineteenth century the Pope seems to have had little control but a concordat was signed in 1860. Prior to that date the priests are said to have been "sans foi ni loi." Since then, practically all of the priests and sisters (some 635 in all) have been sent over from France. There are but two or three Haitian priests. These men and women are generally distributed over the country and are doing a splendid work. Among them are men who served in the French army throughout the war. They form the best informed foreign group resident in Haiti. There are fine cathedrals in Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitien and churches in all towns. There are a few Protestants on the island, some being descended from a company of American Negroes who migrated there many years ago. A few missions are maintained by other groups.

In all but the highest circles the real religion of the people is of African origin with a veneer of Christianity. It is common to speak of all these African rites under the name "Voodoo," a term often overworked. The different tribes originally had different customs but as no tribal distinctions have survived in Haiti the resultant is a blend. Based as African religions were on fear, the propitiation of the deities was very important. With this, as every student knows, was a curious emphasis on sex. The Voodoo dances of today, therefore, often degenerate into sexual orgies. Several attempts were made by the Haitian government to suppress these Voodoo dances but the government dared not be too stringent, and probably was not very enthusiastic in the first place. They are now under the ban of the law but they still exist, though seldom seen by the whites.

Some of the presidents of Haiti have been Voodoo priests. When President Simon left office a fetish of some sort was found in the palace and his successor, though personally not accepting local beliefs, feared to offend so sent for a Voodoo priest (a Papa-Loi as he is called) to perform the requisite ceremonies. To an animal deity the name "barka" is given. On one occasion Simon tricked the Catholic archbishop into performing the funeral services of such a "barka," a goat in this case. The deception was subsequently revealed and more stringent rules for the identification of corpses were adopted by the archbishop. Few Haitians will, for political reasons perhaps, deny the power of such barkas or fetishes.

In the country food is usually placed on the grave. I once witnessed a memorial service for a recently deceased child. The priest was busy with Voodoo rites as we approached the cabin but seeing us shifted to the opposite side of the room where Christian emblems were displayed. Later on food was scattered on the highway and, on inquiry, he told us that he did not know the reason for this but that it had long been a custom of his fathers. Even Christian celebrations like Easter have a strong African infusion. From Friday to Sunday the Lord is supposed to be dead and the devils therefore have their opportunity. To hinder them it is necessary to knock on wood. So all day long there comes rolling up the hills about Port-au-Prince at intervals the reverberations of the faithful.

As is natural in this stage of religious development superstition is most prevalent. No native mother attends the funeral of a child as this would cause another death in the family within a year. Should a funeral procession stop for any reason in front of a

house holy water is secured at once and the house sprinkled. From such naivetes to belief in charms and witchcraft, the simple mind runs the entire gamut.

Human Sacrifice. The idea of human sacrifice is as repugnant to the high class Haitian as to the American. Many of the best Haitians do not believe that it ever occurs, and are sincere in their belief. Others have told me very positively that it does. Such is the belief of some of the best informed foreign residents including many of the French priests, one of whom said he would put the number at one a year for the entire country. It takes a long time to overcome old customs. Such sacrifices are said to be of children only.

Cannibalism. The eating of parts of human sacrifices is alleged to occur at times. There is some evidence that the eating of parts of brave enemies, not as food in the ordinary sense, but in an effort to gain the qualities admired in the victim, may have occurred. The American marines in Haiti firmly believe that this happened in at least one case, for a native confessed that he had taken part therein. It is also believed by foreign residents to have happened in other instances. A magistrate told an American that he knew a man was convicted in court of this offense in 1909. Only one Haitian admitted to me that he thought it possible, but I was present in a little interior village when a native gendarme accused a woman of having eaten human flesh. This she denied with every indication of horror. If it ever happens it is certainly extremely rare and is viewed by nearly all Haitians just as we view it.

Personal Traits. The first strong impression I got of the Haitian people was their manly self-respecting bearing. There was no subserviency in their

attitude toward the whites. I do not mean that there was any indication of surliness or insolence. Speak to the market woman or the peasant on the road and you are sure of a "bon jour" often accompanied by a tipping of the hat. They seemed willing to do any favor. Everywhere they have borne the reputation of being very hospitable without demand for money. If one spends the night in a country cabin the best is offered and payment very often refused. They are sometimes likely to deceive you for they are inclined to give you the answer they think you want. In general, however, they are honest when charged with definite trusts. It has been necessary in days gone by to send large sums of money by messenger and in sailboats around the coast and I am told that such money was always delivered. The life of the white man or woman has long been secure and the murder of a white has occurred only under great provocation. My impression is that the people are willing to work but their work standards are not ours.

Elsewhere I speak of schools. Here I want to mention the handicap the Haitians carry because of ignorance. The peasant knows from tradition and experience a good deal about the adaptability of soils to crops and seldom blunders. Outside of this he knows nothing of any save the simplest processes. Give him a wheelbarrow and he will transport it on his head. Tell him to take a bicycle three miles and it will go on his head. Show him, however, how to use these articles and there is no trouble. He shows an adaptability to handle automobiles and drives fairly well, often, indeed, becomes proficient at minor repairs, but is an untrustworthy chauffeur both because he is happy-go-lucky and because he appreciates so little the meaning of momentum and other physical

factors entering into accidents. The railroads do not rely on Haitian engineers. One such, asked one day if there was water in the boiler, said it was all right anyhow. He could run the engine without water. He had done so once.

There is among the Haitians an indifference to suffering which seems to us heartless. I believe this, too, grows out of ignorance. When one does not know how to prevent suffering he becomes much of a fatalist. Open sores on animals are frightfully common. Animals are expected to work indefinitely without food. Perhaps fifty per cent of the hack horses in Port-au-Prince cannot take the driver and one passenger up the long but easy hill to the American Club, yet few drivers will refuse to attempt it. Moreover, the Haitian standard of driving is incessantly to nag the horse by jerking the lines. Much of the same indifference is shown by the lower classes to human suffering. They have always seen suffering. Why worry?

The Family. The fashionable marriage is under the auspices of the Church and this is the legal form. As a matter of fact most marriages are what we call "common-law" while in local dialect the girl is said to be "placed." Such placements are often followed later by formal ceremonies when the couple have accumulated adequate funds. They are not always permanent and there seems to be considerable freedom in forming and breaking them. One caco leader is said to have seven camps with a wife in each. Stories are current of men with a dozen or more wives and many score of children. Children are desired and are as often spoiled as abused. A couple will sometimes sell a child for a dollar or two but this involves an idea on their part that the child will be better off in some better situated family than at home.

Domestic slavery of this sort is very common, the child growing up in another house and being the servant of the family, rarely sent to school, and receiving nothing until grown save board and clothes.

Home Life. Among the poorer people there is little in home life save residence under one roof. There are no regular meals, food being taken whenever convenient, or whenever secured. The children are pretty much left to their own devices as the mother is very likely away at market, the father working in the fields. Sometimes in the evening stories are told around the fire or pine torch. Games for children are strangely lacking. In the upper classes the home life is much as in the United States.

Food and Drink. Rice and red beans might be called the national foodstuffs. The peasant eats boiled plantains, bananas, yams, cassava and corn, with whatever fruits he can get. He is fond of salt fish or pork. Sugar cane is highly esteemed. My opinion is that the peasant is underfed.

Aside from water, the native uses coffee which is much better than most of that we get. He is also fond of rum which the poorer classes usually get in relatively crude forms under the names of "taffia" (unrefined) and "clairin" (partly refined). Drunkenness is not common either because of the use of rum from childhood or because there is not enough money to get enough rum. Of the rum itself there is no shortage. The wealthier classes drink whatever they like as no "amendment" hinders them.

Clothing. Not being liable to sunburn, the young child is seldom hampered by clothes. More precocious here as elsewhere the girl attains them first. Thereafter it is largely a question of the available supply. Formerly the country women coming to

town are said to have worn blue costumes. Now the costumes are made of any material obtainable. The men are more or less clothed, for exposure of the body is no offense, and the washwoman along the streams are often practically nude. This fact makes the complaint of one paper, that the American doctors made the Haitian women bare their arms to the shoulder that they might vaccinate them, seem a bit ludicrous. Shoes are seldom worn by the peasants, and the white man going about in the rainy season would often like to have the feet of the peasant. The clothing of the peasant does not seem overly clean and yet soap in the form of bars about an inch square and thirteen inches long is one of the articles most frequently imported. Bathing is frequent but whether in waste water or stream seems to make little difference. The wealthier classes draw their styles from Paris and are so insistent on formality that at government receptions the men must wear heavy black dress suits.

The Color Line. At first sight no color line seems to exist in Haiti but closer observation reveals it. True, the blackest man may aspire to any position in the country and, if he has enough force of character, may attain it. True, the country has boasted of the expulsion of the white man and the elimination of the white color from the flag. "Black man with money, mulatto: mulatto with money, white man: white man always white man," runs the local saying. The line can be found. The servant is usually darker than the master. Black men can be found in the highest circles but these circles are decidedly lighter in color than the lower. Low grade foreign whites marry at times into high grade native circles. One native father was surprised when advised to find out something about the American

who would marry his daughter. The idea of investigating the white man had not occurred to him. A citizen came to an American official asking the release of a prisoner. He admitted his friend's guilt but said, "Don't you know he is compelled to work under a black sergeant?" "These girls are praying the Lord every night to send them light-colored children" said a French woman. Two Haitian girls educated in France were dumfounded on return to Haiti to find themselves of mixed parentage. A Haitian woman hearing that the Dominicans were of mixed descent plaintively asked, "Then why do they hate us so?" The color line has found its way into politics and there have been "black" parties opposed to "mulatto" groups. I do not know how much emphasis to give this factor. The Haitian writers who discuss it are not agreed. It may be in part a tacit acceptance of a widely held philosophy that the black is the inferior. I was told of one able Negro who could not marry into the lighter group and who, therefore, refused to marry. It indicates in any case a desire to be accepted on a basis of equality which at times is almost pathetic.

The Upper Class. "What did you expect to find when you came to Haiti, Europe or Africa?" asked a charming gentleman one day. Yankee-like, I asked in return, "If I go out into the hills what will I find?" His reply was a smile. Go into any gathering of the upper class, shut your eyes and listen and you will believe yourself in a cultured European gathering. In bearing and courtesy, in interest and appreciation of art, music and literature, in ability to sing, play, dance or discuss, the American finds that he has no advantage. Their feelings lie a bit nearer the surface than ours and voices break forth in angry discussion or boisterous mirth more quickly but they

as quickly subside. Why should not these things be so? Many of these people, who can afford it, have been educated in Europe and go there whenever possible. Their traditions are European, not African. They know more of foreign language than the corresponding groups of Americans and are more likely to talk in English to you than you are to talk in French to them. Like gentlemen they respond at once to courteous treatment and like gentlemen they resent condescension or overbearing manners. Too often they have received the latter where they had a right to expect the former.

The Two Haities. Geography sometimes misleads us. There are two Haities, not one, though the geographical boundaries are the same. The first is of Africa, for there is little essential difference between rural Haiti and Africa. The second is of Europe. The first is illiterate, the second, educated; one uncouth, the other, polished; two languages, two religions. An African mass struggling to keep itself alive in this physical world; a small handful struggling to attain equality with the civilized world! Where can a more striking contrast be found?

The Slave Tradition. Haiti is suffering from a survival of slavery traditions. The French masters directed; the slaves did the physical labor. When freedom came the leaders, usually mulattoes (though the men of action, the military chiefs, have often been black) tried to carry on the old traditions. Educated Haiti does not like work, nor has it ever learned the dignity thereof. Today your Haitian gentlemen will not carry packages from store to house. Your high-toned Haitian girl will hardly stoop to pick up a handkerchief dropped on street or in church, though she will call a servant to do this. Haiti has no work ideal, and whenever possi-

ble the lower classes follow the example of the upper. You call on Miss A—and are met by the maid of Miss B—who will go one hundred yards to get the maid of Miss A—to have her find out whether Miss A—is in or not, while all the time Miss A—is within call and hears the conversation. The house-owner waits for half an hour for the return of the servant sent to carry a step ladder to the house across the street and finds that the servant has been standing at the gate hoping to find a laborer whom he can hire to return the ladder, for such labor is beneath the dignity of the house servant.

The young man recently given a position as chauffeur at a salary which means comfort to his mother will surrender his position rather than hold the reins of the horse when your wife rides into the yard and finds the yard boy gone. The chauffeur of the machine bringing a friend to get the trunks of an officer and finding only one servant at the house will go a mile to bring up a couple of prisoners with a guard, rather than help carry the trunks. The gentleman in straitened circumstances coming to sell you a few books will arrive empty-handed, and a small boy, hired for the purpose, will come in a few minutes carrying the books. The transaction finished, the former owner of the books will probably depart in a cab for it is not customary for gentlemen to walk in the middle of the day. The only employment, then, befitting the gentleman is clerical or professional labor. To many this means a government position for technical training is not common and in Haiti, as elsewhere, the only place where training and ability are not needed is in government service. Yet work must be done. By whom?

The Masses and the Classes. Haiti won its freedom but in a very real sense traded masters, substituting

mulatto for white. For forty years or more, the rulers had tried various devices of compulsory labor to get the fields cultivated, yet production decreased. They wrote glowingly of agriculture but the state has never done anything for agriculture save to establish a fête and to permit the agriculturist to pay most of the taxes. It puts no tax on the land but it puts a heavy tax on the chief export, coffee, which must be paid by the poor peasant who gathers it. It refuses to tax the manufacture of liquor but it taxes the export of cacao. The burden is all thrown on the poor man. The result of all this is that while there is patriotism in the sense of love of country in the upper classes there is none in the sense of sacrificing self for country nor is there any real appreciation of the basis of public welfare. The country has been governed for the interest of the upper classes.

Public Morality. Haiti has not yet learned that a public office is a public trust. In America we have trouble with individuals who violate this standard, but in Haiti it is expected that the official should “graft” or “faire Calypso” as it is termed. Government offices have been looted by out-going administrations; everything movable in government ships has been carried away. You wonder at the fine houses in Port-au-Prince till you learn the customs. One of the finest was built out of “surplus materials” of the palace; another, from the “remains” of the Cathedral. The negotiation of the sale of a warship to Haiti enabled one official to construct a fine residence. A writer states that 5,000 gourdes was the price for voting in favor of a new constitution and 500 gourdes for a venal contract, and that a deputy who accepted 300 gourdes bragged of his honesty. He adds that one minister demanded 37,000 gourdes for a

house for which only 15,000 had been paid, and when asked for reasons said he had no information to give; whereupon the sum was voted. One woman expressed regrets to a friend of mine that her husband had lost a government position paying \$30 a month, not, as she hastened to add, on account of the \$30 but because the position gave him a chance to make \$1,600 a year. In all matters, then, the legislators have expected their "pots de vin."

The head of one of the oldest business houses assured me that in the old days the real profit came from dodging customs dues; another added through speculation in gourdes. More coffee was always received at Havre than was exported from Haiti. All contracts and franchises had to be arranged and I am told that a corporation, nominally at least, American, gave shares of stock to the family of a high official even after the coming of the marines. An American contractor told me that officials had suggested grafting schemes to him. So it went. Is it any wonder that many Haitians today sincerely believe that American officials must in some way be making extra money out of their positions.

The Wrong Attitude. There are some who will say that all these things are indicative of the capacity of the Negro. Not so, for they have appeared everywhere on earth when similar theories of government have obtained. The fundamental reform needed in Haiti is a change in the attitude of the upper groups.

Government. Barring the short periods when a couple of rulers styled themselves emperors, Haiti has always been a republic. In reality, however, it has always been a military despotism as the thirty-nine military posts would indicate. It has had an ample supply of constitutions from 1805, 1806 (when it was stated that a new and *regenera-*

tive constitution was needed) through the years 1816, 1843, 1846, 1859, 1861, 1867, 1874, 1879, 1889 down to the last in 1918. The "elections" had always been a farce in that they but "elected" the man who had seized the power in his hands as the "saviour of his people." However, as soon as things were settled and the appointments to office made, there were more hungry and dissatisfied people on the outside of the administration than contented within, and the conspiracies started anew. As a rule they did not cause great loss of life or danger and loss to foreigners. One fact in Haitian history not yet adequately explained is why practically all of these revolutions started in the North. The later revolt against the Americans was in the same district. It may be that distance from the Capital has been the chief factor as some have claimed, but others have tried to show that there are differences in the people, in the degree of culture, etc. The first effort of the revolutionist was naturally to get control of the custom houses in order that money might be secured.

The existing organization of the Haitian government is simple. The executive department consists of the President (elected for seven years by the National Assembly, and ineligible for reelection till one term expires) and a cabinet of five members appointed by the President, to wit: Secretaries of "Foreign Relations and Justice," "Interior," "Finance and Commerce," "Public Instruction and Worship," and "Public Works and Agriculture." The republic has two legislative houses: the Chamber of Representatives with ninety-nine members elected by the people and the Senate of thirty-nine members elected by the representatives from lists furnished by the President and the Board of Electors.

The country is divided into five de-

partments in each of which is found a commissar directly appointed by the government and a man of great power for he practically controls all appointments of local officials. Under the departments are the communes, ninety-two in number, each administered by a communal council whose head is called the communal magistrate. The smallest divisions are the sections under a chief of section. The section and communal officials receive very small salaries from local funds arising from sale of market privileges, licenses on business, etc. There is much complaint as to grafting here as well. Practically all local improvements are paid for by the national treasury.

In the judicial system we find at the bottom the justice of peace with a salary of from \$16 to \$20. The courts are the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Cassation (the Supreme Court). The presiding judge is paid \$200 per month, his immediate assistant, \$175, and there are nine judges at \$150 a month.

According to all accounts many of the lower judges are incompetent. As one critic put it, perhaps 30 per cent of the judges know the law and 50 per cent can use it; the rest are worthless. The Haitians themselves have little confidence in the courts. One prominent lawyer said he could win any case for \$1,000. He assumed, of course, that his opponent did not have \$2,000 to spend. Some of the higher judges are able men. Haitian lawyers seem to prefer to settle cases out of court if possible.

Cases in Court. Little dependance is placed on the courts by foreign residents. Let a few cases suffice:

A firm arranged with a local agent to purchase 10,000 pounds of tobacco of a certain quality. Being told that this purchase had been made, it investigated and found a very poor quality,

which it refused to accept. Suit was brought and the court ordered payment for the entire amount, even though it was shown that the agent had only about half of the contracted amount in his warehouse.

A British subject paid a garage man \$53 for repairs on an automobile estimated in advance at \$19. Incidentally he found that garage man was using it without his permission. Disgusted, the owner decided to sell the car. He sold it in eight days. Four months later, the garage man demanded \$25 as commission on sale. When refused he used threats, then presented a bill of \$40 for storage. When this too was refused, he brought suit. The owner was not told when the case was to be heard. On the testimony of the garage man, without hearing the owner, the court gave a verdict of \$40 to the garage man plus 100 gourdes (\$20) for moral damages.

Several thefts occurring in a certain boarding-house, a lieutenant of the Gendarmerie arrested all the servants who could have had access to room from which the money had been taken. One servant practically confessed. Another brought suit for damages, claiming her reputation was injured. It happened that the suit would not lie, being brought against a foreign vice-consul, but the lawyer fully expected to win. The only connection of the vice-consul with the case was that he had lost the money and notified the police.

A provoked American struck a native boy. Suit was brought. The American sent a doctor to examine the boy and the doctor returned a bill of \$500 for services. He accepted \$100 in settlement. The American had two short conferences with a lawyer who returned a bill for \$2,500 but accepted \$650 in settlement. The American did not dare let these bills go be-

fore a native court, yet the lawyer had charged more than he was earning in two years.

One merchant imported shirts of a peculiar pattern not elsewhere on sale. One day a man wearing such a shirt entered the store. Examination at the custom warehouse, where the shipment had been left, revealed the fact that ninety shirts had been stolen. The man could not tell a straight story as to how the shirt had come into his possession. Yet, as there was no direct evidence, he was discharged and started a counter suit for moral damages, which had cost the merchant 1,500 gourdes up to the time I left.

An American firm bought a quality of coffee but examination showed that some of the bags contained stones only. Yet the court ordered payment in full.

Attitude towards Property. In Africa, it is stated, food is tribal and not private property. That is the opinion of the Haitian. The universal story of Haitians and foreigners alike is that foodstuffs (and practically anything else) will be stolen. If you see yellow oranges on a tree in Haiti you may know that they are bitter. No sweet orange ever gets that color on the tree. Gardens must be constantly watched. A Belgian told me that on a banana plantation of his compatriots they got no bananas until several natives opportunely died. The peasant leaving his cabin unguarded must bury or carry with him all his possessions, and even then he fears to find the doors stolen on his return. In town everything must be taken off the porch at night and locked up if it is desired to keep it.

I do not mean to imply that all Haitians are thieves but enough to make property somewhat of a nuisance. There is no danger of your automobile's being stolen, for it cannot be hidden, but it may be used without your knowl-

edge. One friend of mine was ordered to pay \$1,000 for injury done to a woman by his chauffeur, when at the time he had supposed the car was standing in front of his place of business. Such an attitude towards property is a serious handicap to development.

Education. The common statement in Haiti is that from 95 to 97 per cent of the population can neither read nor write. A prominent European resident in Port-au-Prince told me that one day he stopped on the street and pretended to be unable to see the hands on the large clock above. He asked passers-by and not until he had reached the seventeenth, a boy of ten, did he find anyone who could tell him the correct time. The Americans have found teachers who could not sign their names or add sums of money up to thirty gourdes; music teachers, who knew no music and could play no instrument. Here too was graft. Rent was paid for school buildings burned years before; salary to a teacher who admitted not having entered the building in years. Although on paper there is a complete system of schools in the country with attendance obligatory and tuition free, there are no publicly-owned buildings. The schools are scheduled to open in October and close in July. On paper, there are some 900 schools but the enrollment is admittedly only about 40,000, and an American who studied them carefully stated that in 1920 the actual attendance was not more than thirty per cent of this number, say 14,000, with as many more, perhaps, in the schools under the charge of the French Fathers and Sisters. This same investigator reported some 1,300 teachers on the list, the average salary paid primary teachers being about \$7 a month, the actual payments ranging from \$4 to \$15. Some of the town schools are pretty good, although there is a feeling that

they have suffered in recent years. It is admitted that the church schools are by all means the best. The average attendance in the public schools seems to be about ten pupils to each teacher. In Port-au-Prince with a population of 100,000 there are not more than 7,000 pupils.

The condition is deplorable and the worst aspect of it to me is not the poverty of teaching material or the inability with present income to pay living wages or extend the system. But I could find few indications of a genuine and widespread belief in public education. There are highly trained and able men who have come up from the public schools, yet those in power are only too willing to tell the people that they will do the thinking for them, an attitude not unknown even in America. What I mean is that until the dominant group see that they and their country are held back by the ignorance of the masses there is not likely to be a great movement in favor of public education unless some outside stimulus is supplied. Many people now favor the extension of education who do not see any way to get it.

So much for the Haitians as they are. Let us now consider the use made of the country, and its future possibilities.

Ports. There are twelve ports open for foreign commerce. Of these only Port-au-Prince is equipped with a wharf. At the rest, lighters are necessary. Some of the ports are practically open roadsteads, dangerous at times. There are two lighthouses, one at Mole St. Nicholas, the other at Port-au-Prince. As vessels are forbidden to enter or leave before sunrise or after sunset without special permission, this second light has little utility.

Railroads. There exist several stretches of what will be a through road from Cape Haitien to Port-au-

Prince which, when completed, will open up part of the interior. At present the road borders the ocean most of the way and was constructed primarily for military purposes. The line from Cape Haitien runs south some twenty-four miles to Bahun and handles some local business. The second line in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince handles a certain amount of passenger traffic to Leogane but is primarily a cane-carrying road. The future of railroads in such a rough country is very problematical. A short branch serves as a street car line in the Capital.

Roads and Other Communications. Much headway has been made in recent years but there is great need of roads into the interior, as for instance, the upper Artibonite valley. Some system of trails in the hills, modelled perhaps on that in the Philippines, would be of great value for the bulk of the produce is carried on animals. There are thousands of trails now but they are usually in bad condition.

The larger towns have telephone systems and the country is fairly well provided with telegraph and postal service. There is cable connection with Europe and America and inadequate wireless service. Information spreads rapidly from mouth to mouth. Military men tell me that they never make a patrol or inspection without finding themselves expected at the destination.

Steamer Service. Regular passenger service from most of the ports to and from New York is maintained by the Panama line while the French line has a direct steamer to Europe about once a month. A Dutch line has regular cargo boats for Europe. There are many sailing boats about the coast and more or less regular connections to Santiago, Cuba.

Commerce. The chief exports of Haiti are coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar

and dye woods. The chief imports are foodstuffs, cloth, iron and steel, and soap. The figures on main articles for the year ending September 30, 1919, are as follows:

<i>Imports</i>	
Wheat Flour	\$2,708,772
Rice	1,123,658
Meat	191,847
Other foods	1,334,934
Soap	839,756
Cloth	4,789,814
Iron and Steel	731,227
Tobacco	381,844
Liquor, beer and other beverages ..	129,212
Automobiles	70,996
Agricultural implements	32,003

Total \$17,117,608

<i>Exports</i>	
Coffee	\$16,407,233
Cotton (incl. seed)	1,933,576
Cocoa	648,395
Logwood	578,698
Sugar	506,959
Goat skins	369,959
Hides	149,992
Honey	260,565
Castor Beans	231,453
Lignum Vitae	70,825
Mahogany	4,436

Total \$21,460,044

The three chief ports for imports are Port-au-Prince (\$9,597,499), Cape Haitien (\$2,301,909), Cayes (\$1,469,278) or \$13,318,687 of the total; for exports, Port-au-Prince (\$7,450,599), Jacmel (\$3,256,580) and Cape Haitien (\$2,933,689). In 1919 ninety-three per cent of the imports were from the United States, while of the exports forty-four per cent went to the United States and fifty-two per cent to France. To some extent this is an indication of war-time conditions, for Haiti has preferred to trade with France, but in part it is an index of a growing dependence on the United States.

Industries. There are thousands of little booths along the roadsides and

of small shops of all sorts in the towns, and there are many tailors and shoe-makers. "Big business" is largely in the hands of foreigners. At an early period the French seem to have been dominant; in later years, prior to the World War, the control had passed to the Germans. Germans had built the wharf at Port-au-Prince and one of the railroads. These have passed into American hands, nominally at least. American concessionaires had built the other railroad. There were no other American enterprises in the country of any importance. In recent years a plantation company has invested about \$1,250,000, chiefly in the St. Michel Valley. There is a small factory for the extraction of dyes near Cape Haitien and in 1921 a company was formed to grow and can pineapples, also at Cape Haitien. Several Americans have entered business in various towns. There is a cigaret factory at Port-au-Prince. The City National Bank has purchased the Banque Nationale and become the strongest financial undertaking in the country. The American Foreign Banking Corporation tried to get a foothold but found business unprofitable and withdrew in 1921. The Royal Bank of Canada, a strong institution, has several branches in Haiti.

Poverty. From what has been said it must be evident that the Haitians are poor. This is perhaps the first strong impression the visitor gets. Only a poor people will work for twenty cents a day, the prevailing wage today. Only hungry people will pick and deliver coffee for three cents a pound, which is all the peasants got in 1921. One can even understand the reply of the President in days gone by when complaint was made to him that the Haitian coffee brought a low price in Europe because it was so dirty and full of stones: "But we get three cents a

pound export duty, stones and all, do we not, even though you say that one-third is stones?" "Yes." "Then let the old law stand." Need Haiti be so poor?

Agricultural Possibilities. In spite of the dense population of Haiti which is now beginning to overflow into the Dominican Republic, the soil can be made to produce much more than it does today. The hillsides where the rainfall is adequate might be covered with valuable woods and with fruit trees yielding far greater returns to the cultivator than do the few vegetables he grows today. The wonderful mountain scenery, only a few days from New York, might be made very attractive to those seeking to escape our cold winters. The plains have great possibilities which are unrealized today for their soil is rich. The production of sugar, cacao, etc., is only a small fraction of what it might be. Let us examine them a bit.

One who rides out to Cape Haitien over the plain of the North which stretches from the ocean back to the hills, on one of the highest of which are perched the ruins of the famous "Citadel," will find some 70,000 acres of level land. The soil is of humus and black clay to a depth of twelve to fourteen inches, with subsoil of mixed clay and sand to the water-table at ten feet. There are no stony outcrops. The soil is suitable for cane, pineapples, etc. Yet today it is largely overgrown with woods. Agriculture is possible without irrigation but there are three small streams flowing through the plain. Everywhere the tourist sees ruins of old gateways and stone walls encircling acres of land. He rides down a muddy path in the centre of what was once a wide avenue. He crosses brick culverts built perhaps one hundred and fifty years ago. Before long he realizes that this must at one time have

been a garden spot, and such it was, for here was the centre of the old French culture and from here went enormous quantities of sugar, 24,000 tons in 1796. Probably there are not more than 500 acres of cane here now and practically none has been grown for a century.

The second plain is on the west coast, the Artibonite, between Gonaives and St. Marc with some 20,000 acres of level land. Here the country looks like Arizona. The Artibonite twenty-five miles from the mouth is running about a billion gallons of water every twenty-four hours, entirely unused. Here the problem is difficult for the Artibonite will be hard to dam. It is here the French once installed what appear to have been the first steam pumps in the new world and I am told their remains are still to be found.

About seventeen miles north of Port-au-Prince, the plain of "Arcahaie" stretches some twenty miles along the coast with a width of from two to five miles, some 30,000 acres. This has been under cultivation for a century. There are now some 5,000 acres of cane, 8,000 of plantains and 3,000 of minor fruits. The soil is easily worked but is depleted. There are five small streams, four of which were used by the French for irrigation. The works have not been kept up.

Just between Port-au-Prince and Lake Saumatre lies the plain known as the "Cul-de-Sac," containing some 96,000 acres of which 70,000 are adapted to cane, the balance being mostly low marshes of which 10,000 acres are valuable for pasture in dry seasons. This was entirely cultivated by the French but today 30,000 acres are wooded. By the proper development of irrigation projects, for the rainfall is inadequate here, it is believed that 1,260,000 tons of cane could be grown on this plain. Just west of Port-au-Prince

is the little plain of "Carrefour" of 1,700 acres, 1,200 suitable for cane. Three thousand tons of cane is the estimate of possible production.

A little further west is the plain of "Leogane" with dark rich soil which reminds one of the Mississippi Valley. It contains some 20,000 acres, all good cane ground, with an estimated possibility of 350,000 tons. There is a good deal of cane here but it does not seem to be well cared for, the production seeming to average about ten tons an acre.

On the south shore is the plain of "Cayes," rich soil of some 150,000 acres of which perhaps 10,000 are now in cane. Here the rainfall is some seventy-five inches and irrigation is unnecessary. Within sight of the town of Cayes is the little island, Ile de Vache, with a central plain of some 8,000 acres on part of which cane might be grown, though it is used for grazing land today.

The French in 1791 with 792 mills produced 163,500,000 pounds of sugar.

From the revolution down to 1919 no sugar was exported. In the year 1919-20, 8,798,877 pounds were exported—the product of one American-owned mill.

Haiti's Need. This summary indicates that there are great opportunities in Haiti, if. Now what is this "if"? Primarily, stable government. This is, of course, not the sole factor, but it is one great fundamental which Haiti has lacked. So far as I can learn, it has never been the practice for either Haitians or foreigners to invest their capital in Haiti in any enterprise not under their immediate control. In large measure this has been due to the many uncertainties surrounding property. If there is to be a solid and substantial development in Haiti some way must be found to induce the residents to make investments at home and thus to gain a personal interest in the use of the land, the organization of the markets, and all the other essentials of communal welfare.

CHAPTER II

The Military Intervention

ALTHOUGH the United States had always respected and upheld the independence of Haiti, it became increasingly worried over the situation after 1900. Sam, Alexis and Simon were overthrown and exiled; Leconte was blown up with the palace; Auguste was poisoned; Oreste and Zamor were exiled and the latter killed on his return—all between 1900 and 1915 when Guillaume was killed. Haiti was heavily indebted to French and German bondholders, and, to a lesser extent, to English. These countries were beginning to send representatives

with reference to collection and once or twice money had been collected by force. Moreover after 1912, there came to the State Department evidence that Germany was talking to Haiti about a loan of \$2,000,000 to be secured by certain port rights, control of customs, and rights in a coaling station at Mole St. Nicholas. All of this seems to have happened without the knowledge of the American Minister to Haiti, a man who had had no previous diplomatic experience. Germany denied the charge but added to her denial made in 1914, the state-

ment: "The German Government has joined with other European governments in representing to Washington that the interests of European countries in Haiti are so large that no scheme of reorganization or control can be regarded as acceptable unless it is undertaken under international auspices." This challenge to the Monroe Doctrine could not be ignored. Moreover the incessant revolutions in Haiti were producing a state of anarchy.

During the six months' rule of Zamor in 1914 it was rumored in Haiti that Washington was negotiating with him and the report was used against him. In October, 1914, the Haitian Senate passed the following resolution: "The Senate, after hearing the denial of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the existence of negotiations between the National Administration and the government of the United States, declares its satisfaction with his explanation and condemns any kind of treaty." On November 7, 1914, Theodore replaced Zamor as president, and early in December the American Minister (then Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, who for a generation had been secretary of our legation in Paris and knew French perfectly) made certain proposals with reference to the control of the custom houses and on December 10, 1914, submitted a project for a convention. On December 15 this was peremptorily refused and the matter was dropped with the statement that the United States "was actuated entirely by a disinterested desire to give assistance."

By March, 1915, Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was president of Haiti and a commission of two men from Washington arrived, claiming to be agents of President Wilson. Their powers were challenged and they soon left. In May, Mr. Paul Fuller, Jr., was sent to Haiti with the title of Envoy Extraordinary.

On May 22 he submitted a proposal covering the following points:

(1) The United States will protect Haiti against all foreign attack.

(2) The United States will assist Haiti to suppress insurrection by the use of all forces needed.

(3) Haiti agrees not to sell or lease Mole St. Nicholas in any way to any foreign government or the nationals thereof.

(4) Haiti agrees to enter into arbitration agreement for settlement of foreign claims.

To this the Haitian Government replied on June 4, 1915, accepting clauses 1, 3, 4, and adding a fifth to the effect that in case of disagreement with reference to this convention the difficulty should be submitted to the Hague. Clause 2 was changed to read that the United States would facilitate the entrance of capital to Haiti for business purposes, would aid in unifying the debt, in modifying custom guaranties, and in establishing monetary reforms. To accomplish these ends Haiti would employ only trustworthy men in the customs' service and would organize a rural mounted constabulary. If necessary, after consultation between the two governments, American troops might be employed to suppress insurrection in Haiti to "be retired from Haitian territory at the first request of constitutional authority." After exchange of notes Mr. Fuller left on June 5 and further discussion was prevented by another revolution.

Arrival of the Marines. Cape Haitien being threatened by a revolutionary army, marines were landed on June 15, 1915, from the French cruiser, *Descartes*, of the allied patrol fleet. This action forced the hands of the United States, which seems to have had no thought, let alone plan, of active intervention. In July, American marines landed in Cape Haitien from *U. S. S.*

Washington and *U. S. S. Eagle*. The latter was left at the Cape, and on July 26, 1915, the *Washington* sailed for Port-au-Prince. The next day 160 or more political prisoners, including members of many prominent families, were murdered by order of the president, who took refuge in the French legation. The official immediately responsible for the massacre was taken from the Dominican legation and killed. The English and French representatives cabled for warships. On July 28 the president was dragged from the French legation and cut to pieces. Rear Admiral Caperton at once landed marines from the *Washington* and *U. S. S. Jason* was ordered to bring all available men from Guantanamo. Possession of the city was taken with little opposition. On July 30 the French cruiser, *Descartes*, arrived and landed a legation guard. On August 12 Dartiguenave was elected president. On August 16, at the request of the State Department, Admiral Caperton was ordered to take charge of the custom houses and to use the receipts for organizing a constabulary, for public works, for the aid of discharged soldiers and relief of the starving populace, and for the support of the Dartiguenave government. This was done against the protests of the Haitian Government.

A large part of the people were well pleased with the advent of the Americans, but many politicians who saw their plans checkmated were, and have continued to be, antagonistic. Bands of "cacos," the local term for revolutionary bandits, which also included all sorts of lawless and criminal gentry, roamed the hills and offered opposition to the Americans wherever possible. It should not be forgotten that these men lived by theft and robbery, as a rule doing no work, and that the poor peasants of the hills have

suffered the most through loss of stock and crops. In some sections practically all the domestic animals were killed or stolen. The suppression of these bandits was a slow process and the last of the bands was not broken up till the summer of 1921. These troubles have all been in the north central and eastern sections of the country; the whole southwestern peninsula has been quiet almost from the first.

In attempting to judge of what has been accomplished certain facts must be kept in mind. Here is a country where a small number of intelligent, educated and sometimes unscrupulous men control a great mass of ignorant peasants. It is a country where the tradition of having overthrown the flower of the French army still survives and where orators still boast of their ability to overcome any invader, a land where the simple peasants still believe that they can be rendered immune from bullets by charms. The caco leader, Benoit, carried a book of charms with him and yet evidently was a bit skeptical for when urged, only a couple of days before his death, to surrender, he said he did not dare to for his followers would kill him if he admitted his inability to win out. Given the conditions of the country which make life easy and capture difficult it is clear that the suppression of opposition is difficult. So the Haitian presidents have always found.

The fact is, then, that a large percentage of leading Haitians were thoroughly despondent over the situation and were ready to welcome any force that promised to give them peace and order. They fully expected that the Americans would take complete control and work order out of chaos. In fact they expected the impossible. When, for reasons we shall consider elsewhere, the new day did not come promptly and in all its glory, they lost

faith both in the ability and the sincerity of the Americans. There were plenty of persons shrewd enough to capitalize this natural reaction to their own advantage and to foment an antagonism which is by no means as great as it appears. Let us now return to the main course of events as they affect the military forces.

The Corvée System. Within a year from the arrival of the marines the country was quiet save for sporadic outbreaks of cacos, and the year 1917 was relatively uneventful. In the effort to suppress these bandits one of the greatest difficulties was presented by the lack of roads. General Butler, in 1917, revived a law, dating from 1865, requiring citizens to work on local roads and thus initiated the corvée system. The execution of this law and the general supervision of the road-work was turned over to the Gendarmerie. Prominent American residents of Haiti have told me that they advised against this system but were met with the answer that it was a military necessity. At first there was little opposition. The communities were glad to have roads and coöperated. Soon, however, discontent arose. Instead of working near their homes, men were being taken, sometimes driven manacled under charge of Haitian gendarmes, several days' journey on foot from their homes. It is alleged that in some places no shelters were provided. The Americans made provision for food but later it was discovered that the natives in charge did not give it to the men or did not turn over more than a small part of the money allotted for food. In practice, too, the local head, known as the "Chef de Section," whenever called on for men sent whom he pleased, even destroying the cards showing that given individuals had done their share. He thus favored his friends and punished his enemies.

Some individuals worked two or three months instead of the two weeks theoretically required. Many, naturally enough, took to the hills.

In other cases the mistaken zeal of Americans fomented opposition. An American tells me that one day he was riding with a major and a lieutenant. The major criticised the lieutenant because the men were not working on the roads. The latter replied that it was the planting season and that he had given the men two weeks on their promise to return at the end of that time to the road work. The major objected, saying that he would be held to blame, and insisted that the men be called out at once. The lieutenant refused to break his promise and so was transferred and replaced. This was the beginning of trouble in that neighborhood.

Where the men were tactfully handled and fairly treated, different results were secured. Captain B — who had charge of the section between St. Marc and Pilboro Mountain not only finished it but, when ordered to go on to the next section, carried some 800 men as volunteers with him. He managed things so that each gang of thirty men had a cook. A regular diet with meat once a day was provided and the men were paid two gourdes (40c) a week. Captain B — lived with the men and was the only white man with them. He had as high as 8,000 men working under him. The men worked about ten hours a day, work stopping at noon on Saturdays. In the south near Cayes the work was so managed that local merchants contributed considerable money and after the stop order was issued there was a petition that the work be continued. Elsewhere there seems to have been some graft by gendarmes and local officials who let men off on payment of bribes.

It was not the system itself, then,

but the way it was handled that seems to have been at fault. As one priest put it, the worst feature was that it gave the unscrupulous leader the chance to tell the natives that the whites were trying to reintroduce slavery, and that it made the men afraid to come to the towns lest they be seized. So great was the outcry that it was stopped on October 1, 1918. At this time there were no marines in the interior and the commander of the north either permitted or ordered the corvee continued in the Hinche-Maissade district. The facts were discovered by chance, the corvee stopped and the court-martial of the commander advised, but in some way he seems to have escaped. I was told by — that in his presence General — called this man a murderer and a liar and unfit to be in the service but added that for the good name of the Marine Corps he would have him transferred. When it became known that the corvee had been ordered stopped, the antagonism against its continuance is easily understood. Well-informed men have told me that it would have been an easy matter to have got all the men needed for a small payment and that the total cost to the United States would have been vastly less than that of the suppression of the rebellion which was occasioned, though not wholly caused, by the system. In my opinion this was the greatest mistake made by the Marine Corps in Haiti. It should be added that the law itself has not been repealed and that American officers since have been able to get much work done on local roads by appealing to local pride and self-interest.

After January 1, 1919, there was a great increase in caco activity which compelled the establishment of garrisons of marine in the interior, the constant patrolling of the country and many armed encounters with consid-

erable loss of life. It happened, of course, that the men fomenting this activity, and to some extent directing it, supplying arms and ammunition at times, etc., were safe and sound in Port-au-Prince and the Cape. The number of marines in the country was increased from about one thousand to over two thousand and has since been kept at the latter figure. After the foolish and futile attack on Port-au-Prince early in 1920, when the leaders seem to have expected a mass uprising of the people, organized warfare decreased and it became a problem of protecting isolated hamlets against the attack of cacos for, I repeat, the chief sufferers have been the Haitian peasants. Patrols are now maintained largely to give confidence to the people, for the bandits are gone. So quiet and law-abiding are the people that I would not hesitate to go anywhere in Haiti at any time and unarmed. It may be said, then, that at the present time there is no military problem whatever in Haiti, but there is and will continue to be a police problem. It should not be forgotten, however, that only the presence of the marines makes possible the continuance in office of the president and the peaceful functioning of the government. In this connection, let me add that the bills for the Marine Corps are all being paid by the citizens of the United States, not, as many Haitians believe, and as some American writers have intimated, by the Haitian Government.

Gendarmerie. One of the first efforts of the Marine Corps was to establish a Gendarmerie of Haitians, officered at first by Americans with the plan of gradually replacing these by competent Haitians. On July 1, 1921, there were 2,532 gendarmes officered by 16 Haitians and 122 Americans. Four of the Haitians were first lieutenants and it was expected that three others

would soon be advanced to that rank. Privates in the Gendarmerie are paid \$10 per month; corporals, \$15; sergeants, \$20; first sergeants, \$25; all in addition to 15c a day allowance for rations and lodging. The total cost to the country per year is upwards of \$1,000,000. The Americans are drawn almost exclusively from the Marine Corps. To secure good men and hold them it is provided that in addition to their pay from the United States, the Haitian Government should add sums which run from \$250 per month for colonels, \$150 for captains, to \$39 for second lieutenants. The United States Congress passed a special act to allow the men to accept this service. An officer, providing his own car, as many do, is allowed thirty gallons of gas a month and may bring his car in duty free, but has to pay this duty if he sells the car outside of service ranks. As a rule a man occupies one rank higher in the Gendarmerie than he holds in the Marine Corps. This force is scattered in all the communities and rural districts of the country. It is uniformed, the suits being made in the prisons, and is the police force of the nation replacing the old army which was disbanded at the time of the Occupation. It gives great promise of future usefulness.

The Haitians complain that the pay given them is so small that the best grade of men will not enlist and that many cacos and other unfit men are enrolled; also that many incompetent Americans have been appointed. There is a measure of truth in the claims. Yet the pay is not small judged by Haitian resources and compares favorably with that available elsewhere. Many mistakes in appointments have been made but there is a steady weeding out of the unfit. Promotions of Haitians have been slower than many of the American organizers had ex-

pected, but, on the other hand, it has been hard to find Haitians whose standards approached those expected by the Americans. It will take a long time to dislodge the belief that office is to be made a source of personal revenue, and it is difficult to prevent abuse of power. Some of the marines advanced from the ranks to become lieutenants in the Gendarmerie lacked the necessary tact and executive capacity and some of the commissioned men lacked the proper personality. Again some curious errors have been made in Washington. I recall that one captain in the Gendarmerie with a long service record in the Marine Corps, who had been a splendid success and received high praise from his commanding officers, was reduced to the ranks and practically driven out of service by the "plucking board" at Washington, while a lieutenant under him, who chanced to have been sent to France while the captain was kept in Haiti, was given a permanent berth.

On the whole, my impressions of the Americans are very favorable. While there are a few sinecures for the men in a couple of large towns the average officer in little rural communities, living in what we would call a shack, isolated from all white society and deprived of all opportunities for amusement, deserves great credit for his work. Such men are often petty kings and it is to be expected that they fail at times. The evident esteem paid most of them by the natives and the answer one gets if he suggests replacing them by native officers, is sufficient reply to the criticisms. It will be a long time before they can be replaced to advantage. At first the Gendarmerie had various duties but now it is almost wholly limited to police work. The danger that I see is that it may be thought of as a military force whereas it should be a civil force comparable to the mounted

police of Pennsylvania and under *civil* control.

Prisons. Great complaint has been made of the prisons which are under the control of the Gendarmerie. I visited most of them and found them about the cleanest buildings on the island. As buildings they are not very satisfactory but no just complaint can be made as to the way they are kept. Every reliable witness I saw says that they are vastly better now than in the old days. Formerly though the government was supposed to allow ten cents a day for food, little of the money ever reached the prisoners who depended on their families or on alms for practically all they had. The prisons are said to have been extremely filthy as well. The total prison population averages about 2,000 a day. In May, 1921, there were 4,179 inmates. During the year 1920 there were 30,393 prisoners and 1,497 deaths. During the first six months of 1921 there were 9,842 prisoners admitted and 229 deaths. I examined the charts of prison population and found an average of from 40 to 50 deaths a month; but during the summers of 1919 and 1920 the deaths rose to about 68 a month. The chief causes of death were tuberculosis, prison edema (probably beri-beri), pneumonia and smallpox. The epidemic of edema had given the officials grave concern. Though the diet was known to be adequate it was modified and the officials hoped the problem was solved. When one sees the condition of inmates on arrival he does not wonder at a high death rate. I am fairly familiar with institution problems and have no criticism to offer of the way in which the prisons are conducted. The inmates are better cared for than are the great mass of Haitian peasants.

Martial Law. Beginning September 3, 1915, martial law was proclaimed at

Port-au-Prince and was gradually extended to cover the country. Provost courts were established and the press prohibited from criticising the Haitian Government or the Occupation. It was the intention of the Occupation to interfere as little as possible with local institutions but it felt it could not trust the courts. As a matter of fact the provost courts seem to have awakened little antagonism though there is some criticism that their sentences were severe. The Occupation issued an order that no rum was to be sold to marines. This order was, and is, frequently disregarded. In November, 1919, some marines sent a Haitian boy to the store of one Mangones, to buy rum for them. Mangones sold the rum and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment at hard labor. He claimed not to know for whom it was intended and is said to have secured his release through the intervention of the French consul. On September 15, 1920, the provost courts were ordered to sit "only for trial of offenses that are beyond doubt inimical to the United States or a violation of custom laws." That there was some reason for the earlier doubt was shown in the spring of 1921 when a native court freed a customs collector at Ouanaminté who had stolen some \$5,000.

Freedom of the Press. In pre-Occupation days no paper dared criticize the government unless it could get ample protection and editors were often arrested and papers seized. The establishment of a censorship, therefore, had little real effect on their activities but it gave a chance for an argument that might appeal to Americans at home. The star case was the arrest and imprisonment of Henri Chauvet, the editor of *Le Nouvelliste*, the most prominent paper of Port-au-Prince, for publishing on November 22, 1918 an announcement of the impending recall

of the financial adviser, Mr. Ruan. This case was brought to the attention of the State Department which upheld the court. The amusing thing is that the guess was true.

The fact is that M. Chauvet was punished because he violated an explicit order of the Occupation and in such case we can hardly criticize the court, whatever our opinion as to the scope of the original order. Later on the press restrictions were removed and in 1921 there began a great campaign of abuse and vilification of everything American and of the Dartiguenave government which would never have been tolerated by any previous Haitian régime. The president became much alarmed for his own safety. It was useless to take matters to the courts. The best people and some of the editors did not believe in it but were forced to keep silent or go along lest they be condemned as traitors. One of the leading officials wrote:

You will readily understand the position I have taken when you are made aware that the majority of the judges being opposed to the existing state of things, the government cannot, until the magistracy has been reformed, obtain from them the collaboration necessary to a good administration of justice. From a spirit of contradiction they will always condemn when a case is before them if they believe that those are the occasions in which they can hurt the government or the Occupation. In the same spirit, they, on the contrary, acquit murderers and robbers under the pretext that the prison régime is too severe under the control of the Gendarmerie, meaning in reality under the control of the Occupation.

On May 26, 1921 the following order was issued:

While the freedom of the press and of speech are practically unrestricted, articles or speeches that are of an incendiary nature or reflect adversely upon the United States forces in Haiti, or tend to stir up an agita-

tion against the United States officials who are aiding and supporting the constitutional government of Haiti, or articles or speeches attacking the President of Haiti or the Haitian Government are prohibited and offenders against this order will be brought to trial before a military tribunal.

For this action the commanding officer was thanked by the Haitian president. This was immediately tested by one of the papers which published an article with damaging words replaced by blanks. The editor was arrested and his lawyer tried to convince the court that only the Lord himself could know what the blanks represented. The court thought otherwise and a small penalty was imposed as a warning.

Public Works. Another source of irritation in connection with the Occupation was the taking over by the military officials of most of the public works, which remained in their hands practically till the end of 1917. Even after civilian Americans had been appointed in accordance with the Convention there was seemingly great unwillingness to turn over the control. It is difficult for the civilian to get at the exact situation which led to some of these moves or to pass judgment upon their wisdom. Beyond doubt they caused considerable irritation. For instance, the control of the ice-plant at Port-au-Prince, a German-owned enterprise, was taken over and as there was a shortage of ammonia during the War, all the ice for a time was taken for the hospitals, etc., and for the Occupation. Thus officers' families were supplied while American civilians as well as Haitians went without.

It was the Occupation as well which forced Haiti to take action against Germany and to sequester German property. That there was some reason for this action is clear when we remem-

ber that the Germans had large control over the business interests of the country. The point I wish to make is that such action would probably not have been taken by the Haitians, into whose prominent families many of the Germans had married.

The Marine Corps. A word is needed as to the personnel of the Marine Corps. The old standards of the Corp were high, both as regards men and officers. At first the Haitian clubs were opened to the officers, who attended the balls and parties, danced with the girls, and to all appearances enjoyed themselves. When the families, prohibited at first, began to arrive, not only did an American social group grow up, centering in the American Club, but a line of social cleavage was created because of the color prejudice. It must be confessed that not all of the Americans treated the natives with due respect and this attitude was resented, naturally enough. Moreover, it was galling to the Haitians to see Americans who had never had a servant at home putting on airs, raising the price of house rents by bidding for desirable houses, riding in automobiles on which they paid no duty and burning gas which they could buy at a little over twenty cents a gallon, while the civilian, native or foreign, was paying from seventy to eighty. Unfortunately, drunkenness was not unknown even on the part of high officials and their wives, while local standards were shocked by the sight of women in automobiles smoking in public. Although such things were infrequent, every incident was told and retold and helped to confirm the suspicion that little help could be expected.

While I saw no American official in the Cercle Bellevue in Port-au-Prince, at Cape Haitien the earlier relations existed in large measure. During the War, with the necessity of sending men

to France, many privates were made officers, particularly in the Gendarmerie. This caused much complaint, whatever the merits thereof. With the close of the War there came the enlistment of a group of young boys of decidedly inferior type to the older men. Both officers and older men commented on this and criticized the Washington government for sending such material to Haiti. This group is being weeded out and the later arrivals are of better stamp. It gives me pleasure to add that with very few exceptions I was very much pleased with the men I met, both officers and enlisted men.

To complete the picture I should add a word as to the location of the marines. Headquarters are at Port-au-Prince and here is stationed the largest body of men. There is a training camp at Mirabelais, thirty-two miles to the northeast, a camp at Las Cahobas, seventeen miles to the east, twenty miles north another company at Thomme. Further north companies are found at Hinche and Maissade, while the headquarters of the north are at Cape Haitien. In this way a large percentage of the men are kept out of the big cities and the average Haitian sees few marines save those with the Gendarmerie.

Atrocities. It has been necessary to give this outline of the history and policies of the Marine Corps before considering the charges of cruelty brought against the marines. There is no charge that any policy of deliberate cruelty has been adopted. All complaints are against individuals. Rumor is common; evidence is rare. The cases fall into several more or less clearly distinct types:

1. Drunkenness and accompanying disorders. Relatively common. The Commanding Officer told me that 90 per cent of his troubles with the men

were due to alcohol. Such disturbances have seldom been the cause of much actual abuse, but have led to fights. In some cases natives unwilling to furnish alcohol have been threatened by marines with guns. One such case came under my personal observation. In this, as in most others where facts became known, the guilty party was summarily and severely punished.

2. Sexual Assaults. Such have been perpetrated just as they were in France by Americans as well as by Germans. I chanced to be present when the first complaint in a case of rape of a young girl of ten or eleven was presented. In this case the man was proved guilty, later admitted guilt and pleaded insanity: he was sentenced to *fifty-one* years imprisonment on the combined counts. Severe punishment has always been meted out to such offenders.

3. Third degree methods to secure evidence. Admitted. The third degree is far from unknown either in Europe or America. To a considerable extent it must be admitted as justifiable under field conditions. That it can be abused and doubtless has been is evident, but it cannot be judged by parlor standards. It is amusing to find one American civilian taken on a patrol in Haiti becoming so exasperated at the obvious lies of a woman that he urged the officer in charge to more severe measures and then came home to write up the incident as an illustration of the cruelty of the marines, forgetting to tell his own part in the performance. Where life is involved human passions run high.

4. Deliberate striking, shooting, etc., of escaping prisoners and others. Such things seem to have occurred in some cases. Let a couple of illustrations suffice: A white man riding one day with Captain — saw him spur his horse between two women on way to market, knocking them down and

scattering their wares over the road. Then he rode off laughing. It is not surprising to find this man one of the six or seven officers generally accused of being guilty of criminal attacks. An American told me that an officer out after cacos met five men at a certain place, two of whom were in his, my informant's, employ. He asked them where the cacos were; through fear or ignorance they failed to answer. The officer then shot them all and on his return reported that he had been attacked by 150 cacos and had killed 5 of them. My informant may be wrong but he is sincere in his belief.

I fear we must admit that such things have happened. That is the belief of the best informed men I have met both in and out of the service, Haitians, Americans and Europeans. As a matter of fact, much as we may regret it, every well-informed man knows that they are to be expected. The real question is whether they were abnormally common and whether, when proved guilty, the offenders were punished. Prominent Haitians, French priests and other reliable persons have told me that these acts of cruelty were extremely rare and that more offenses would have occurred, by Haitians on Haitians, had there been no intervention. I fear that the emphasis laid on cruelty is because of the influence it may have in the United States rather than because of sympathy for the victims.

As regards the second point, I think the officials did not let the Haitians know the extent to which men were punished for offenses. The Haitians got the impression that guilty men were shielded. This I do not believe though it is possible that some cases were not investigated with sufficient care. I regret that more searching inquiry was not made in connection with the few officers accused.

The marines themselves are to blame

for some of the criticism heaped upon them. A certain type of man likes to brag of his exploits and of his wickedness. There has been a lot of this kind of thing where the basis of fact was extremely small. Certain investigators have been deceived in similar fashion. Some ex-service men seem to have tried to capitalize their alleged repentance. As I went about the country I tried to observe the attitude of the natives towards the marines. Nowhere did I detect signs of fear or of desire for revenge. On the contrary there was a feeling of respect, often of friendliness.

On the whole I feel that the men in the Marine Corps deserve our respect. We are too ready to believe that they change their character when away from home and among people of different color. I am not trying to dodge responsibility or shield crooks, but to

keep a balance in my verdict. We did much for the boys in France but absolutely nothing for those in Haiti. The fact is that there were many more acts of kindness than of cruelty. The good things have not been advertised to the world. Day after day I have talked with officers and men who are bending all their energies towards helping the Haitians. I have seen peasants going out of their way to call on and bring presents to men who had been stationed in their communities. The opposition to the marines is not all genuine and disinterested. The thief and grafter do not like interference. I suspect that behind all surface explanations lies the resentment against the uniform, the symbol of an outside force preserving order, the reflection upon the inability to control self, which hurts the Haitian's self-esteem. Here is the crux of the situation.

CHAPTER III

The Civil Side of the Intervention

IMMEDIATELY after the election of President Dartiguenave on August 12, 1915, steps were taken to secure a Convention which was signed in Haiti, September 16, ratified by the Chamber of Deputies, October 6, and by the Senate, November 11, 1915. Owing to delay in Washington the exchange of ratifications did not take place till May 3, 1916. In the interim, practical control of Haiti, of government funds and of municipal administration, was in the hands of the Occupation. Since that time the functions of the military have been reduced until now it does little more than "sit on the lid" and preserve order.

The Convention (which is printed in full at the end of this chapter) established a financial protectorate over

Haiti; it introduced a Financial Adviser of rather unique powers inasmuch as the Haitian Government agreed to put his suggestions into effect, and yet left the questions as to whom he was immediately responsible, and under what conditions he might be removed, vague, to say the least.

This treaty met with much opposition in Haiti but attracted no attention in the United States. Its intention is evident from its text and was plainly understood both by Haitians and Americans. The Haitians were so despondent over their situation and the future seemed so dark that they were willing to accept the help and protection of the United States, the sincerity of whose intentions they did not question, on any terms demanded. Natu-

rally they wanted as little interference with the local government as possible. It is also possible that they thought that later they might evade some of the promises made.

Subsequently some one, the military authorities get the credit, felt that control of telegraphs, telephones, light-house service, and postal service should be in American hands and a nasty dispute arose. In August, 1916, it was agreed that "the operation, management and maintenance of the telegraphs and telephones" should be put under the charge of the engineers nominated by the President of the United States. There have been other difficulties over the postal service and with reference to public education and control of municipal revenues.

The President. President Dartiguenave, taking office in August, 1915, elected for a period of seven years, at once found his position extremely difficult. He was desirous of pleasing the Americans, yet jealous of the rights of the Haitian Government. Many of the steps he took are sharply condemned as illegal by some Haitians, defended by others. Putting the worst possible construction on them, we find they are exactly what all other Haitian presidents have done. There has never been a free and untrammelled expression of public opinion. The group with longest purses and heaviest arms has always won, and the wishes of the governments have been accepted unless the opponents were strong enough to overthrow them. But rebels now had to deal with the American marines and the prospect was not alluring. Dartiguenave then remodeled the government somewhat. He proposed a new constitution which was adopted by popular vote and promulgated June 18, 1918.

The principal new features of this constitution are the land law, men-

tioned elsewhere, and a special article which ratifies the acts of the United States Government during the Occupation; protects Haitians from prosecution because of obedience to the orders of the Occupation; provides that acts of the court martials shall not be subject to revision, but without destroying the right to pardon; and ratifies the acts of the Haitian Government up to the time of promulgation. This constitution was rejected by the chambers and it is freely charged in Haiti that this action was brought about by money supplied by a few men with German connections.

At the time there was no criticism of the way the election of Dartiguenave was managed but latterly it has become the fashion to make all sorts of accusations against it. No proof has been offered so far as I know and the French priests who would have known the facts smile at the charges. Under Dartiguenave, the chambers have been dissolved and the government is carried on by the executive with a council of ministers. The President's enemies make much of this. The truth seems to be that Dartiguenave has done very well in a very trying position. He is a cultured man of long political experience. He has a keen appreciation of the dignity of his position. At times he has not been as strong perhaps as desirable, but he has reason to fear for his safety should any chance remove the Americans.

The first of the treaty officials arrived in Haiti in July, 1916. It is impossible to try to trace the history since in detail but a few points may be mentioned.

Receiver General. The Receiver General deserves much credit for the work of his office. His administration has been honest and efficient. Smuggling, avoidance of payment of customs, etc., formerly prevalent, have been

reduced to the vanishing point. He has enforced the law without fear or favor and has naturally made enemies. He is handicapped by having to administer an antiquated tariff schedule which the government has refused to change. Duties are figured in part in American money, in part in Haitian, both ad valorem and specific, and the figuring of duties is involved and tedious. The law requires absurd details as to invoices and fines for violation are frequent. He is criticized for having introduced non-Haitians in too great numbers. The business houses criticize him for the stringent application of the law in such fashion as to increase immediate returns, perhaps, but to check the future development of business. For instance the older custom seems to have been to charge duties on the basis of the metric pound of 500 gr., but the Receiver General states that the Haitian law prescribes the French pound of 489.50 gr., and charges accordingly. It is claimed that his office attempted to collect an extra duty on the five-gallon gasoline containers, asserting that they had a local market value of 20c, also on glass tumblers in which jellies were shipped.

Trade Handicaps. To show some of the handicaps under which merchants labor and to illustrate the need of change in the laws, not to criticize the present administration, I mention the following:

On two American scales for weights of 1,200 pounds the duty collected was 20 per cent ad valorem, or \$33, where the official schedule seems to call for a fixed duty of \$2.

Machines for agriculture or the preparation of the products of the country are duty free, but a merchant was forced to pay on an engine for running cotton press and coffee sorters 20 per cent ad valorem or \$355.21 in gold and 702.17 gourdes.

Any imported article sent abroad for repairs must pay an ad valorem duty on the repairs which may be greater than original duty on article.

One firm had to pay \$124.71 in gold and 277.11 gourdes for merchandise billed but never received. By the ruling of the department such goods delivered later must pay duty a second time, unless found in a Haitian port.

Fines have been paid in such cases as the following:

Because consular invoice did not state whether the woolen hats were for men or youths.

Because invoice did not say whether handkerchiefs were for head or pocket.

\$27.50 paid in duty on mixed candy instead of regular duty of \$3.31 due to mis-translation on invoice of the word candy as "confiture" instead of "bonbons."

Fine paid on padlocks because invoice did not state that they were of iron.

On lead pencils because invoice did not state "office."

On hosiery because invoice did not say they were for women.

On ink because color black was not stated.

Yet in each of these cases the declaration is said to have contained all the details required by the tariff.

There has been much trouble because of the custom of assimilating articles not specifically mentioned with those they most resemble and charging appropriate duty. It is claimed that the present administration has managed to change assimilations to increase cost. Thus the cloth known as "Prescott stripes" formerly put with nan-kinette is now put with "drill" with an increase of 100 per cent in duty. Italian colored cotton drill, formerly put with "drill," now is classified with "Toile de Vichy" and "Bazin" with an increase of 25 or 50 per cent in duty. Automobiles, formerly classified with vehicles, are now put on an ad valorem

basis with great increase in duty. Perhaps the funniest case is that of grape juice which, first imported some fifteen years ago and classified with wine, by the present administration was first taxed ad valorem, then as aerated water, and now as cider, resulting in a duty increase of 50 per cent and the stopping of the importation.

Similar complaints are made in great number by merchants all over the country. The importer is likely to feel that the lower rate should always apply; the executive is tempted in the other direction. Wise legislation should remove the uncertainty.

Financial Adviser. Two men have filled the position of Financial Adviser. Whatever their qualifications they have not impressed the Haitians favorably. The present Adviser has been absent from Haiti continuously for almost a year, drawing his salary and per diem expenses of \$15. That this should have been permitted is a reflection on the United States. It is obvious that his recommendations have not been accepted and the Haitians simply refuse to deal with him. One thing is certain and that is that one of the main purposes of the Convention, the determination of the validity of the internal debts, etc., has not been accomplished although six years have passed. Such a condition calls for immediate reform. Of course, many of the criticisms passed on the Adviser are childish. There has been much complaint because of the conversion of \$3,000,000 into francs, for the payment of interest on the foreign debt was made at the rate of 9 francs to the dollar, whereas, a little later, francs were quoted at 14 to the dollar. Just how the Financial Adviser was to know the future is not stated. Equally foolish is the complaint that he fixed the value of the gourde at 5 to a dollar whereas it was intended to be of equal value. Such critics should

consider the present price of the mark. Another suggestion, much condemned, with reference to the control of the importation of money will be considered in connection with the finances.

Engineers. For some reason there was considerable delay with reference to the engineers. Although the first chief engineer reported for duty in January, 1917, he had no assistants or employes and no funds until the end of the year. Until that time whatever work was done was in the charge of the Occupation.

Irrigation was turned over to the engineers in October, 1917; the streets and pavements of Port-au-Prince, in November, 1917. Management of the Haitian telephones and telegraphs was undertaken in February, 1918, and of the lines operated by the Gendarmerie in November, 1918. Roads and bridges were taken over in June, 1919; the water service of Port-au-Prince in April, 1919, of Cayes in April, 1920, of Gonaives, St. Marc and Cape Haitien, in September, 1920.

In Haiti practically every local need must be met from the national treasury. Yet the older law made really no provision for any constructive policy or proper maintenance of public utilities. Not until July, 1920, was an adequate law secured. This organized a corps of Haitian engineers under the chief engineer and put under the control of the chief engineer the construction, maintenance and repair of public utilities, the operation of telegraphs and telephones, the water services of the towns and communes, irrigation projects, the supervision of the engineering works of the communes and the supervision of all concessions, including mines, quarries and power installations. Practically all the public works were found to be in bad repair, owing to neglect, and repair bills have been high and will be for some time. The

money available has been very inadequate. For the three years ending October 1, 1920, \$744,000 had been spent for the repair and maintenance of the public works in all of Haiti and \$625,000 on new construction. The total length of roads is about 750 miles but the sum available for maintenance and repair is only \$13,000 a month. Many repairs have been made and some important surveys and plans. In coöperation with the United States Geological Survey, the work of triangulation for the entire country has been started. Taking all into consideration, the work of the engineers has been very satisfactory and few complaints are made. The only one of any merit coming to my ears was the result of an early decision to replace the old telephone system of Port-au-Prince, which was very poor, with an automatic system estimated to cost some \$40,000 (which will cost much more in reality). So little use is made by the native of the telephone that he looks on this expense as made for the benefit of the foreigner. One or two schoolhouses have been built and many repairs made.

On the arrival of the Occupation there were practically no roads for wheeled vehicles in the country. As a military measure the old French road from the Cape to Port-au-Prince was rebuilt and was thrown open December 1, 1917. On January 5, 1918, the President with other officials, officers of the marines and newspaper men, made the journey from Port-au-Prince to Cape Haitien. This road and the others constructed are dirt roads. There are practically no bridges so streams must be forded. The Limbé River near Cape Haitien is a serious obstacle and in high water cannot be crossed. It has brought a new source of revenue to the natives who have come to demand American prices for pulling cars across. Depending upon the weather, for in the

rainy season some of the dirt roads cannot be travelled by automobiles, one can go from Cayes or Jacmel to Cape Haitien and on to Ouanaminté on the Dominican border whence a road leads to Monte Cristi. The road question is difficult because of the high construction cost of permanent roads. However, a very creditable beginning has been made.

American Representatives. To summarize, there are in Haiti today, representing the United States, the following: 1. The military force. 2. The officers of the Gendarmerie. 3. The Receiver General and assistants. 4. The Financial Adviser. 5. Engineers and medical men. 6. Diplomatic and consular officials.

Keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of the Haitians are frightfully ignorant and wholly occupied in getting the necessities of life, accustomed to obey their leaders without question. Keep in mind also the fact that there is no real middle class. Keep in mind the further fact that a very considerable proportion of the educated classes have been occupied either in staying in office, or displacing those in power that they might get in, and it becomes possible to consider the reaction of the Haitians to the working of the Convention.

It is claimed by the American officials on the ground that, almost from the first, much of the activity of the government has been to defeat the purposes of the Convention. As evidence of this is offered the refusal of the government to accept certain proposals made to it. On November 5, 1918, the United States recommended the adoption of the plan of the Financial Adviser to create a Bureau of Internal Revenue and to establish: (1) Taxes upon certain manufactured articles, liquor, patent medicine, perfumery, tobacco, matches. (2) A poll tax. (3) Documentary tax.

(4) Business and Occupation tax. (5) Tax on rentals of government land and water rights. This was firmly refused.

Land Ownership. Reference has already been made to a change in the constitution of 1918 permitting foreigners to own land. The old constitution read: "No one, unless he is a Haitian, may be a holder of land, regardless of what his title may be, nor acquire any real estate." As a matter of fact this law was circumvented by a mortgage scheme but that did not change the law. The constitution of 1918 reads: "The right to hold property is given to foreigners residing in Haiti and to societies formed by foreigners, for dwelling purposes and for agricultural, commercial, industrial or educational enterprises. This right shall terminate five years after the foreigner shall have ceased to reside in the country, or when the activities of these companies shall have ceased." About July, 1920, a decree was promulgated practically rescinding this provision and giving foreign owners until about the first of July, 1921, to dispose of their holdings. Meantime, some foreigners had converted their old mortgage holding under the new constitutional provision and some foreign corporations had bought a great deal of land for agricultural purposes and had invested large sums of money. In the spring of 1921 a tenant of a foreign owner refused to pay rent for the premises he occupied. The lower court, ignoring the constitution of 1918, based its decision on the old constitution and decided in favor of the tenant. If this decision is upheld or the decree is put in force serious international complications will ensue.

To cite other recent cases: The Receiver General found that certain customs papers were understamped. Investigation at the bank revealed that one clerk alone had charge of this

matter, without assistance, and that understamping had occurred. The court instantly discharged the accused man and compelled the bank to pay his salary in full, even after he was out of the bank. The lawyer of the bank advised payment. In 1918 a native under arrest killed his guard, a gendarme, and escaped. He was recaptured but acquitted. The agent of the Haitian Government said that there was no doubt of his guilt but that no jury would convict in a case involving a gendarme; that is, an official who was looked upon as an agent of the Americans. These cases indicate the unwillingness of the courts to coöperate with the Americans.

Anti-American Agitation. Attention has been called to the necessity of stopping the newspaper agitation in the summer of 1921. This had stirred up so much antagonism that at a public celebration one orator suggested that the statue of Dessalines looked towards the sea and indicated plainly that the Americans might go in that direction. A younger and less subtle man almost openly advocated the resort to force to drive out the invader. It was rumored in Port-au-Prince that a plot to assassinate the President had been made. The President is unpopular because he has drawn a good salary (\$24,000 a year) and because it is felt that he has not always opposed the Americans.

Let me quote as follows from a letter from one of the ablest Haitians I met:

If some difficulties have come between the two governments the cause is that the Haitian Government was not frank enough. The President of Haiti should have frankly accepted the help of the American forces. By obliging Haiti to live orderly he would have been permitted to inaugurate in Haiti all the reforms of which the country is in need and which could never have been attempted. Instead of that he showed himself to the Haitian people as if he were

crucified on a cross. On the other hand, he seemed to have an air of accepting all the American views, discussing them with Americans, but only in order better to deceive them. The result of this sad system did not have to be waited for long. On one side the Haitian people, encouraged by the President to continue their political cliques, their disorderly designs, resisted by every means. On the other side, the American officials flouted by the government kept themselves on guard because distrustful. The relations instead of becoming cordial and sincere began to be difficult and became tense. The country's interests are harmed. . . . When then will stop the treason and the revenge? An agitation cleverly led by the city cacos has begun. The politicians, who are in search of power and who believe that the days have come back when as masters they can pillage the public cash box, have accused the Occupation. They want, under the pretext of defending the rights of the people, to make them rise up and try once more to get a hold of power.

This letter indicates what I know to be true, namely, that the campaign against the Americans is not wholly disinterested and that it is not in accord with the opinion of some able Haitians. Aside from the newspaper agitation which many Haitians disliked, including the editors of at least one prominent paper, the anti-American, or "patriotic feeling," as they prefer to call it, has found expression in the "Patriotic Union" founded, I believe, in 1920, which includes many prominent men. This organization raised a fund and sent three representatives to Washington in the spring of 1921. Their memoir, published in *The Nation*, New York, May 25, 1921, may be accepted as the strongest presentation of the criticisms of the Haitians. Of this memoir, I will let one of the most prominent living Haitians speak. I chanced to be talking with him shortly after its publication. He asked me if I had seen it and proceeded to point out

certain serious errors. I asked him if the delegates knew the facts he stated. He said in substance: "Of course. They are trying to deceive the American public."

I think it evident that a condition of stale-mate has been reached in the relations of the United States and Haiti, which is injurious to the prestige and good name of the former and militates against the welfare of the latter. This impasse is the more serious when we recall that the term of President Dartiguenave is nearly over and that a new president will be inaugurated on May 15. Some betterment of the situation should be sought at once.

Evidence from another side is offered by the fact that Haitian officials still persist in the old system of graft wherever possible. Some opportunities still remain in spite of the efforts of the Americans. A magistrate at E—— barbecued three cattle and gave a big feast. Later it appeared that he had stolen the cattle and that he had also been guilty of other thefts. In addition he had charged a fee of thirty gourdes which he divided with a gendarme corporal for permitting a Voodoo dance that he had no right to condone, for the dance is prohibited by law. Though he was removed from office he exercised enough influence to avoid criminal prosecution, being released by the Commissar of the government. In the budget of the town of P—— there has been a regular appropriation paid of 5,000 gourdes for street lights but the Americans have been unable to locate the lights.

At Port-au-Prince, after a disastrous fire in the spring of 1921 the business men raised a fund and insisted that the government put the fire department under the Gendarmerie. This was finally done and an American fireman who had been brought down sometime before, but whose services had been refused, was put in charge. About

June 1 it appeared that the funds appropriated by the commune, ranging from one to two thousand gourdes a month had been embezzled, or otherwise secreted. Theoretically there were fourteen paid firemen but some had been unpaid for upwards of two years. There were two steam fire engines, both in such bad order that one to two hours was required to get up steam, two chemical engines without equipment or chemicals, a Ford car for the chief with one wheel gone and no tires, no supply of fuel, no ladders, hatchets or axes; but there were some brass helmets and red shirts. The firemen are now paid about \$15 a month and regular drills have been established. Steam can now be had in fifteen or twenty minutes. The new chief put out the first fire reported, with chemicals, reaching the house one minute after the alarm was received, and for his reward the papers published the story that it was a fake fire arranged for his benefit.

Migration to Cuba. What is considered by some Haitians to be the biggest graft in the history of the country has grown up in connection with the migration of the Haitians to Cuba to work on sugar plantations, which became important during the War. Thousands have gone, chiefly from the southwestern peninsula and the northern coast. Several plans have been adopted which need not be described here. All migrants must have passports to which photographs are attached. As photographs are not easily available it is said that the Department of the Interior has a number of pictures on hand which are affixed to the papers, as the only check kept is on the number of emigrants, no comparison being made of the men with the photographs. The passports cost one dollar, but a fee of \$2 extra is paid to facilitate their issuance, while a local official gets two dollars for tending to

the signature. The captain of the boat must pay to the Haitian consul in Cuba two dollars for each person, one dollar of which is supposed to be used for the upkeep of the consulate, the other to be turned over to the Haitian treasury; but I understand that in 1920 nothing was received by the treasury, the Haitian consul by a scheme known as "boxes of cigars" having divided his receipts with the *proper person* in Port-au-Prince. This consul in Cuba also visits the factories from time to time on the pretext of supervising the living conditions, at which times he expects to receive checks of from \$500 to \$1,000 to enable him to make a favorable report. These visits are known as "cleaning up the neighborhood" (*refraichissement de lisere*). (A new consul was sent to Cuba in the summer of 1921 from whom better things are expected.) Meantime the laborers, having no such sums of money, sign notes bearing high rates of interest, pay as much as \$500 at times before they are out of debt, agree to remain several years and are carefully watched. The money is generally deducted from their wages. Further, the factory or plantation is said to underweigh the cane they cut to enable it to meet the extra overhead expenses. It is a disguised slave trade and illustrates the tender interest of Haitian officials in the welfare of their poorer neighbors. It must be admitted that with the war-wages received in Cuba the workers were better off than they would have been at home.

Present Situation. I have tried to point out the chief measures undertaken by the Americans and some of the difficulties they have encountered. I think I have made it plain that the fault of the present situation is not wholly on either side. Local residents, both native and foreign, complain that there has often been a lack of tact and

courtesy on the part of American officials, arbitrary actions and decisions, refusals to take advice or be guided by more experienced men. This criticism is not limited to the military men. Some say that it is due to the number of southerners sent down, but my observation does not confirm this. Some of the complaints are humorous, as in the case at C—— where an official, after a heavy flood, waded through the streets barefooted with trousers rolled up to his knees. The natives said he did it to show his contempt for them, whereas such a thought never entered his head.

More serious, however, is the case of a civilian official who, finding some material which he wanted to use in the possession of a private firm, peremptorily demanded it. On being refused he said he would send marines to seize it and it is alleged that he applied to the commanding officer, only to be told not to be such a fool. Another official tried to refuse service of papers guaranteeing the wages of a servant, as if he were immune to the law. Such incidents have left bad impressions. Other men have lost esteem by trying to bid for the favor of the natives. A market woman tried to compel a French lady to buy a certain piece of meat and finally threw it in her basket, whence it was removed. The dealer called a gendarme whom she knew. He seized and shook the French lady who demanded to be taken to police headquarters to file a complaint. The young officer who heard the story dismissed the gendarme saying it was evidently a case of "fifty-fifty." This officer is said to have been living with a native girl at the time. Later he tried to apologize. On the other hand, many men have gained the thorough respect of all by their courtesy and willingness to hear complaints before making decisions.

CONVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, 1915

PREAMBLE: The United States and the Republic of Haiti desiring to confirm and strengthen the amity existing between them by the most cordial coöperation in measures for their common advantage, and the Republic of Haiti desiring to remedy the present condition of its revenues and finances, to maintain the tranquillity of the Republic, to carry out plans for the economic development and prosperity of the Republic and its people, and the United States being in full sympathy with all of these aims and objects and desiring to contribute in all proper ways to their accomplishment:

The United States and the Republic of Haiti have resolved to conclude a convention with these objects in view, and have appointed for that purpose, plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Republic of Haiti, Mr. Louis Borno, Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and Public Instruction,

The President of the United States, Mr. Robert Beale Davis, Junior, Charge d'Affaires of the United States of America,

Who, having exhibited to each other their respective powers, which are seen to be in good and true form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The Government of the United States will by its good offices, aid the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis.

ARTICLE II. The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the President of the United States, a General Receiver, and such aids and employes as may be necessary, who shall collect, receive and apply all customs duties on imports and exports accruing at the several customs houses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti.

The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the President of the United States, a Financial Adviser, who shall be an officer attached to the Ministry of Finance, to give effect to whose proposals and labors, the Minister will lend efficient

aid. The Financial Adviser shall devise an adequate system of public accounting, aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the expenses, inquire into the validity of the debts of the Republic, enlighten both governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues, and make such other recommendations to the Minister of Finance as may be deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti.

ARTICLE III. The Government of the Republic of Haiti will provide by law or appropriate decrees for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver, and will extend to the Receivership and to the Financial Adviser all needful aid and full protection in the execution of the powers conferred and duties imposed herein; and the United States on its part will extend like aid and protection.

ARTICLE IV. Upon the appointment of the Financial Adviser, the Government of the Republic of Haiti, in coöperation with the Financial Adviser, shall collate, classify, arrange and make full statement of all the debts of the Republic, the amounts, character, maturity and condition thereof, and the interest accruing and the sinking fund requisite to their final discharge.

ARTICLE V. All sums collected and received by the General Receiver shall be applied first to the payment of the salaries and allowances of the General Receiver, his assistants and employes and expenses of the Receivership, including the salary and expenses of the Financial Adviser, which salaries will be determined by previous agreement; second, to the interest and sinking fund of the public debt of the Republic of Haiti; and, third, to the maintenance of the constabulary referred to in Article X, and then the remainder to the Haitian Government for the purposes of current expenses.

In making these applications the General Receiver will proceed to pay salaries and allowances monthly and expenses as they arise, and on the first day of each calendar month, will set aside in a separate fund the quantum of the collection and receipts of the previous month.

ARTICLE VI. The expenses of the Receivership, including salaries and allowance of the General Receiver, his assistants and employes, and the salary and expenses of the Financial Adviser, shall not exceed five per centum of the collection and receipts from customs duties, unless by agreement by the two governments.

ARTICLE VII. The General Receiver shall make monthly reports of all collections, receipts and disbursements to the appropriate officers of the Republic of Haiti and to the Department of State of the United States, which reports shall be open to inspection and verification at all times by the appropriate authorities of each of the said governments.

ARTICLE VIII. The Republic of Haiti shall not increase its public debt, except by previous agreement with the President of the United States and shall not contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenues of the Republic available for that purpose, after defraying the expenses of the government, shall be adequate to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such debt.

ARTICLE IX. The Republic of Haiti will not, without a previous agreement with the President of the United States, modify the customs duties in a manner to reduce the revenues therefrom; and in order that the revenues of the Republic may be adequate to meet the public debt and the expenses of the government, to preserve tranquillity and to promote material prosperity, the Republic of Haiti will coöperate with the Financial Adviser in his recommendations for improvements in the methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and for new sources of needed income.

ARTICLE X. The Haitian Government obligates itself for the preservation of domestic peace, the security of individual rights and the full observance of the provisions of this treaty, to create without delay an efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians. This constabulary shall be organized and officered by Americans appointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the United States. The Haitian Government shall clothe these officers with the

proper and necessary authority and uphold them in the performance of their functions. These officers will be replaced by Haitians as they by examination conducted under direction of a board to be selected by the senior American officer of this constabulary, in the presence of a representative of the Haitian Government, have supervision and control of arms and ammunition, military supplies, and traffic therein, throughout the country. The high contracting parties agree that the stipulations in this article are necessary to prevent factional strife and disturbances.

ARTICLE XI. The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of this territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to any foreign government or power, nor to enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers that will impair or tend to impair the independence of Haiti.

ARTICLE XII. The Haitian Government agrees to execute with the United States a protocol for the settlement by arbitration or otherwise, of all pending pecuniary claims of foreign corporations, companies, citizens or subjects against Haiti.

ARTICLE XIII. The Republic of Haiti, being desirous to further the development of its natural resources, agrees to undertake and execute such measures as in the opinion of the High Contracting Parties, may be necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the Republic, under the supervision and direction of an engineer or engineers, to be appointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination of the President

of the United States, and authorized for that purpose by the Government of Haiti.

ARTICLE XIV. The High Contracting Parties shall have authority to take such steps as may be necessary to assure the complete attainment of any of the objects comprehended in this treaty; and should the necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintaining of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.

ARTICLE XV. The present treaty shall be approved and ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective laws, and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged in the City of Washington as soon as may be possible.

ARTICLE XVI. The present treaty shall remain in full force and virtue for the term of ten years, to be counted from the day of the exchange of ratifications, and further for another term of ten years if, for specific reasons presented by either of the High Contracting Parties, the purpose of this treaty has not been fully accomplished.

In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate, in the English and French languages, and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done at Port-au-Prince (Haiti) the sixteenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifteen.

The treaty has since been extended (1917) to cover the second period of ten years provided for in Article XVI.

CHAPTER IV

The Financial Problem of Haiti

THE treasury of Haiti is in a deplorable condition. The country is, and long has been, practically bankrupt. Under normal conditions the income should be adequate to meet the necessary expenses of a well-con-

ducted government, but Haiti has not been well conducted and its finances have been handled in reckless fashion. It was saddled at the very beginning of its existence, as the price of French recognition, with a debt of 150,000,000

francs (the sum demanded by King Charles Fifth in 1825, of which 30,000,000 was paid, and the balance of which under Louis Phillippe in 1838 was reduced to 60,000,000 francs). Revolution followed revolution. The government borrowed money at ruinous rates to fight the revolutionists; the latter borrowed with promises to repay out of the national treasury if successful. The merchants, French at first, German later, took the risk and reaped rich rewards. Internal claims piled up. The payment of the loans made impossible oftentimes the payments of salaries, and claims therefor were bought up by speculators, payment assured if they had friends at court. Foreign merchants openly encouraged the pillaging of their warehouses during revolutions, knowing that the government would be forced later to make handsome amends. Meantime the government was being robbed by its officials and merchants took advantage of their venality to dodge customs duties. Today it is impossible to state just what the outstanding obligations of the government are, for there are some important unsettled claims. Roughly speaking, the situation as of December 31, 1920 is as follows:

To this sum must be added the floating debt, many unpaid salary vouchers, the guaranty to the railroads, and miscellaneous claims whose total I cannot estimate but which the delegates of the Union Patriotique seem to place at \$4,420,920.

The loan of 1875 bore 8 per cent interest at first. The interest was irregularly paid and in 1880 and 1885 readjustments were necessary. It is secured by a duty of 33½c on each hundred pounds of coffee exported.

The loan of 1896 was arranged with the National Bank of Haiti. Bonds with a face value of 500 francs were issued at 400 to the bank, which sold them to the public at 450. Some of the bonds were reserved by the government and issued on the basis of a 500 franc bond for each 400 of certain existing internal and floating obligations, some of which were bearing 18 per cent interest. This interest is secured by a tax of \$1.20 on each hundred pounds of coffee exported.

The loan of 1910 was contracted with the Bank of the Parisian Union, Paris, Messrs. Hallgarten, & Company, Messrs. Ladenburg, Thalmann & Company, of New York, and the Berliner Haendelsgesellschaft of Berlin. The

FINANCIAL SITUATION OF HAITI, DECEMBER 31, 1920

FOREIGN LOANS			
1875	5%	19,252,500 francs	Interest paid to date
1896	6%	37,638,500 "	" " "
1910	5%	61,576,500 "	" " "
		118,467,500 "	
At par.....			\$23,233,500
At present price of francs (12.5 per \$1.00).....			\$9,477,400
INTERIOR DEBT			
Principal			\$7,839,176
Interest due			1,380,712
Total			\$9,219,888
Total debt at present price of francs.....			\$18,697,288
Deducting paper money which is secured (gourdes 4,057,972)			811,594
Net total.....			\$17,885,694

loan was for 65,000,000 francs. The banks paid 47,000,000 francs (72.3 per cent of face value) or 361.50 for each 500 franc bond which was offered to the public at 442.50. It is reported that the banks paid 5,000,000 francs to the Haitian officials who signed the contract. Interest on this loan is secured by a tax of \$1.00 on each hundred pounds of coffee exported, and a surcharge of 15 per cent on import duties.

The Paris prices for these bonds have been as follows:

	1875 300 fr. 5%	1896 500 fr. 6%	1910 500 fr. 5%
1912.....	240-278	500-524	440-475
1914.....	218-258	475-516	395-447
1916.....	235-261	455-508	353-434

Internal Loans. The internal loans are as follows:

1912. Authorized by law of 1911 to pay debts incurred by revolution which put LeConte in power. Face value \$674,000, bearing 6 per cent interest. Sold to public at 89 (included 500,000 gourdes set aside for the account of the generals). Secured by 5 per cent of the gold surtax on imports.

1913. Authorized by law, June 15, 1913. For current expenses, reconstruction of some public buildings and relief of fire sufferers. Face value of bonds to be \$609,902 with interest at 6½ per cent. Offered nominally at 94 but real yield was 78.8 because gourdes were accepted at 3.5 to the dollar whereas the exchange at that time was 4.17 to a dollar. Secured by 5 per cent of gold surtax on imports.

1914 A. Authorized by law, May 29, 1914, to pay debt for revolution which put Zamor in office and included 400,000 gourdes for soldiers. Bonds to total 724,000 with interest at 6½ per cent and sold at 80 but gourdes were accepted at 3.5 per dollar whereas exchange was 4.72, thus making bonds net 59.4. The government secured about 2,000,000 gourdes. If loan were refunded today at face value it would cost 3,620,000 gourdes. Secured by 5 per cent of gold surtax on imports.

1914 B. Issued by Zamor for "extraordinary expenses." Face value bonds 1,500,000 gourdes. Interest 6½ per cent. Gourdes again accepted at rate of 3.5 whereas price was now 5 to a dollar. Issue nominally sold at 80 so real return to government was 56. Secured by part of import duty on tobacco seemingly already pledged for construction of schoolhouses.

1914 C. Issued by Zamor on account "extraordinary expenses" caused by revolution. Total, 1,200,000 gourdes bearing interest at 6½ per cent. Secured by 5 per cent of the surtax on importation and by

export tax of .05c on each hundred pounds of coffee exported.

1914 Consolidated Debt. Law sanctioned November 30, 1915, after intervention. Gold bonds bearing 6 per cent to be exchanged for outstanding obligations dating from 1899 to 1911 for salaries, pensions, etc. Amount outstanding about \$1,111,284. No specific security pledge.

Railroad Accounts. These are the principal outstanding internal obligations. Among the unsettled accounts are those of the railroads. The National Railroad of Haiti received a concession to build a road from Cape Haitien to Port-au-Prince in 1907. The first section was completed in 1912. The bonds outstanding appear to be \$3,544,548 and interest was paid to 1914. The government agreed to pay deficit if profits were less than 6 per cent plus 1 per cent for sinking fund. I have no late figures but in March, 1919, the deficit was \$1,050,000. This is an American corporation with some \$2,500,000 of bonds held in France. The French Government has pressed for settlement. The railroad also has claims for damages done by revolutionists.

The Central Railroad of Haiti took over in 1909 a road organized by German Haitians in 1900. It has lines near Port-au-Prince. Nominally at least, it is now an American corporation. The government guaranteed 6 per cent interest on \$688,000 of a total capital of \$760,000. Payments were made to 1915 but none since. The railroad claims that the government agreed to cover operating deficits.

No payment, save a partial payment in 1916 on the internal debts has been made under the Financial Adviser and the affectation of specific revenues to be used for this purpose has for some unexplained reason been entirely disregarded. This has caused serious hardship to many of the bond holders for in a country like Haiti the government bonds are almost the only relatively safe investment a man of small means can make.

The income of the government is almost wholly derived from the customs duties, the internal revenue in 1919-20 yielding only \$373,675. Because of the local disturbances, followed by the World War these have fluctuated greatly. In 1911-12 under one of the best presidents the country has had the customs receipts were \$6,324,659; but in the year of disturbance of 1913-14 they fell to \$1,103,849. Since that date there has been a considerable increase. In 1918-19, \$5,728,722 was collected and in 1919-20, \$6,414,605. In the year 1918-19, the duty on imports amounted to \$2,425,408; on exports, to \$3,302,174; and of this sum considerably over \$2,000,000 was the duty on coffee exported. The export duty on coffee yields about one-third of the total government income. The \$3 per hundred pounds exported is affected (pledged) as follows:

External loans	\$2.53
Internal "05
Subsidies "05
Loans for local improvements18
	<hr/>
	\$2.81 $\frac{1}{3}$
Leaving for government18 $\frac{2}{3}$
	<hr/>
Total	\$3.00

In 1919-20 the tax on imports yielded 52 per cent of the total revenue: on exports, 42 per cent and the internal revenue 6 per cent. A very considerable part of the receipts from customs is definitely pledged as indicated above, and the remainder is not adequate for the maintenance of the government and the development and construction of roads, bridges, wharves, etc. If we estimate the total revenue at \$6,000,000 about \$3,500,000 is required to meet the obligations of the debt. The collections for the first six months of 1920-21 were only about half of those of the corresponding period of the preceding year. It is, therefore, a matter of paramount importance that the exact debt be determined and improper claims disallowed, as a preliminary to a much needed reform in taxation. In view of the large amount of the bonds of Haiti which are held in Europe it would be greatly to her profit could advantage be taken of present exchange rates.

Currency. The monetary unit in Haiti is the gourde of 100 centimes which was intended to have a par value of 96 cents. Just prior to the intervention the gourde had been subject to violent changes and at one time had fallen to two cents, later advancing to about 20c, a figure which was accepted by the incoming forces and fixed as the rate of exchange. It has been kept at that figure ever since. There are no gold or silver coins but there is a token currency of bronze and nickel. Disregarding the earlier period there have been since 1884 frequent issues of paper money.

One usually sees bills of one or two gourdes. There is no security for the coin but the credit of the government, but through an arrangement with the bank the paper money is protected. The government paper money is being withdrawn and replaced by bank notes. In normal times the circulation in gourdes is about 12,000,000; in nickle, 7,000,000; or in American money, \$3,800,000. This is all needed at the height of the crop season but flows to the banks in the dead season. As roads and transportation facilities, as well as banks, have been almost nonexistent, the transfer of money has been difficult and local exchange rates have been very high. There has resulted, therefore, particularly during the period prior to the intervention, much speculation in the currency which has been a great source of profit to the merchants and some others but for which the poor man has paid. The reports of the Haitian Government will show this to anyone who cares to read them. In recent years a large amount of American money has circulated in the island and is accepted everywhere.

The Banque Nationale. Every community has its scapegoat on which the collective sins may be laid and which everyone is at liberty to curse. In Haiti this rôle is played by the Banque Nationale as it is universally called. Incidentally it functions as the treasury of Haiti and the chief interest of good citizens everywhere is to put as little as possible into the treasury and to get as much out as possible. The greatest check to the misuse of public money in Haiti has been the curious idea of the bank that money must be used according to contract. Naturally the politicians have not loved it.

In 1881 a charter was given to a French company under the title, Banque Nationale d'Haiti. In the early years of this century at least four

of the employes of the bank, two German, two French, forgot these obligations and combined with a number of very prominent Haitians to get a little spending money. The result was the "consolidation scandal" and the reorganization of the bank. The Germans demanded a large part in the reorganization and objected to the inclusion of Americans but the French, holding control, insisted on American participation. The reorganization was affected in 1910 under the title Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, and the bank remained a French concern, the Germans having to be satisfied with the allotment of about 2,500 shares to the Disconto Gesellschaft out of a total of 40,000 shares. Some 6,000 shares were held in New York by three firms of close German affiliations. At the outbreak of the War the Germans on the Board of Directors resigned and their interests were taken over by the National City Bank, which had purchased some 2,000 shares about 1911.

Shortly thereafter the French arranged with the National City Bank for the taking over of the management. In February, 1920, arrangements were made to buy the French stock and to apply for a new charter to be granted the National City Bank. The bank is still operated under the French charter as the Haitian Government has as yet refused to transfer it. The director at Port-au-Prince has never been an American, though the assistant director is. The present director is an Italian; his predecessor was a Frenchman. The Americans had nothing to do with the privileges granted the bank by its charter, or with the obligations laid upon it.

In making the loan of 1910 the Haitian Government agreed that the money pledged for its security should be handled by the Banque Nationale and that 10,000,000 francs of this loan

should be devoted toward the retirement of all the then issued paper and nickel money. This agreed with the charter given the bank which made it a bank of issue, the government agreeing to withdraw its paper. This charter also made the bank the collector and disbursing officer of the moneys of the government and as such it was functioning when the Occupation took place. The bank had entered into the most solemn pledges not to permit funds to be used except for the specific purposes provided in the laws. From 1911 to 1915 several efforts were made by the parties that chanced to be in power to get hold of these trust funds and divert them to other channels.

In 1914 under Zamor a law was passed suspending the retirement of paper money, the money thus secured to be used for "current expenses." The bank on the advice of its Haitian lawyers refused to recognize this law or pay out the money except as pledged.

The \$500,000 Transfer. Theodore replaced Zamor in November and managed to stay in power about three months. Being in desperate need of money he determined to get some of the funds he knew were being held at the bank under the convention of 1910. But his necessities were just as well known to the local officials of the bank who took the precaution to advise the New York office of their fears. They were told to prepare the money for shipment to New York. Then the New York office was advised that the Port-au-Prince bank did not dare try to move the money from the vaults lest it be seized en route. Here the United States was asked to lend its help and the S. S. *Machias* was sent for the money. The Haitian Government demanded the money. The French director, thoroughly frightened, wanted to yield, but a young American assistant shut the vault and defied the

officials. Crowds filled the streets. The French manager fled to the French legation. Just then, December 17, 1914, the *Machias* arrived and the marines loaded some \$500,000 on board and took it to New York where it was placed on deposit, drawing interest until 1919. At that time a monetary reform agreement was executed between the government of Haiti and the bank, the first article of which read—"The bank will bring to Haiti and keep on deposit to the credit of an account which shall be known under the name of 'retirement fund' the balance of the 10,000,000 francs of the loan of 1910, including the \$500,000 transported to New York in December, 1914, increased by interest at the rate of 2 per cent per annum on that sum from December, 1914 to December, 1918." This sum with other sums accumulated in trust funds, amounting in all to \$1,735,664.89, was to be used to retire the outstanding paper money estimated at 8,877,972 gourdes at the rate of five gourdes to one dollar. This was done.

This is the true story of the transfer of which the delegates of the "Union Patriotique" (see New York, *Nation*, May 25, 1921) said that the purpose was "in order to force the Haitian Government to accept the control of the custom houses by systematically depriving it of financial resources." And later, "This amount is still in the United States." Now these facts are not unknown in Haiti and must have been known to the writers of the *Memoir*, or else they remind us of the story of a little girl sent to an institution to have a mental test. The psychologist reported that she was backward, but not feeble-minded. Seeing her at home again, a playmate said: "Jennie was sent to an idiot asylum but couldn't pass the entrance examination and was sent back home." The fact is that the courage of one

young man prevented the Haitian Government from violating its solemn pledge. Incidentally the most prominent Haitian lawyers supported the stand taken by the bank.

Struggle for Bank Charter. The alleged reason for the refusal of Haiti to transfer the charter of the bank to the City National Bank was the insistence of the United States Government upon a clause to read: "To avoid the possibility of any currency crisis during the period of retirement of paper money and as long as such retirement shall be in process the government obligates itself to prohibit the importation and exportation of non-Haitian money except that which might be necessary for the needs of commerce in the opinion of the Financial Adviser." I am informed that this suggestion was considered at a meeting in Washington attended by representatives of the State Department, by bankers from different parts of the country and by the French representative, M. Casenave, and agreed on as necessary.

The true reason is that the Banque Nationale has agreed to issue bank notes to replace the government paper money and has agreed to keep these gourdes at a rate of five to one dollar. A combination of hostile bankers or speculators free to import United States gold might influence the exchange and make it impossible to keep this rate. No exception was made of the Banque Nationale which was affected by this law as well as the other banks. A violent opposition broke out in Haiti led by the local representatives of the Royal Bank of Canada and many protests were made, signed by some American business houses including the American Foreign Banking Corporation. The reason given for the opposition was that it would give the Banque Nationale a monopoly of importation and exportation and force the other

institutions to buy exchange at any rates it might fix. The bank, however, was ready to establish a fixed rate so this argument does not hold.

Inasmuch as the Financial Adviser had control and not the Banque, this objection could hold only on the assumption of improper collusion between the Banque and the Adviser. Some of the American business men and the British Minister later stated that they signed this protest under misapprehension of its wording and intent. That there was some reason to anticipate such speculation is evidenced by the fact that when it was known that the Banque Nationale could not get the new bills ordered in the United States as promptly as expected one other agency managed to collect 200,000 gourdes of the old bills or about one-sixth of the total. I suppose they were starting a museum. Now, there may be valid objection to the proposal. I am not an international banker and do not know. I am satisfied, however, that a large part of this opposition was not disinterested and I believe that antagonism of the government to the Banque and to the Financial Adviser is the real cause of its objection to the proposal.

The Banque Nationale, besides its headquarters in Port-au-Prince, has branches in the eight principal towns of the country with agencies in several smaller places. It receives from the government $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the total receipts and disbursements, which is probably much less than the government would have to pay if it established its own agencies. This payment will be less if the new charter is granted. While the Banque is a money making institution, at least I hope it is, it is compelled by its position to do many things which bring no revenue. For instance it has charge of the issuing of postage stamps, supplying the proper

agents throughout the country, and collecting the money. For this it receives nothing, although this service costs the bank some \$15,000 a year for clerk hire. It also tends to the surcharging when it is found that certain issues are too large. Formerly this was done by government officials at great profit to themselves but not to the country. Owing to the depression in 1921, nickel flowed into the bank until it had something like \$700,000 tied up, on which no interest could be earned, and the bank vaults were overflowing. Finally it had to refuse to receive it. There was no legal obligation to so receive it and yet the government found fault with the refusal.

I have no connection with the Banque Nationale and have never met its president, but, in view of the wild stories that have been circulated by Haitians, and some Americans, of the evil character of the bank and its influence on the United States Government, it is my duty to tell what I found. I should add that in the proposed charter to be granted the National City Bank a number of modifications have been made in the privileges which are all to the interest of Haiti. I see no fundamental difficulty in arranging things so that Haiti may be glad to avail itself of the Banque's services in the future. I must confess that I should like to see

the resident director an American and this I say with no thought of criticism of the very able director now in charge, Mr. Scarpa.

An American Loan. One of the things confidently expected by the Haitians from the Americans was a loan. I was frequently told that a loan had been promised in the Convention of 1915, but this is an error. As a matter of fact such a loan seems to have been expected by the American officials. I am informed that in April, 1917 the Secretary asked for bids on a loan of \$30,000,000 and that two were received. It is stated that these negotiations fell through because of the opposition of the Financial Adviser to certain suggestions of the French Government. There have been negotiations since but the details have not been made public. This amount appears to me excessive but if the proper arrangements can be made between the two governments I should feel that an ample loan on favorable terms would go a long ways not only towards establishing Haitian finances on a sound basis but as an evidence of sincerity on our part and as partial compensation for whatever mistakes and failures we have made. I have already indicated my belief that a reorganization of the taxation system of Haiti is imperative as a basis for good government.

CHAPTER V

A Summary and Some Suggestions

THE Haitian Attitude. Haiti is sensitive, oversensitive, perhaps. Her pride is hurt. Under such conditions people are always extreme in their reactions, and likely to be hypercritical. Much of the antagonism reported as coming from the Haitians is a smoke screen to cover their feelings.

With few exceptions, the Haitians are not antagonistic to Americans but they are critical of the policies of our government. What are these criticisms?

1. Incompetency of our representatives.
2. Uncertainty as to intentions of the United States.

3. Failure to settle internal loans and to make a new loan.

4. Arbitrary actions of both marines and civilians.

These are the underlying complaints. Now, to influence the people of the United States the arguments advanced may be quite different. We must not forget that some Haitians are trying to manipulate the situation to their own advantage and to deceive their fellow compatriots as well as us. What then is the real basis on which the complaints are founded.

Just now Haiti is in a financial depression. Her merchants are overstocked with goods bought at high prices. There is evidence that American firms dumped a good deal of merchandise immediately after the Armistice and recklessly extended credit. The price level of the products of the country is very low. Not being international financiers, the people listen to the agitators who tell them that this is the result of the American Occupation. The Germans are returning and we must expect that they will not always be friendly to the people who forced them to leave the country. The holders of the internal bonds have suffered both because the interest was not paid and because there is no market for the bonds. The provisions in the loans setting apart certain revenues for their security seem to have been entirely disregarded by the American authorities. This is one side of the situation.

Haiti feels that she has surrendered many of the attributes of sovereignty without securing corresponding benefits. She points to the work of Wood in Cuba, of Taft in the Philippines, and asks why she has not been favored with men of like calibre. She forgets the effect of the War upon the United States and the world-wide financial crisis. Nevertheless, while there may

be some measure of justice in this complaint on which I do not pass, for I cannot enter into personalities, I may be permitted to add that in my belief no man could have made a success under the existing conditions. That is to say that I believe the responsibility for the development in Haiti rests primarily not upon the shoulders of the men sent to Haiti but upon the government at Washington. In the opinion of Haiti, while entering professedly upon a program of financial control in the island, we have indicated a desire to exercise wider control. This fear has been exploited by politicians to the extent of their ability and they have found agitators in this country to assist them. Some have attempted to give this a political cast and to throw responsibility on the Democratic party; but I think it is time that we stated openly that there is no partisan policy in this country as regards Haiti.

Haiti was rather inclined to welcome the marines but she wants to know why they are kept in the country after the problem has ceased to be military. She feels that their presence is a constant pressure to force the government to accede to any demands made. Leading Haitians do not emphasize the "atrocities" of which we hear so much. They believe many occurred but recognize that cruelty is not an American trait or policy. It is not the marine, it is the uniform, the symbol of outside control, which irritates.

The Haitian Dilemma. A southern writer on the race problem in the United States once said that there were but two solutions: The first was the removal of the Negroes to some other country, which was impossible; the second was race amalgamation, which was unthinkable. Haiti is in a similar quandary. She is afraid the United States will not remove the marines (this indicates an inability to maintain

self-control, which is galling). She is equally afraid that the marines will be removed (that means revolution). Intelligent Haitians all think, whatever they say for publication, that revolution will occur if the marines leave. They would however welcome their removal from Cape Haitien and Port-au-Prince, say to Gonâve Island a few miles away, so that they could appear at short notice and yet be out of sight. My guess is that a free and honest expression of Haitian opinion would show 90 per cent in favor of the continued maintenance of order by the United States; but opinions differ as to the best scheme.

American Accomplishments. To change the viewpoint for a moment, what have the Americans accomplished in Haiti?

1. The maintenance of order.
2. Establishment of the Gendarmerie.
3. The honest handling of revenues.
4. The beginnings of roads.
5. The regular payment of government employes.
6. The cleaning up of the towns and the beginning of sanitation.
7. The maintenance of a fixed exchange rate of gourde and dollar.

Order is fundamental in good government. Even the much regretted caco trouble may be of great future value if the people have learned that rebellion does not always pay. The Gendarmerie, well-paid, is the beginning of an adequate police system. While the roads are far from perfect no one questions their value. Revenues have always been inadequate. Formerly the government employes were irregularly paid and the bond holders always paid. Now all employes receive their pay, a matter of no small importance. Only a small beginning has been made in sanitation, but the first steps are always most difficult. A system of gov-

ernment engineers holds great promise. Few Haitians seem to have realized what it has meant during the years of financial readjustment to have the support of the United States to their exchange. A glimpse of the experience of Europe and South America should be enlightening in this regard. What would the gourde be worth today were it not for the Americans? Incidentally we may note that the presence of two thousand marines with regular incomes, a large part of which is spent locally, has meant a great deal to merchants and workers of the country. Granted these things, the American achievements are not specially creditable to the United States. We have signally failed on some of the big things such as reorganization of schools and finances. Why, Washington must explain.

What Haiti Wants. In all countries there are demagogues who want freedom of action accompanied by freedom from responsibility. There are many such in Haiti. But such a program will not work in a world of inter-related peoples. We are vitally affected by the actions of Haiti and we cannot be indifferent. This the leading Haitians recognize. What they want is that we should "make good" in our control of Haiti.

Passive Resistance. Haiti has decided that the present program does not work. She has accepted a policy of passive resistance and is in a position to block most of our efforts. From this situation relief must be found.

The Convention. One of the starting points for trouble is in the Convention under which we are working. It is an illustration of the old type of diplomacy from which we are trying to escape in that by "diplomatic language" it purports to do one thing while seeking to accomplish another. Its intent was to give the United States the temporary control of the situation in order that

Haiti might be set on her feet and the way prepared for a real independence later. It was desired to do this while preserving as far as possible the Haitian Government. This desire, however, led to the failure to give to the United States such a position in Haiti that its position could not be a matter of dispute. It set up several more or less coördinate officials, all representatives of Washington, directly responsible to no one head. The American Minister, the commander of the military forces, the Financial Adviser, the Receiver General, the engineers, are all independent. In actual functioning, regardless of their individual merits or personal relations there has been no adequate attempt to achieve common ends. Each for himself is carrying out his duties in accordance with his own ideals, with little conference with the others and with less clear understanding of what Washington is really trying to do. Unless the American government organizes its representatives under some one head, military or civil is unimportant provided the head be an executive, gives them a policy and backs them up, the present Convention is unworkable. It is doubtful now if modifications can be secured. Such modifications are not necessary provided Washington will take a firm stand and will so organize its efforts that constructive results may be secured. It is difficult to understand why Washington, having secured what it wanted, did not proceed to make its will effective.

What Might Have Been. Leading Haitians, Americans and other foreigners resident in Haiti tell me they think that other representatives at the outset might have avoided the present situation. We are, however, confronted by present facts not past possibilities. A change of personnel now is of doubtful value unless the other changes be made.

Foreign Opinion. We should not forget that foreigners resident in Haiti, no matter how critical they are of past performances, are practically unanimous that America must stay in Haiti until a new generation of Haitians, with different ideas of government are ready to assume charge of the ship of state. The collective judgment of these men should be carefully weighed in forming our policy.

What We Might Do. I have never met an American who wanted to absorb the country of Haiti. I know no one who desires to destroy the Haitian Government or who has any wish save that in the future it may prosper and be completely independent. The United States has guaranteed the independence of Haiti, and I have no doubt will continue to do so in the future. Hitherto, however, we have been content to let things take care of themselves. Now we are confronted with the necessity of some definite policy. Even the most zealous advocates of a "self-determination policy" might be brought to see that a given group has "self-determined" its present inability to stand alone and maintain international obligations. Our duty to the people of Haiti is not fully met by accepting at face value all the statements emanating from its upper classes. The world judges by performances, not by words. If we believe that we have an obligation to help Haiti we must carry out our belief regardless of the protests of selfishly interested politicians, there or elsewhere. But we must not be satisfied with words or a purely negative program of "protection." There are many things we might do. We might as a nation refund the Haitian debt. We might admit the products of Haiti on the same terms as those of Cuba, for why should we discriminate between two islands in almost identically the same situation as regards our markets?

A clear declaration by Congress of our intentions with reference to Haiti might clear the atmosphere there. I do not believe there is any difficulty between Haiti and the United States which cannot be amicably settled.

The Option. No one knows the future. No one can be certain of the accuracy of his own ideas. It seems to me that today we are confronted with

the necessity of a choice between two courses, simple yet complicated: complicated because they must rest on continuity of program. We can admit the impossibility of helping Haiti under existing conditions, and withdraw, or we can declare our program, organize our forces, and make good. My humble advice to the United States Government is then: Get in, or get out.

CHAPTER I

The Dominicans

THE total area of the Dominican Republic is over 19,000 square miles, or somewhat more than the combined areas of the states of Vermont and New Hampshire. Running east and west almost in the center is the great central range whose highest peaks rise to 9,000 or 10,000 feet and where valleys like Constanza can be found whose elevation is over 3,000 feet. This range is wooded, has a heavy rainfall and is consequently the starting point of many rivers whose general course is north or south; but the streams on the north all turn east or west, finally reaching either the Yuna to empty into Samana Bay or the Yaque del Norte to find outlet near Monte Cristi. The districts on each side of this central range are quite different. To the south in addition to a wide territory more or less unoccupied, both because of small population and distance from market, are areas like that near San Juan, which will become centers of general farming some day. There are wide stretches of ground used only for grazing purposes today whose soil is not very good.

To the north lies the great valley, ten to fifteen miles in width, known generally together with the hills farther north under the name "Cibao." Just east of the city of Santiago this valley is divided by low hills some 700 feet high. To the west the rainfall is inadequate for agriculture except along the edge of the hills on each side. There is some grazing land near Santiago but further west the country is quite arid and is the home of countless herds of goats which range at will. This part of the valley is drained by the Yaque

del Norte which receives numerous additions from the south but nothing from the north. On some of these side streams land can be irrigated. At Mao, for illustration, a Belgian who saw the possibilities has made a splendid beginning of a rice plantation. Some 12,000 acres here could probably be irrigated at reasonable cost, and the same may be true on other streams. In the neighborhood of Guayubin there are some 50,000 acres which could be irrigated with gravity flow from the Yaque itself at an estimated outlay of \$1,000,000. Nothing has been done on this. Between this place and Monte Cristi there are now several sugar plantations which pump the water from the river. Their future financial success is considered somewhat problematical, owing to the expensive installations necessary.

Santiago itself is the center of the tobacco-growing district. Its streets are packed at times with horses and burros delivering tobacco to the warehouses. To the east near Moca and La Vega we come to the cacao districts, and then to grazing districts. In many ways this appears to be the richest agricultural section of the country. In this region, too, are several saw mills converting the native pine into lumber both rough and finished. I have seen boards eighteen inches in width, but the average is much smaller.

North of the Cibao is a low range of mountains with fairly adequate rainfall offering numbers of small fertile valleys. Going east on the coast from Monte Cristi, with the exception of one small area, we find no land of value

until we reach Puerto Plata, one of the chief ports of the country, where there are several sugar plantations. East of this city there is nothing of note until we come to the Bay of Samana on the eastern coast. Here are extensive coffee plantations and here also the outlet for much of the cacao of the Cibao.

South of Samana there are some cacao regions and then the low lying and swampy, or else rough and hilly coast, little utilized at present. On the south side we find again sugar plantations beginning with the enormous development at La Romana. Sugar centrals are found at intervals along the coast as far as Bani, west of Santo Domingo. To the west at the mouth of the Yaque del Sur at Barahona new territory has been planted in sugar within the last five years. The Barahona peninsula itself is arid.

Population. The first census of the Dominican Republic ever taken was completed in the summer of 1921. This showed a total population of 894,587, a little over 45 per square mile, or about one-fourth the density of Haiti. Of these some 500,000 live to the north of the central range; 394,000, to the south. The crop areas indicated on the map on page 112 also indicate fairly accurately the location of the mass of the population, although there are scattered households everywhere. The country can support many times its present population. To the total given above it is stated that three or four thousand should be added to allow for foreign workers at San Pedro de Macoris. Why these were not included is not stated.

Origin. In the Dominican Republic one occasionally sees the high cheek bones and straight black hair which suggest the Indian. History tells us that the racial antagonisms were never as severe here as in Haiti nor did slavery

take as cruel aspects. The Spaniard mingled his blood freely with Indian and Negro. The Dominican averages a shade lighter than the Haitian; otherwise there is no apparent difference save the suggestion of Indian at times. The percentage of white ancestry is larger, but there are practically no families of pure whites in the country save those of recent immigrants. An American lady of mature years chancing to talk to some young marines one evening in Santiago invited them to have some ice cream with her. They did not immediately respond and after a bit, thinking they were timid, she repeated the invitation. They accepted, asking however, "You are an American are you not?" At the restaurant one youth naïvely said: "You see there are so many people here who look white in the evening and much darker the next morning that we have to be very careful."

Immigration. There are a few hundred Spaniards or Spanish colonials in the country who have come over for business and a handful of other Europeans and Americans. While it is the desire of Dominicans to encourage such immigration and to attract if possible Spanish farmers, much of the white population is of men temporarily employed who do not intend to remain. To this number must be added many thousand laborers on the sugar plantations who have come from all over the West Indies. Some of them remain but the majority return home. The only source of present immigration of any importance is that from Haiti. This began about a generation ago. The Haitians came in to do any kind of day labor but have settled down to remain. Already they form a very considerable part of the population of some of the towns. I have heard the number in Santiago estimated as 2,500 or 3,000 out of a population of perhaps

20,000. The Dominicans are not keen about this increase. The importation of oriental or negro labor is prohibited by their old law but they have always granted permits to the sugar plantations. Their antagonism is in part historical resentment against the Haitians first, because they once held the territory, and secondly because the Dominicans want to be considered as white while they believe the Haitians to be black.

Land Ownership. The Dominicans are essentially a nation of landowners. The scarcity of population, the abundance of land, has given all a chance. This fact must be kept in mind for out of it flow some important results. The country has never been surveyed. Titles are in great confusion. Not only have many titles come down through long periods of time with the boundaries inadequately described but there has also grown up a system of money or peso titles, as they are called. Instead of trying to divide the inheritance, each heir was given a certificate that he owned so many peso's worth of certain lands. These certificates have been passed from hand to hand and many fraudulent titles have appeared. As in Haiti this is a situation calling for settlement. In the south in the cattle and sugar regions the land seems to be held in large tracts by relatively few families. In the Cibao while there are large farms the average holding seems to be small. One competent observer says that in the richer portions the individual family holds about thirty acres of which he probably cultivates ten. The Military Government has established a land court which is grappling with this problem.

Agriculture. The methods of the Dominicans do not differ greatly from those of the Haitians. The machete is here also the chief tool in agriculture. The difference that one notes, however,

is that here and there modern machinery is appearing. It was my pleasure to see one large farm whose owner prided himself on his efforts to follow improved methods of agriculture. He was even trying to introduce some American fruit trees. He had over 100 of the best pigs I saw on the island. Out of his own money he was building a road to connect with the main highway. The Dominican farmers are more prosperous than the Haitian. One finds here actual plantings of cane, cacao, tobacco, and bananas, to a far greater extent than in Haiti. Most of these valuable crops are carelessly handled, and the products are not of the highest grade. For sometime prior to the financial depression the Military Government was employing some thirty agricultural advisers, was maintaining trial plots, was importing machinery which it sold at cost, and was introducing good seed.

Sugar. The most valuable crop of the country is sugar. This is grown chiefly in the south although there is a little grown at Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi. The soil and climate are so favorable that replanting is unnecessary for fifteen or twenty years and I have seen fields said to have remained in sugar over thirty years. Owing to the enormous cost of the mills sugar is produced chiefly on large plantations. Of these there are about a dozen, most of which are today under American control. Two of the largest are La Romana in the east, where the investment is stated to be some \$7,000,000, with 16,000 acres in cane and a labor force of 7,500, and Barahona in the west. This is a new plantation which is grinding this winter for the first time. The investment here is said to be over \$10,000,000. A splendid plant has been built with adequate provision for houses for the employes. The total possible sugar production is a

matter of conjecture but several times the present output can be grown.

Domestic Animals. The Dominican appears to have more and better cattle and horses than the Haitian. He (and she) are very fond of their horses and are superb riders. Some use is made of the stock for draught purposes. Goats are very common.

Housing. In the Dominican Republic nearly all the houses in rural districts are made of palm boards. One rarely sees a mud-plastered cabin. The roofs are of palm, metal being preferred by the better situated. The rural homes are at times very attractive, with well-kept yards, decorated with flowering or brightly colored shrubs. If on the main roads, there is often a neatly kept hedge which gives evidence of considerable pride. I am told that the new roads are having a marked influence in stimulating the better care of premises. There are few outbuildings and latrines are almost non-existent. The running streams are the main water supply, but in the Cibao there are many cisterns and a few wells. In the towns the architecture is Spanish. The houses are generally directly adjoining the street, giving the passer-by full opportunity to get glimpses of domestic scenes as doors and windows are wide open till closed at night. In every town is the square often so elaborately planted that no open place is left. These parks are the center of the evening social life. Late in the afternoon the girls and boys are promenading and in the evening their parents are also in evidence. Here are given the band concerts which everyone attends. The main streets of the larger towns are more or less macadamized. The sidewalks are very narrow, at times two or three feet above the street level, and not infrequently at different levels in front of two adjoining properties, so great care is needed.

Sanitation. As regards health there seems to be no great difference between the two ends of the island. The prevailing diseases are the same. An American doctor in charge of a local hospital spoke of the amount of surgical work needed in a country with few doctors, none, practically, in rural districts. He also had noted a gain in weight of patients after entering the hospital, thus confirming casual observation as to the inadequacy of food eaten. In the Dominican Republic the French law prevails that a doctor cannot carry or give medicine; instead, the patient must be examined by the doctor and medicine then secured from a druggist. This leads to doubling of charges, to much neglect of suffering among the poor and to hardship in emergency cases. While such a law may have its advantages in France it is worse than foolish under Dominican conditions. The druggists are said to charge often \$4 for simple medicine, which costs but a few cents, and which the physician would probably give the patient. The number of apothecary shops in all the towns and the amount of patent medicine carried, leads the visitor to accept as low the estimate that 5 per cent of the total income is spent for drugs.

Epidemics have been rare here as in Haiti but the country suffered severely from the "flu" and in the autumn of 1921 the smallpox epidemic had crossed the border line from Haiti and was spreading rapidly. Yet an American critic of the administration was condemning it for buying vaccine points. At first the papers and local doctors ridiculed the diagnosis of the disease as smallpox. One Spanish doctor, having first vaccinated his own family, made speeches against the vaccine campaign and condemned the vaccine which he, himself, had used. By the end of October the papers were condemning the

government for not taking more energetic measures. While there are some good physicians in the towns nurses are scarce and hospital facilities are grossly inadequate. There are no sewers in the town. A new leprosarium is nearly ready for occupancy.

The Family. The girls are strictly chaperoned in the better families and marriage is said to be impossible to one who has fallen. In the lower classes concubinage is common. The illegitimate birth rate is high, varying in different regions. No reliable figures can be secured. Formerly one civil official issued the license while the ceremony was performed by another or by a priest. Under the present law the priest can issue the license also, while one civil official can issue license and perform ceremony. This change was introduced to try to limit common-law marriage. As a rule, marriage is contracted early and large families abound. Prior to June 13, 1918 (Executive Order No. 168) there seems to have been no legal requirement that parents should support their children.

Labor. In the rural districts the men and women work side by side and both are seen on the roads taking produce to market. In the towns the lower class women work not only as servants but in the factories. Until lately the higher class women did no work outside their own homes, and not much there, according to common report, but now, since a number of young women from Porto Rico have set the example, many Dominican girls are found in government offices as clerks and stenographers. The Dominican is reputed a rather capable but rather unreliable laborer. In considerable measure this is said to be due to the prevalency of land ownership. Having his own land he does not care to work regularly for others. He likes to take contracts, if not of too long dur-

ation, but cannot be relied on for steady performance. He appears to be good with machinery. It has long been necessary to bring in outside laborers for the sugar plantations because of these conditions and the roads are today being constructed by Haitian labor. In some of the poorer districts, the Dominicans are said to be much steadier as day laborers. Common labor was being paid from eighty cents a day up in 1921 and it was claimed that few would work at the bottom price. In the towns, perhaps as a result of American influence, the washerwomen were charging as much as is charged in our big eastern cities. The upper class man rather despises manual labor.

Personal Traits. From the standpoint of culture there are great differences between the higher and lower classes, for in the Dominican Republic, also, the middle class is hardly existent. Both, however, have traits in common. They are intensely proud of their Spanish connection and think and speak of themselves as Latins. One almost never sees burdens carried on their heads, a custom so characteristic of Haiti. They are kindhearted and generous to their friends, though rather indifferent to suffering. Courtesy is a mantle to be worn on all occasions. They are outwardly polite regardless of their feelings. They will stand on the sidewalk or street blocking your way but with no thought that they are inconveniencing you. Though I was in the country when the newspaper agitation was at its height never once was I treated in discourteous fashion. Among themselves the young men are said to be rather given to fighting—"They are always at it," said one young woman. In pre-Occupation day everyone carried a weapon and the one most desired was a pearl-handled forty-four caliber revolver. Homicide was common.

Amusements. There are a goodly number of creditable newspapers in the various towns and these are sold on the streets more freely than in Haiti. Rumor and surmise are more prominent than news. There are more and better bookstores than in Haiti but the stores carry a large supply of Spanish stories either of the wild-west type or extremely salacious. Reading is not a general habit although the clubs will have well-bound editions of the classics. The movies are well-patronized but the films are extremely poor and one must wonder what sort of an impression they give of America. There are some good bands in the different towns.

Business. Here, as in Haiti, "big business" is in the hands of foreigners and many of the better shops are conducted by Spaniards or Porto Ricans. There are a good many Syrians who have not encountered as much opposition as in Haiti. A few American enterprises have been started, such as the electric light and water works system formerly supplying Puerto Plata and Santiago, just now in a state of suspended animation owing to inability of the company to continue old rates under war conditions and the refusal of the Dominicans to modify the contract in satisfactory manner. The leading banks are the International Banking Corporation, which is under the City National Bank of New York, the Royal Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Nova Scotia, the latter a newcomer. Save the sugar estates there seem to be few agricultural enterprises in foreign hands.

Manufactures. Factories are not numerous in the country but there are a number of distilleries where rum is made, which are owned and operated by Dominicans. During the War a well-equipped safety match factory was started at Puerto Plata which is turning out a good grade of match

which finds ready sale throughout the country. There are two cigar factories making excellent cigars, both Dominican owned and operated, in addition to cigaret factories of foreign ownership. A great quantity of cigars are made in homes and small workshops for local consumption.

Railroads. There are only two lines of railroad doing a general business, with a combined mileage of about 150 miles. The Dominican Central Railway runs from Puerto Plata through Santiago to Moca, 60 miles. This was built by foreign interests but was taken over by the government in 1908. It is a narrow gauge and climbs up a grade of 11% from the coast in order to reach the Cibao. The second road, the Samana and Santiago Railway, runs from Moca to Samana with branches to San Fernando de Macoris and La Vega. Although not standard gauge it differs from the first so no cars can be transferred. No railroad runs from the northern to the southern part of the country and while the project has often been discussed there is no present prospect that such a road could pay expenses. On the sugar estates in the south there are 225 miles of private roads. There is also a short line of some five miles connecting Azua with its port.

Roads. Prior to the Occupation there were few wagon roads in the country although an excellent beginning had been made. Transportation was largely on horseback. There was no wagon road even between the Capital and the Cibao and the journey from Santiago to Santo Domingo was a matter of days even under favorable conditions. I shall want to speak of the public works again so will only add that it is now possible to go from Monte Cristi to the Capital in an automobile with the single exception of a gap of some twenty-five miles in the

mountains, which will be entirely closed in a few months. Even now the trip from the Capital to Santiago is sometimes made in one long day.

About 1912 an American engineer was put in charge and some good roads were built, but he seems to have encountered much opposition and the appropriations were irregular and the funds wasted on disconnected bits of road. To what extent this was due to local politics, to what extent to the official who had been trained as an electrical engineer instead of a civil engineer, or to his lack of tact and uncompromising honesty, I cannot say.

Ports. There are docks at Puerto Plata, La Romana (dock belongs to sugar company but is open to others), San Pedro de Macoris, Santo Domingo and Barahona; elsewhere lighters are used. There are a number of lights on the coast. The harbors are not in very good condition, never having been adequately dredged.

Steamship Lines. The Clyde Line has had a monopoly much of the time in the trade with the United States. Now at least two other lines send freight steamers regularly. The French line gives direct connection with Europe. There is also frequent connection with Porto Rico.

Commerce. The foreign trade of the Dominican Republic estimated by five-year periods is as shown below.

This table indicates a very gratifying increase in the total foreign trade but a considerable part of the increase after 1914 is due to war-time prices, just like the terrific slump which came in 1921, and has little re-

lation to production. The production of sugar has been doubled from 85,000 tons in 1910 to about 185,000 in 1920. A large part of this commerce is with the United States. For instance, in 1919-20 the United States trade represented 77 per cent of the imports and 87 per cent of the exports; 13 per cent more of the imports were from Porto Rico and to Porto Rico went 2.6 per cent of the exports.

For the year 1918, which can be taken as typical, the chief imports and exports were as shown in the table on page 173.

Economic Situation. The rapid increase in commerce brought great prosperity to the country. The crops were good; the prices were high. During the War there was no special shortage of anything. Those who had previously eaten white bread did not have to make substitutions. The money income was great, both for the individual and the state. The merchants seemingly expected the boom to last forever. They were given extremely liberal credit both by banks and by American houses. After the War there seems to have been a good deal of "dumping" here as well as in Haiti. It was not until 1921 that the significance of the War came home to the Dominicans. Suddenly there was no market for their goods. Merchants could not sell because no one could pay. In the summer of 1921 the Dominicans did not declare a moratorium. It was not necessary. They simply stopped paying their bills. I saw many accounts settled for 35c on the dollar. A banker told me that the banks had failed to

FOREIGN TRADE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1905-1920

	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Total</i>
1905	\$2,736,828	\$6,896,098	\$9,632,926
1910	6,257,291	10,849,623	17,107,314
1915	9,118,514	15,209,061	24,327,575
1920	46,525,876	58,731,241	105,257,117

foresee the crash and were caught with large loans outstanding. He said that his guess was that the loans of very doubtful value today ran from about \$12,000,000 and \$7,000,000 to \$2,000,000 for the three largest banks. The warehouses are loaded with goods bought at high prices which cannot be sold for more than a fraction of the original cost. This situation and the uncertainty of the future have greatly increased the discontent against the Americans, who, in some mysterious way, are held responsible. The government tried to save the tobacco growers by buying crop at a price above the market. It has the tobacco on its hands and the outcome is uncertain.

The Future. In time the crisis just mentioned will be met and conditions become normal. The country is relatively undeveloped. The climate and soil are good, although one needs to be very careful of the exaggerated statements often made. Probably not more than 10 per cent of the soil is really first-class. But a growing season practically twelve months long and a soil of average fertility wherever the water supply is ample, accomplishes wonders. Schoenrich is correct in speaking of Santo Domingo as the country with a future. Nature has done her part. What will man do?

Schools. In 1915 the Dominican Republic did not own a single school-building. Rural schools were almost unknown, not exceeding eighty-four

in number, the superintendent told me. The total school enrollment was about 18,000. While there were some public schools in rented buildings dependence seems to have been placed on the private, subsidized schools, the subsidy depending wholly on political influence. The teachers were paid very little and very irregularly. There was little supervision of the schools. Diplomas and certificates were given with very little reference to qualifications. Numerous private secondary schools existed, "all issuing diplomas none of which required proper preparation therefor and most of which required practically none." There were two Institutes of Social Studies and one Professional Institute whose functions seem have been to furnish salaried positions and a poorly equipped and inadequately supported University. The government sent some fourteen students abroad but there was complaint as to method of selection. On paper there was a comprehensive system but, as Mr. Lane once wrote, "The code of education was a pompous collection of inane provisions." Probably the best way of measuring the efficiency of the school system is the fact that about 90 per cent of the population was illiterate. The children of the well-to-do were educated abroad, often in the United States, if light enough in color to pass as white. There was little interest in general education save in limited groups. Here as elsewhere

CHIEF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR THE YEAR 1918

<i>Percentage of Total Imports</i>		<i>Percentage of Total Exports</i>	
22.46	Foodstuffs	61.90	Sugar, incl. cane and molasses
18.46	Cotton	21.64	Cacao
9.57	Machinery and Apparatus	7.39	Tobacco (leaf)
7.61	Iron, steel and manufacturing	1.30	Hides (cattle)
5.51	Fibres, vegetable and manufacturing	1.05	Honey
3.97	Hides, skins and manufacturing	1.02	Coffee
3.14	Mineral oils	.85	Goatskins
2.41	Woods and manufacturing	.80	Beeswax

were individuals, prophets of a new order like the Porto Rican, Eugenio M. DeHostos, whose name is spoken in reverence by the Dominicans.

Religion. The Roman Catholic Church is dominant in the country. To a large extent its churches have been built from public funds and there is some dispute as to whether the buildings are or are not the property of the state. With the exception of a small handful of Spanish Franciscans, all the priests are natives. The present Archbishop is very popular but the priests as a body are despised rather than respected, both by foreigners and educated natives. Rome appears to have little control of the situation. The local priests live openly with their women and their families are not limited to one. Drunkenness is frequent among them. The French priests of Haiti are disgusted with them. Judging by appearances the Dominican men have only a formal contact with the church, the great mass of attendants at meetings being women. The Protestant churches in the country are few and feeble. A number of denominations maintain missions. Except among the immigrants one finds no traces of the Voodooism so dominant in Haiti.

Government. The constitution establishes a representative form of government. The Senate is composed of twelve members, one from each province, elected for six years. The Chamber of Deputies has twenty-four members, two from each province. Suffrage is extended to all males over eighteen years of age. The Congress is supposed to meet each year on February 27 for a period of ninety days which may be extended sixty days if necessary.

The president is elected for six years. There is no vice-president, Congress choosing his successor in an emergency.

The Cabinet consists of the secretaries of the seven departments:

The Department of the Interior and the Police, which oversees the administration of the provinces, the municipalities, and the police force and has charge of the archives.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, which has charge of the consular and diplomatic corps and foreign relations.

The Department of the Treasury and Commerce, which collects and disburses public funds and prepares statistics.

The Department of War and Navy, which attends to all matters of public defense.

The Department of Justice and Public Instruction, which has in its charge courts and prisons, matters of education, and all things pertaining to the Roman Catholic Church.

The Department of Agriculture and Immigration, whose title is self-explanatory but whose accomplishments have never been very striking.

The Department of Promotion and Communications, which controls all public works and the granting of patents, trade-marks and mining claims.

There are twelve provinces, each with its own appointed governor who is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Interior and Police. In actual life these governors have often ruled as petty kings and have sought to rival or "oust" the president. Their powers are considered too large by some of the ablest Dominicans. The provinces are divided into communes with necessary local officials.

Courts. In each commune there is at least one local court (*alcadía*), sixty-three in all. Each province has one court of the first instance. There are courts of appeal at Santiago and Santo Domingo (possibly a third at LaVega—my authorities are conflicting), the number of whose judges can

be increased but not diminished by the president, and a Supreme Court at Santo Domingo. The last consists of a presiding judge and six assistants according to the constitution, but I believe there were but five at the time of my visit.

The legal codes are almost literal translations of French codes of the middle of the nineteenth century with few adaptations to local conditions. The legal books are usually French. The courts have been poorly equipped either with furniture or books. There has been little supervision of judges or lawyers and the average standard is not considered very high.

The Dominican courts seem to have aroused much less antagonism than those of Haiti. There is little evidence of discrimination against the foreigner. There are, of course, curious decisions. On one of the sugar plantations an automobile driven by a man probably intoxicated and carrying the owner also intoxicated attempted to cross a railroad track one night at about two o'clock. It was struck by a train which was being backed down the track with the engine at the further end, a brakeman carrying a lantern on the front car. Damage suit was brought and the court held that the chauffeur, brakeman, engineer and fireman were equally responsible and imprisoned all of them while it fined the sugar company \$500. This was paid as the company feared to fight. This case probably indicates an attitude towards corporations not unknown elsewhere rather than an attempt to penalize the foreigner. Incompetency rather than crookedness is the burden of the criticisms.

Attitude Toward the Law. As regards the attitude towards constituted government little need be said. One recent writer has thus summarized the situation: "During Santo Domingo's seventy years of national life, nineteen

constitutions have been promulgated, and there have been fifty-three presidents, but three of whom have completed terms of office for which they had been elected. Two were killed, twenty deposed, and the others resigned more or less willingly." There were thirty-five presidents between 1863 and 1916, thirteen between 1899 and 1917 and seven between 1911 and 1916. It is evident that the central government has never been any too secure. The fact is that most of the time there was active revolt in some part of the country. Although the president appointed the governors he had to take the strongest men even though these were opposed to him. At one time a provincial governor controlled part of the city of Santiago while the rest was ruled by the commandant of the fortress there. Here another governor was raising his own army and handling revenues with little regard for national laws while elsewhere a private citizen owning a great territory ruled as a feudal lord, gathering to himself criminals and malcontents from other regions. Where the opposition did not dare come out into the open guerrilla warfare and banditry flourished, often supported by politicians in the towns. Between these political bandits and roaming criminals no hard and fast line can be drawn. I am informed that even the strongest of the rulers like the despot Hereaux, dictator from 1881 to 1889, or Caceres, who was assassinated in 1911, had never entirely suppressed the brigands, particularly in the eastern district. The Dominicans have never attained that respect for law without which orderly government is impossible.

Nominally a republic, the actual government has been a despotism. There have never been political parties as we understand them. There have been parties named after their leaders

but their programs have been identical, that is, to get into office. It is difficult to point to any measure undertaken by any government for the benefit of the country. There have been no free elections worthy of the name, though there have been contests between these personal followings. The voting has been under direction.

Graft. In a country so managed it must be expected that officials will try to make private profit out of their positions. This is freely admitted. The politician has dodged his taxes as have other influential men. For instance in 1917 with some sixty-six stills operating in the north the internal revenue from them was less than \$15,000 a month, but when in 1919 an American was put in charge and the stills reduced to nine, the revenue increased to \$35,000 a month. In the province of Santiago, with from twenty-two to twenty-eight stills operating between 1912 and 1917, the total revenue was about \$55,000, but in the first seven months of 1918, one still alone in Santiago paid \$57,000 revenue. A competent observer said that his guess was that the graft in the civil pay roll was not more than 5 per cent but that big money was made on supplies for the army and in financing revolutions. This last was the origin of a large part of the old fortunes of the country. Everywhere the people believe that the officials are grafting. Formerly every cigar had to have a separate revenue label and it was forbidden to remove this until the cigar was partially consumed. Now each box or package

must have a label and I was told in Santiago that probably three-fourths of the cigars smoked had paid no dues as only the larger factories could be made to observe the law. I cite this to show the attitude of the common man. He does not believe that any official is honest and knows that he would not be if given similar opportunities. Bonding companies are significantly absent.

We are often told that the revolutions were practically bloodless and were really little more than counter-parts of our electoral campaigns, with rifles and revolvers furnishing the fireworks. Aside from the fact that the natives say that the revolutions were becoming more violent, this statement ignores their effect on industry. "The peasants have never had any inducement to save," said a Dominican woman to me one day. It was useless to try to accumulate stock or other property when tomorrow, or next week at the latest, some leader or his gang would come along and seize everything. No continued industry was possible if "volunteer forces" might appear at any time looking for recruits. The handicap to the country was enormous.

It is evident that there are certain fundamental resemblances between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in spite of equally obvious differences. The latter country is a bit further along the road to civilization but is still stumbling over some of the same obstacles. The necessity of an inner change in the attitude of the leaders is just as acute.

CHAPTER II

The Military Government

AFTER the flight of Morales in 1906, Caceres became president of the Dominican Republic and was re-elected in 1908. He was assassinated on November 19, 1911, and replaced by Victoria, who was elected constitutional president on February 27, 1912. Revolution broke out and the United States sent a commission which helped effect an agreement between the leaders of the opposing factions. The Dominican Congress assembled and accepted the resignation of Victoria, electing the Archbishop, Adolfo A. Nouel, as president. In spite of his personal popularity he was not a strong executive and after a brief time resigned in disgust. Bordas became provisional president, April 14, 1913, and served for one year. There were other revolutions and another commission went down from Washington. The resignation of Bordas was arranged and Baez became provisional president, August 27, 1914. In October, Jiminez was elected president, taking office in December. For a time all was quiet but in April, 1916, Arias, the Secretary of War, deposed Jiminez and assumed power. With the consent of Jiminez, American forces were landed on May 5 with orders to support Jiminez and Arias was notified that he would not be recognized as president. The Dominican Congress then chose as provisional president a prominent physician who had given up his profession to enter politics and who had lived many years in Cuba, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal.

As a condition of its recognition of the new government the United States suggested a convention similar to the one with Haiti (which is reprinted on page 152). This the Dominicans abso-

lutely declined. The American authorities then refused to turn over to the government the revenues collected. Finally Washington resolved to end the trouble and order the naval forces to take entire charge. So on November 29, 1916, there was set up "The Military Government of the United States in Santo Domingo," which has remained in complete control since. The governor has been an admiral of the United States Navy, more correctly a series of them. All the high officers of the central administration have been Americans.

Lack of Definite Reasons. So far as I can learn, Washington has never given either to the Americans or to the Dominicans a definite statement of the reasons leading to the intervention, except the brief statement in the Knapp proclamation that the intervention was to help establish stable government in order that treaty obligations might be kept. It is not publicly known just what men advised such intervention. Until some of the inner facts are revealed it is difficult for the outer world properly to evaluate the courses followed or to award praise or blame. The Dominicans understood at first that a legation guard was to be landed; then that men were being sent to prevent damage by revolutionists; but the subsequent demands of the United States make these seem but excuses. I have indicated that from the American standpoint the Dominicans had not, perhaps because they could not, lived up to the pledge not to increase the debt without the previous consent of Washington. The preceding paragraph indicates a great deal of internal turmoil. In all of this, however,

neither American lives nor property were jeopardized so far as known.

Prominent Americans and Dominicans have told me that they believe that Washington knew of certain plans of Germany to use the island if opportunity offered and, inasmuch as we were not then at war, thought it better to forestall such a possibility. If this were the main reason it is difficult to understand why President Wilson waited until December, 1920, before proposing to withdraw the troops. Some Dominicans believe that Washington more or less identified the Haitian situation with the Dominican and failed to appreciate the differences. It may be that European countries urged our government to intervene. So I was told by one of the highest officials under Mr. Wilson. There is no evidence whatever that this action was due to any underhanded or grasping motives. This the Dominicans admit for they, and I, believe it was done in good faith as a matter of necessity. I should like to know, nevertheless, just what the reasons were. Admitting then that only the strongest arguments could have induced Mr. Wilson to order an occupation seemingly so contradictory to certain principles emphasized by him, and admitting good faith, it is possible that the action was a grave mistake. Here, then, is the fundamental question which makes all the problems of actual administration of our trust insignificant but upon which we must suspend judgment until all the facts are known.

No Evidence of Policy. Whatever the facts prove to be in regard to the reasons for occupation, there is no evidence that Washington had at the outset, or has developed since, any well-thought out policy or program. It presented a scheme for a new treaty as already mentioned. When this was refused and anarchy threatened, Wash-

ington, finding its hands forced, ordered the Navy to assume full control. Under such circumstances one would naturally assume that the officials in the Dominican Republic would be given a policy to be carried out. No trace of any such policy can be found. Seemingly Washington has drifted along in a hopeful attitude, settling problems as they have arisen but holding no clear vision of what it wants to do. The men on the ground have been left to their own devices. Admiral Knapp decided to interfere as little as possible and Washington was satisfied. Admiral Snowden, who is reported to have said that he "would be damned if he did anything and damned if he didn't," decided on the former course and Washington was just as satisfied. Whether the State Department and the Navy Department saw eye to eye is a matter of doubt. Certain important recommendations of both military and civilian representatives were quite contrary to the policy of withdrawal announced by Mr. Wilson and I am told that the local officials knew nothing of this decision until they received the declaration with order to publish. If it be true that Washington had no policy, it is a reflection on our methods. It has put our representatives on the island in an unfair position for they are supposed to be the executors of our policy, not the originators. I have sought to make this point clear before discussing what the Occupation has done, because of its bearing on our final verdict.

It would be hard to find a more responsible or more anomalous position than that of the admiral called on to serve as governor of the Dominican Republic. His immediate assistants were fellow officers many of whom, in keeping with American traditions, did not know the language of the country. In the provinces were the old native

officials, the governors, the communal councils, etc. The old system of courts with native judges existed. Congress was no more. If new laws were needed there was no way to get them except to issue executive orders and 589 such had been issued by December 31, 1920. But would the courts recognize and enforce these new laws? It is obvious that while the governor might obtain the best native advice on modifications of the old laws (which was often asked) he could not count on the hearty co-operation of the people, particularly of the educated class, which was most likely to feel antagonistic. Regardless of the wisdom or the necessity of his decisions there was sure to be sharp criticism. As a matter of fact, he has been compelled to issue orders which affect nearly all departments of the national life. It is out of the question to consider all of these and we can only indicate some of the more important changes made and describe some of the new programs, and indicate the nature of the criticisms. I should add that the policy has been to employ Dominicans wherever possible.

Preservation of Order. While there was some armed opposition to the marines when they entered the country this was speedily overcome. The military problem became a police problem. There had always been armed individuals and at times armed bands in various parts of the country whose suppression had been difficult, both because of the nature of the country and because they were more or less supported by public sentiment. As already stated there was no hard and fast line between the roaming criminals and the revolting politicians, the "gavilleros" as they are locally called. The peasants feared to oppose or denounce them and their fear was justified. Even the big sugar estates formerly "paid for protection" and I am

told that they have continued this policy even under the Military Government. To assist in suppressing such trouble the natives were required to surrender all arms and it has been very difficult to get a permit to possess even a shot gun. One result of this policy, which is approved incidentally by all thinking Dominicans, has been a great reduction in homicide. A prominent man told me that in the province of Santiago prior to the Occupation there were about 300 homicides a year and that since there have been only 50 a year. Many Dominicans freely admitted the truth of the statement. This means that over a thousand Dominicans are alive and, we will hope, well, who would have been dead had the old conditions obtained. This number, let us note, is many times the total of all the atrocities ever charged against all the Americans in the entire country.

There was an increase of banditry in the summer of 1921. About the middle of September I heard that arms from Mexico, via Jamaica, had been landed at Monte Cristi, their delivery having been arranged by prominent men of San Pedro de Macoris. I was not greatly surprised to learn that in the round-up made at the end of the month after the English manager of a sugar estate near this town had been kidnapped and held for ransom, brand new Smith and Wesson arms with new ammunition were captured. The politicians in the towns, hoping for the early departure of the Americans, were starting their old games.

Barring such local affairs the entire country has been at peace and the foreigner as well as the native can go about freely without fear. Evidence of a changed order is seen in the fact that many peasants who had formerly hidden their cabins away from the main roads are coming out of the brush and building new homes on the high-

ways. Everywhere I found that now they feel safe and have no fear either for themselves or their possessions. The peasant appreciates the substitution of order for the old revolutions. Of course, arms and ammunition are smuggled in once in a while. In one case the crew on one of the Clyde liners had planned to deliver a considerable quantity which they could have sold at great profit but the shipment was discovered. There are, however, few arms of any account in the hands of the public.

Police Force. The Military Government has built up a local force known at first as the "Guardia" and still so called except in official papers. (For some reason the name was changed in June, 1921, to *Policía Nacional Dominicana*.) This consists of some 800 men, officered by Americans, and is very similar to the Gendarmerie of Haiti, although its duties are more limited. The pay of privates is \$15 per month. It is criticised by the Dominicans just as the Gendarmerie is by the Haitians. Its officers however feel that it is to become a valuable asset to the country. I suspect that much of the local opposition is due to its control by Americans. Some of the papers in 1921 tried to start a movement to condemn as traitors those who served in it.

Internal Revenue. While on the island I learned that after 1904 very great frauds grew up in connection with the internal revenue. In the report submitted in November, 1920, by Lieutenant Commander A. H. Mayo, the officer administering the Department of State and Commerce, I find ample confirmation of this statement and from his report I take the statements in this paragraph. The total internal revenue collected in 1916 was \$782,144; in 1917, \$1,232,697; in 1918, \$1,697,163; in 1919, \$3,014,230 and in 1920, about \$4,000,000 (I do not have

the exact figure at hand). The amount collected on alcohol, which had averaged about \$210,000 per year from 1909 to 1916, rose to \$511,000 in 1918 and to \$809,000 in 1919. In July, 1917, the largest distillery was sued for fraud and paid out of court the sum of \$64,-340.10 to settle the case. Commander Mayo adds:

The frauds committed in the administration of the alcohol tax were far exceeded by the illegal traffic in stamps and stamped paper. Government stamps and stamped paper had been used by the government, or by the officials of the government, to barter for the purpose of obtaining ready cash, and both were often sold in large quantities at an almost ruinous discount. Officials of the government frequently collected commissions on such sales.

Elsewhere he states:

Enforcement of the old license law has been in the hands of the local municipal governments. Due to poor methods and the practice of selling the right to collect taxes, it was not a success. Of the many taxes imposed and collected by the municipalities it is doubtful if more than 70 per cent of the taxes due and payable were ever collected and in all cases the cost of collection was enormously high, often reaching as much as 50 per cent.

It is estimated that the municipal collections did not exceed \$260,000, while in 1919 under the new system \$630,305 was secured. These changes of great advantage to the country have been brought about largely by the systematizing of the work, the discharge of a large number of dishonest men, the introduction of a local bonding system supported by the employes themselves and not by an increase in the taxes themselves.

Direct Taxation. The tax on land created by executive order No. 282 on April 10, 1919, is in many ways the most important change made by the Americans. The original order con-

tained some foolish provisions such as the attempt to graduate the tax on the amount of land held, not on its producing power, which had to be changed. Leading Dominicans admit the value of the tax and there is little chance of its future abolition. The rate of the tax is one-half of one per cent on the assessed valuation. This law compelled the development of a force of assessors and Porto Ricans seem to have been selected at first. There is much complaint of the way they did the work but it is difficult to determine the justice in the complaints. As a fact, the difficulties were no greater than one would anticipate and experience will show what changes are needed.

The law has succeeded already in destroying many fraudulent titles. The declared valuation of the real property was \$141,000,000. The tax collected in 1919 was \$740,924 and in 1920, something over \$900,000. The collections in 1921 ran considerably behind this sum. This was due in part to the financial depression; in part it was the result of the belief that the Americans would soon withdraw and that a native government would repeal the law. As a rule the people had accepted the law without much objection but some, of course, were antagonistic. One former provincial governor, for instance, refused to pay until given the privilege of paying within twenty-four hours or going to court.

Handling of Funds. The American officials deserve great credit for their work in developing the financial methods of the government, in introducing system, in securing honest employes, and in avoiding the least suspicion of any graft or dishonesty on their own part. For once, at least, the government funds have been honestly administered. It is to be hoped that the Dominicans appreciate these facts. So well have affairs been administered

that all obligations have been met in spite of the fact that the salaries of employes have been materially increased, and by 1920 there was a surplus of some \$4,000,000 in the treasury. Just now the situation is changed. The officials do not seem to have realized the near approach of a financial crisis in the world's affairs which would involve the Dominican Republic. It is now common to condemn these officials, but we must not forget that the local banks were equally shortsighted. I am inclined to the belief that some people in the United States were no better informed.

Education. The Dominicans freely state that the impetus given public education is one of the best things done by the Americans. Rufus H. Lane, who was in charge of the school work, appears to have been one of the best men we have sent down; at least the Dominicans are enthusiastic about him. No less enthusiastic over the schools is his Dominican successor. Since the Americans came the number of rural schools has increased from 84, with about 1,000 children enrolled (average attendance 40 per cent) to 489. The salary of the teachers has increased from \$5 and \$10 a month to \$55 and the salary is regularly paid. (After the financial crisis the salary was reduced to \$40 as an emergency measure.) There are today 489 rural primary schools, 49 primary city schools, 69 graded schools, 6 industrial schools, 4 special schools, 2 normal schools, as well as the University which has been somewhat reorganized. The total enrollment has increased to 100,000. It is estimated that some sixty to sixty-five thousand children have learned to read and write. In some rural districts the census showed that 20 per cent of the population could read and write and that nearly all of these were children under sixteen.

In the towns there is a school-day of five hours. In the country there are two sessions of three hours each for different groups of children, thus enabling the building to do double duty. In the hurricane of September, 1921, many schoolhouses were wrecked and many of these were among the first buildings to be repaired. Even the *bandits* are alleged to have forced such repairs. Local school organizations have been started even in rural communities, which have built many schoolhouses. Five excellent buildings have been erected by the government, two in Santo Domingo, two in San Pedro de Macoris and one in Azua. Plans had been made to erect many others but there were many difficulties encountered. Some towns refused to give sites. No reliable contractors could be secured in the North and by the time outside contractors were ready to bid the slump came and all projects had to be abandoned. Meantime, expecting other buildings to be ready and knowing the delays incident to importing, the school authorities had made large purchases in the United States of desks and other supplies which must now be stored.

Curiously enough it was in connection with the schools that one of the greatest psychological blunders of the Americans was made. Owing to the financial crisis the school-year, 1920-1921, was shortened by two months. This caused a great furore. It seems to have been a regrettable mistake but the Dominicans must not forget that in the old days most of these schools were not open at all. Such shortening of the school-year is not unknown in this country under similar conditions. I trust this new interest in education will not be lost but it is not encouraging to hear in Santo Domingo the common rumor that when the Americans leave one of the fine buildings will be used as

an official residence and not as a school.

Public Works. To the question of permanent public improvements much attention has been paid. It is understood that Admiral Knapp at first favored the construction of a railroad from the Capital to Monte Cristi but later realized that a system of roads was preferable. There was also a crying need for the construction of schoolhouses, for the repair of existing wharves and warehouses and the building of new, for the creation of correctional schools, and asylums for lepers and the insane, and for hospitals. After long study a large program was developed, whose estimated cost was some \$16,000,000. It was proposed to meet this cost by using some three million dollars available in a fund for public works, by setting apart another three millions from the accumulated surplus of government income and by borrowing the balance.

This program was endorsed by the second Pan-American Financial Conference. I am informed that it was also approved by the State Department; at least, such is the understanding of the officials in Santo Domingo. In substance, the State Department is alleged to have said, "Go ahead and spend the six millions and when the balance is needed a loan will be approved." At the beginning of 1921 the officials asked Washington for the loan and were astonished to find that it would not be approved. Finally a loan of \$2,500,000 was allowed in order to meet certain existing obligations and to complete some of the road building program. Doubtless this change of heart was due to the belief that the Americans would soon withdraw but its effect on the program is easily seen.

Roads. Meantime work under way when the Americans entered had been carried on. Many difficulties were encountered. In November, 1917, bids

for road work were advertised in the United States and Porto Rico as well as locally. Two or three American contractors went over the ground but only one bid had been made by April, 1918, and the price submitted was so high that it was immediately rejected. Admiral Knapp wisely decided not to attempt construction on a "cost plus" basis. In 1918 two American contractors submitted a reasonable bid for the construction of fifty kilometers of the road between Monte Cristi and Santiago, the rest having already been laid. This bid was accepted and the work done. In August, 1918, the Department of Public Works was ordered to start another road. The question of labor now arose. The Dominicans had opposed the introduction of Haitians for road building and had been supported by Knapp. But other labor was not available in sufficient numbers. Admiral Snowden became military governor in March, 1920, and shortly thereafter gave his consent to the importation of Haitians. By October, 1920, sufficient engineers had been found and enough labor secured, together with necessary machinery, to create the belief that the main program of roads could be completed by May, 1921. In January, 1921, owing to the failure to secure the loan above mentioned, it was necessary to discharge 90 per cent of the engineers and all of the laborers and stop work entirely. There was no resumption of the work until July 1, 1921, when part of the \$2,500,000 loan became available. The small sum at the disposal of the Department will enable it to finish the main road after a fashion, but that is all. Temporary wooden bridges nine feet wide over some torrential streams must be left instead of the permanent concrete structures planned. The local officials cannot be blamed for the failure of the original program.

From many standpoints this road building has been the most important thing undertaken by the Americans, more important in my own opinion than the building of schoolhouses, and we are making a great mistake in not finishing the job. One Dominican said to me: "You are making a serious blunder by failing to grant the entire sum needed to complete permanent roads. The politicians would howl and the people grumble at first but the roads would be so valuable that in a few years the cost would be a minor matter and the people would be grateful to you for leaving a structure they could not hope to create for themselves." In one community when the work stopped, the citizens gathered together and did a great deal of work to put the road in usable condition. Only one who has gone over the country can appreciate either the need or the difficulties encountered. I sincerely hope that some solution may be found. That the Dominicans appreciate the roads is evidenced by the number of automobiles they have purchased in recent years. Regular bus lines run to all accessible towns about Santiago and the Capital.

Wharves. A new concrete wharf with an adequate warehouse has been built at Puerto Plata replacing an insignificant wooden pier formerly used. The wharf at Santo Domingo has been much enlarged and a fine custom house built. At San Pedro de Macoris a concrete wharf is under construction to replace an old wooden structure. The wharf at Barahona has been enlarged.

Postal Service. In olden days it took from ten to fourteen days to get mail across the country. This service has been greatly improved and will be further expedited when the roads are completed. The graph on page 184 will show the advance made in the last


year. The monthly fluctuations are almost wholly due to weather conditions.

Inasmuch as it is impossible to go further into the details of the work accomplished it may be presented in comparative form by the sketch on page 185 furnished by the Department of Public Works.

It is clearly impossible even to attempt to sketch all the activities of the American officials in administering the government. I have hardly mentioned, for instance, the public health work. I can only summarize by saying that it has been the endeavor to establish such programs as we have found necessary in our own country. Before attempting any general estimate of these attempts it is necessary to consider briefly one or two other matters.

Censorship of the Press. In an order issued November 29, 1916, it was decreed that any comment on the attitude of the United States or with reference to the Occupation must be approved in advance of publication, and the publication of all violent or inflammatory articles or those counselling hostility or resistance to the Military Government were prohibited. There has never been freedom of the press in the Dominican Republic as we understand the term, and the order was doubtless necessary. Its execution, however, and some of the sentences imposed for violation caused much feeling. Censorship is seldom either wise or efficient and probably many blunders were made. The funniest story, for whose truth I cannot vouch, but which was told me by an educated American, ran

TIME REQUIRED FOR MAIL DELIVERY—MONTE CRISTI TO SANTO DOMINGO




(Each cross line represents two hours)

— Fiscal year 1919-20. Average time 3 days 22 hours.
 - - - - - Fiscal year 1920-21. " " 2 " 22 "

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE OBRAS PÚBLICAS
A COMPARISON OF THE WORK DONE BY THE DEPT. OF PUBLIC WORKS
DURING THE THREE AND ONE HALF YEAR PERIOD PRECEDING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION
WITH THE THREE AND ONE HALF YEAR PERIOD FOLLOWING

■ WORK DONE MAY, 1913 TO NOV, 1916 □ WORK DONE NOV, 1916 TO MAY, 1920



as follows: The censor had passed an article in which was described the Bolshevik movement in Russia, and was called to account by a higher official. Subsequently he received an article signed by the same writer and rejected it at once—although it happened to be an article on the Red Cross written by request.

The old Dominican law recognized two types of offensive statements: "difamacion," the allegation of an act affecting the honor or reputation of an individual, and "injuria," an offensive statement not imputing a specific act. The penalty for "difamacion" against the representative of a foreign country was punishable by imprisonment from eight days to three months and a fine of from \$5 to \$10. The publisher was not directly responsible if the offending article was signed by another. "Injuria" was a simple police court matter with a fine of one peso (25c). After the removal of the censorship it was necessary, if any protection were to be given, to change this law and so executive orders No. 572 and No. 573 were issued December 6, 1920. The first of these (Sedition Law) prohibited the publication of (a) any article advocating or defending anarchy or Bolshevism; (b) any proposal to overthrow by force the Military Government, or resistance to its laws and legal orders; (c) any criticism of the Military Government, of the United States, its representatives civil or military, in such form as indicated an intention to provoke disorder or revolt, and (d) any discussion of conditions in the Dominican Republic couched in language which shows an intention to provoke disorder or revolt. The second law (Slander) provided punishment for the libel or slander of civil or military representatives of the United States or similar publications against the government itself. Statements against an individual, if true, are

neither slander nor libel. It is difficult to find just criticism of these laws but they were practically repealed for reasons unknown to me by executive order No. 591 issued early in 1921, which practically limited itself to the prohibition of "doctrines of anarchy" or "doctrines and practices contrary to public morals as understood by all civilized nations."

It seems to be true that the local officials could not count on the backing of Washington and that they were discouraged by the many reversals of verdicts. It is known that Dominicans in Washington wrote home that the papers could say what they chose and could practically laugh at the Military Government. Anyhow, early in 1921 the Dominican papers became not only free in their discussion of local conditions but filled with violent, abusive and insulting comments with reference to Americans. Protests to Washington brought no relief. Leading Dominicans often expressed regret to me that this should be tolerated. To show that I am not drawing on my imagination let two illustrations suffice. The first is taken from the first (and last) issue of *El Machete*, published at Santiago, August 4, 1921.

EULOGY TO THE DOMINICAN MACHETE

Dedicated to Lulu Rodriguez who knows how to interpret the dance of the edge of the machete on white flesh.

Hail to Thee! thou flammiferous cutlas, which, in times past, in the hands of Luperon and Valerio, dulled your edge lopping off the head of the invaders of '83.

Hail, Machete! which on other occasions, solved the problem of an absolute independence, without restrictions, by one act, effected in a sure and bloody manner.

Oh, Machete! your work, effective, regenerative and immediate has been replaced by an act of conservation, which, at the present time is called "prudence."

What is prudence? What is its interpre-

tation? Is it to put up eternally with the opprobrium of a shameful occupation, of an occupation which implies the civil death of the Republic?

Oh Machete! Hail a thousand and one times! because thou, burying thyself in skulls, describing a circle of vindication in space, art the only one which gives that which a people not enslaved aspires to: their liberty.

Machete! thou who art temporarily sleeping the sleep of death, come forth again, brave and triumphant, swift and avenging, in order that those men, in a lethargic state at the present time may be moved; in order that through an act of honor thou mayest revive the fine tradition of '44, kept down today by the ill-omened cetacean of North America which from its maritime positions, surrounded by the waters of the Pacific, kills with one stroke the weak madrepora of the Caribbean Sea.

The writer, one Jorge A. Gonzalez, lacking the courage of his convictions, meekly explained that it was written as a fanciful conceit and that he meant nothing by it. The military authorities decided to sheath the *Machete*.

From the same office and under the same men there appeared another sheet on August 27, 1921, entitled *El Dogal* (The Halter). I quote the last part of an article on "Woman."

Our women are treading a miry path; and I see the mire already coating their fair skins.

It appears as if the women in my country had allowed themselves to be more imbued with the fatal consequences of the morbid and corrupt relations with the Yankee than the men. In the United States there are no moral statutes for the women. The women, enjoying absolute liberty, are in complete moral bankruptcy. The women there lead a very free life; hence the enormous gashes that cut the heart of morality in two. Our girls copy, perhaps unconsciously, some points presented daily before their eyes at the moving picture shows and in the lives of the mercenary women who come to my country from the north, and go

smiling towards a sad destiny, prepared, perhaps, by the infamous intentions of this nefarious intervention.

Nothing whatever was done to the writers or publishers of such scurrilous statements save to warn them and suppress the papers. The regular daily press was at the same time attacking every move made by the American Government or its representatives, asserting the most corrupt motives for every action or decision. Yet the local authorities felt powerless. The reader should not forget that much less offensive utterances in Haiti had resulted in the proclamation of May 26, 1921. It is but another indication of a lack of program at Washington.

The Dominican Reaction. Ask the intelligent Dominican for the best things done in the country by the Americans and he is likely to reply: (1) maintenance of order; (2) development of schools; (3) the tax on land; and (4) the taking of a census. Some would give the road building an important place, but more feel that this is but a continuation of an older program. Practically no one would suggest that the establishment of accounting systems and the emphasis on honest administration deserved attention. Can it be that they are skeptical of the permanency of such efforts?

Ask the same man for a bill of complaint and he will say: (1) cruelty; (2) arbitrary actions; (3) inferiority of officials; (4) multiplications of laws; (5) great increase in salaried positions; (6) failure to understand Dominican psychology.

With reference to the charge of cruelty it must be admitted that there have been many instances, particularly of what the boys would call "rough stuff." However, very few men in reality are charged with these offenses and the critic instantly admits that

they are as nothing compared to the number in the old days. He may say, as one did to me, "But that change is not due to the marines. It is the result of taking away the arms from the people." I still saw a connection. There is another side to the story too. There have been a good many assaults on peaceful marines. The Dominican youth have a pleasant habit of throwing stones when they feel relatively safe and this has led to fights. I knew one fine young marine who was stabbed and killed one evening, apparently because he stopped to speak to some women on the street. I heard of other cases where men had been killed and bodies mutilated.

The local papers tell only one side of the story. When two drunken marines in Santiago try to wreck a drug store full accounts are given, but when a young man of a prominent family is arrested for assault the papers mention the arrest and the efforts of good citizens to rescue him, but make no mention of the offense. One of the officers accused of cruelty has lived as a private citizen for several years in the very community in which the offenses are alleged to have happened and seems to be well-liked. At least when last summer it was reported that certain men were trying to "get him," some two hundred Dominicans on horseback rode into the town to protect him. I have known drunken officers to disturb an entire hotel most of the night; I have seen drunken soldiers on the trains and heard the vilest of language uttered with complete indifference to the possible presence of ladies who might understand English, and there were such. In fact these pettier (?) things are more important than actual cruelty. They are the mosquitoes which torment and irritate. They are the excuses given for the deeper feelings underneath. One writer who had

scathingly condemned the marines for cruelty, when asked for specific cases, hesitated and finally replied: "Five years ago, two marines entered my yard and killed a chicken." It was the only case he knew.

Arbitrary acts and decisions, particularly of younger officers, have caused much complaint. At the town of — two marines on mischief bent entered the premises of a well-known man. He ordered them to leave and when they refused he had two Haitian employes put them out. A little later they returned with guns and arrested the Haitians. The owner followed the party to headquarters. It chanced that the provost marshal was absent and the man in charge, an older marine, locked up the owner and the Haitians. On return of the provost marshal all were instantly discharged and the marines were ordered before a court martial. I tell this story both to illustrate the kind of things which have given great offense and to illustrate the fact that the officials have tried to punish guilty men whenever the evidence was to be had.

There have been both competent and incompetent officials. All I care to say on this point is that I believe the military officials have compared very favorably with the civilians. Let me add the testimony of an old civilian official. He said in effect: "Here in the Dominican Republic I have seen what I long hoped to see, but have despaired of seeing in the United States, that is, a body of men devoting all their energies to governing a community to the best of their ability, with no selfish interests at stake. It has been an inspiration to work with them." I share his sentiment though my personal information is meagre.

It is difficult to pass an opinion on the claims that too many laws have been passed and too many positions created. Only actual experience will

demonstrate whether the Americans have been too anxious to create in another country and under different conditions the machinery in use at home. Doubtless some modifications will be necessary. The officials tell me that one problem which has troubled them is to secure anything approaching the work done by individuals in our own country.

It is quite likely that in many instances native psychology had been ignored or misunderstood. It is difficult for men accustomed to the giving of orders to remember that they are in another country trying to help, not to supplant the natives. Yet I have met many men who displayed a most sympathetic interest in local conditions. It is also true that many natives have not wanted to help, but on the contrary, have tried to make the Occupation a failure. Conditions are not right for thorough-going coöperation.

An American Criticism. My own criticism of the operations in the Dominican Republic would lie in other directions. I have indicated that it is foolish to criticise individuals unless they are failing to carry out some clearly defined program. One can pass on the work of the collectors of customs but how can one estimate the success of a governor who must issue as orders all the laws needed in a country, unless he has men of wide knowledge and experience under him. My feeling about our administration, then, is that

its weakness is likely to lie in the organization and in the excess of devotion which each man is likely to have for his own special work. The governors have been changed too often for the best results and I do not know how much attention was paid to their peculiar fitness for the position. There seemed to me to be a lack of coördination between the different departments. For instance, I understand that the navy officials, feeling that a new dredge was needed, bought one. This dredge, however, was turned over to the Public Works Department which is charged with its operation, without previous consultation as to the type of dredge the department thought desirable. An agricultural college was started and built but it has no connection with the Department of Education. If we maintain a Military Governor what is the function of a Minister of the State Department? If the governor comes from the Navy, why should the Receiver of Customs be responsible to the Army? In other words we have assembled parts of machines on the island and have told our representatives to put them together and *make it run*. We cannot expect to be satisfied with the results regardless of the ability of the individual men. We are to blame, not they. Finally, we have made a lot of beginnings but we have carried nothing through to completion. The result is not creditable to the United States.

CHAPTER III

The Financial Situation

THE gold standard was adopted by the Dominican Republic in 1894. No gold was coined but a considerable amount of debased silver currency was issued. The rate of exchange fell to

five pesos for one dollar and this rate was accepted by the government in 1905 when the American gold dollar was accepted as the standard. The older paper currency has disappeared

but some of the silver (pesos and fractions) is still in circulation. Taking advantage of recent high prices in the year 1919, about \$150,000 of this currency was shipped and sold with a profit to the government of \$55,000 over all expenses. American currency is gradually replacing the native and large amounts of American paper money are in circulation.

Debt. The total debt as of June 30, 1921, was \$12,572,290 (I believe there are some unsettled claims not included) made up as follows:

Balance of the \$20,000,000 loan of 1908	\$8,332,300
1918 Bond issue for payment of floating debt	1,739,990
1921 Loan	2,500,000
	<hr/>
	\$12,572,290

Financial History. In 1904 the Dominican Republic found itself in a difficult financial situation, the interest on the debt being in default. Foreign loans had been made recklessly and the creditors were pressing for settlement. In accordance with the provisions of one such loan, the United States took over (October, 1904) the collection of customs at Puerto Plata. This led other countries to the idea of taking over other ports. To avoid this, the United States and the Dominican Republic entered, on the request of the latter country, in February, 1905, into a protocol taking effect April 1, 1905. An American was sent down who examined the outstanding liabilities of the country which then amounted on paper to over \$30,000,000 but which were scaled down to about \$17,000,000. The two countries entered into a new convention in 1907 and in 1908 a re-funding loan of \$20,000,000 was secured in the United States. The principal features of this convention were that all the Dominican customs should be collected by a Receiver General appointed by the President of the United

States. Not more than 5 per cent of the receipts should be allowed for the expenses of collection. The Receiver General was to pay on the first of each month to the fiscal agent of the loan (the Guaranty Trust Company of New York has served in this capacity) the sum of \$100,000 with the additional proviso that, if the revenues collected in any year amounted to over \$3,000,000, one-half of the surplus should be applied to the sinking fund for the redemption of bonds. The balance collected was to be turned over to the

Dominican Government or put in the sinking fund as the said government might direct. The first sentence of Article III is very important: "Until the Dominican Government has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States." This convention has been carried out and the loan steadily reduced as the statement above indicated. Should normal conditions obtain, the entire loan will have been paid by 1925 and the financial receivership terminate.

Internal Dissensions. Internal turmoil in the country, however, coupled with the prevailing practice of government officials of buying supplies without special authority, of looting the offices of everything movable and the failure to pay official salaries, created considerable obligations. The Dominicans appear to feel that these obligations had nothing to do with the convention but it is difficult to understand, much less accept, such reasoning. In 1912 the United States was forced to

consent to an additional loan of \$1,500,000 which was finally paid off in 1917.

The internal dissensions increased rather than diminished and at the time of the intervention in 1916 there was a deficit in the treasury of some \$14,000 and outstanding claims amounting to about \$16,000,000. A claims commission was appointed in 1917 and the claims cut down. To meet these obligations the Military Government authorized the issuance of bonds bearing 5 per cent interest, not to exceed \$5,000,000. Actually, the bonds issued totalled \$4,161,300. These bonds were for twenty years and were secured as an additional charge on the revenues collected by the Receiver General. In 1920 this loan had been so reduced that it looked as if it would be all paid by the end of 1922, but the financial slump will probably delay final settlement.

In 1921, after the United States had announced its desire to withdraw the military forces, it became necessary to float a loan of \$2,500,000 at 8 per cent to pay certain obligations and finish

some of the public works. This loan was sold to the highest bidders, the Equitable Trust Company, and Speyer and Company at 96½. Much criticism was made of the high cost of this loan but comparison with other loans of about the same date shows that the interest rate was not exorbitant. The *Literary Digest* for September 17, 1921, contains the table of recent bond issues found below.

Under normal conditions the financial outlook of the country is very good and if sound financial methods are adopted it may look forward to an era of prosperity. Some discussion of the internal revenue will be found on p. 181.

During the financial depression it is doubtful if the governmental revenues will be adequate for the present budget. Many Dominicans recognize this and see also that loans may be necessary and that they can be secured only in the United States. As already indicated there are many who would welcome the borrowing of funds sufficient to finish the public works program as well as to meet current expenses.

RECENT BOND ISSUES

<i>Country</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Maturity</i>	<i>Offered at</i>	<i>Yield</i>
France	\$100,000,000	7½	1941	95	8%
Belgium	30,000,000	8	1941	100	8.10
Chile	24,000,000	8	1941	99	8.21
Brazil	50,000,000	8	1941	97	8.25
S. of S. Paulo	10,000,000	8	1936	97	8.47
Dominican Republic	2,500,000	8	1925	100	8.

CHAPTER IV

Proposals for Withdrawal

IN the proclamation of November 29, 1916, made on the entrance of the United States into the Dominican Republic, it was stated: "The Occupation is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of Santo Domingo, but is

designed to assist the country to return to a condition of internal order which would enable it to observe the terms of the treaty concluded with the United States in 1907, and the obligations which rest upon it as one of the family of nations." The only possible inter-

pretation to be put on this is that the United States planned to withdraw its forces at the earliest possible moment.

December 23, 1920, a proclamation was issued by President Wilson which stated that the United States was ready to withdraw and suggested ways and means. Into the detailed suggestions we need not enter as they were not followed. Dominican opinion was not ready for action. Many felt that this was a political device of Mr. Wilson to embarrass the incoming administration. Nearly everyone thought that less could be secured from the administration which had ordered the intervention than from a new one politically opposed to the first. Certain remarks of Mr. Harding had been taken to indicate a very friendly feeling on his part. Moreover, there was a widespread feeling that the United States was drifting into war with Japan and that much could be gained by waiting. Hence the "Wilson Plan," as they call it, produced no other result than to start into activity the local politicians.

Harding Plan. On June 14, 1921, what is now known as the "Harding Plan" was proclaimed by the Military Governor. The essential features of this plan were:

Ratification of all acts of the Military Government; validation of the last loan of \$2,500,000; the extension of the duties of the General Receiver of Customs to cover this loan and to handle part of the internal revenues should the customs revenue be at any time inadequate; the Dominican Government to ask the United States to organize the *Guardia Nacional* to be organized by Dominicans, and by Americans (for such time as may be found necessary to effect the desired organization).

When a treaty covering these points had been drawn and accepted the military forces would be withdrawn. To make a beginning the Military

Governor called for an election but the Dominicans refused to put the machinery in motion and on July 27, 1921, a second proclamation was issued stopping further procedure "until such time as the success of an election may be assured." No action has been taken since. The last sentence in this proclamation was:

By instructions of the Government of the United States announcement is hereby made to all concerned that the procedure of evacuation of the Dominican Republic, outlined in the proclamation of June 14, 1921, and the terms of the proposed convention of evacuation were fully and carefully considered by the United States prior to the issuance of the proclamation and that the Government of the United States sees no reason for any departure therefrom.

This statement must be considered as the answer of the United States to the violent protests which were at once made in the Dominican papers. Seemingly the whole country was opposed. There were meetings and demonstrations galore. It was demanded that the troops be instantly removed and full control turned over to Dominicans at once and without any restrictions. One enthusiastic speaker at Santiago suggested wringing the neck of the American eagle and throwing the carcass in the dust. Others claimed that the method of calling the elections was unconstitutional and that it would not do to have an election as long as the marines were in the country. In order properly to evaluate this protest we shall have to consider what was taking place behind the scenes. Let us begin at Washington.

Whatever the new Administration thought of Mr. Wilson's policy, to just the extent that it disagreed, it would be careful not to make further blunders. Inasmuch as the United States could care nothing about the specific details of the plan for removing the military

forces it must have sought to secure certain things which it considered fundamental. Naturally it would discuss the plan with prominent Dominicans. Of these there was a committee at Washington headed by ex-President Henriquez y Carvajal. It is natural to assume that they told the State Department that the proposed plan was fairly satisfactory and would be accepted by the Dominicans. One of them told me that such was the case. Naturally, therefore, when the plan as issued was opposed there was no reason to change it for what assurance could be given that another plan would be more acceptable.

Native Opposition. I have reason to believe that the plan, in general outline at least, was known to the Dominican press and politicians in advance of publication. It was decided to reject it; hence, when issued, the opposition was already prepared. I suspect that some of this grew out of a desire to make impossible the later election of Henriquez y Carvajal as president, which might easily happen if he could pose as the man who influenced the Americans to withdraw. It may be merely coincidental that he soon announced that he would not be a candidate. The real local difficulty seems to have lain not in the method of calling an election but in the uncertainty as to the outcome of an election at which Americans preserved order. No political leader dared risk it; hence the deadlock. When, therefore, the United States "stood pat" on the plan the politicians were nonplussed for the net result of their antagonism was the indefinite postponement of the departure of the marines, the very thing they most wanted to accomplish. After publicly proclaiming abstention from voting as a patriotic duty it was not easy to come out and ask for an election. Although the leaders by October

had agreed to the election it had not been asked for up to the time of my departure. As a matter of fact the intelligent Dominicans were ready to ratify the acts of the *de facto* government, and to grant all the other things with the possible exception of having American officers in the Guardia. They felt that this would mean not foreign assistance but foreign control.

We must not take too seriously the arguments used in the heat of discussion. One merchant in talking to me demanded the immediate removal of the marines. I replied that I wished they could leave the next day and never return. "Oh no," he said, "you mustn't do that; all my property would be destroyed." "By whom?" I asked, and he grew strangely silent. Thinking Dominicans all know that a native government must be in existence before our troops are moved.

It might be inferred from what has just been said that all the Dominicans want us to leave. Many do. Many say that they have learned their lesson and that the day of revolution is over. Others are not so certain. There are a good many able Dominicans who want the United States to keep control of the country for twenty-five years. These men are not talking for publication for obvious reasons. They do not hesitate to criticise the Americans but they despair of peaceful and honest administration by their fellow countrymen, just now. They say, and I believe them, that there are plenty of Dominicans with adequate ability but that it is impossible to get these men into office.

Foreign Opinion. I met only one foreign resident (and he was an old Irishman just back from a year in Ireland) who did not believe that continued American control was necessary if the country was to prosper. Some of them said that things were likely to run

quietly for a few years but that if we left now it was a question of a short time only until we should be compelled to return and, to them, it seemed better that we should stay and finish the job rather than have to begin all over again later on. When I recall that among these men were Englishmen, Germans, Italians and Spaniards as well as Americans, many of whom had lived a generation in the country and had married native women, I am compelled to believe that their almost unanimous opinion should carry great weight. The reader should remember that I am not here expressing my opinion as to our national policy but that I am trying to state all the facts pertinent to a given situation.

I may be permitted to summarize my impressions. The Dominicans are not antagonistic to Americans. Quite the contrary. They are, however, critical of the policy of our government. They feel that it sent the troops either under false pretenses or through error. They admit that the Military Government has done some good things as well as some bad things and that the cases of cruelty have been incidental. It seems worse, however, to have offenses committed by foreigners than by natives. They argue that, even accepting our view that they violated the convention by allowing an internal debt to arise, the convention did not give the United States any right to intervene, as long at least as the foreign obligations were maintained. They recognize the growing economic dependence on the

United States and they will welcome better trade relations. They assure us that if we guarantee them freedom from foreign interference they will willingly enter into offensive and defensive alliance with us and forever assure us that no territorial rights will be granted to other nations. On paper at least they can make out an excellent case.

Our Future Course. The Government of the United States has pledged itself to withdraw from the Dominican Republic within a short time, provided certain things are done. Inasmuch as there is little fundamental objection to these things, in my opinion they will be accepted. In that case we shall have no option. If, however, for any reason the Dominicans refuse to accept the conditions and no harmonious phrasing is discovered which will satisfy both parties we shall have to decide on our policy and program. Unless we then withdraw unconditionally I think it obvious that we should replace a military by a civil government; that we should select competent men, and maintain and support them. We might well consider the advisability of changing our tariff relations to promote trade. Such a course has long been recommended by the present Military Government. It is, however, not within the scope of my report to enter into such questions. I am glad to say in closing that in my opinion we shall find a solution to present difficulties and shall be able to develop the most friendly relations with the Dominicans.

Some Reflections on Our Policy

HITHERTO I have limited myself as strictly as possible to a statement of conditions as I found them, giving but the minimum of historical background. In closing the report I must state a few of my own conclusions.

Insofar as I can see there are but three general policies which might be adopted by the United States with reference to Haiti and the Dominican Republic:

(1) Withdraw and refuse to accept any responsibility for what happens in either country; refuse to intervene again and refuse also to let any other country intervene.

(2) Withdraw and refuse to intervene again, but let other countries do as they please in regard to the collection of debts or the establishment of naval bases.

(3) Continue the intervention, promising to withdraw as soon as conditions make possible the restoration of autonomy.

When I went to Haiti I was inclined to feel that the first course was the best but I left convinced that it was not. There are many who believe that it is but they have often weakened their case by impugning the motives of those who differ from them. They are inclined to claim that everything done by our government is done for selfish reasons and dominated by deceit and cruelty, while accepting all claims of other nations at their face value.

The fundamental cause of the muddle in which we find ourselves in Haiti and the Dominican Republic is a lack of a clear understanding of the problem and our relation thereto. The older concept of the Monroe Doctrine was

negative. We said to Europe "hands off" but accepted no definite responsibility ourselves. This attitude on our part was, and is, a guaranty of independence to the two other countries without which it is doubtful if they could have maintained themselves. More recently we have encountered a rising insistence in Europe that we should assume responsibility or else permit other countries to intervene as they might deem best. Under this pressure we have intervened in a half-hearted sort of way. Unless we are prepared to surrender the Monroe Doctrine, and of this I see no sign, the time has come for us to assume definitely the responsibilities it entails and to work out some definite policy. Unless we do this it might be better for us to get out and stay out.

A century ago men, sensing an idea a little beyond their powers of expression, spoke glowingly of "individual rights" as if they arose and existed apart from society. We know today that rights flow from society and are determined by it. To society the individual is responsible, and when the commands of society are violated, the individual is punished; that is, his rights are limited. Society judges the individual by his actions not by his size. It recognizes that individuals differ and that the rights granted must be proportionate to the sense of responsibility developed by the individual. The insane man must have a guardian. When we deal with defective persons we do so not to punish them but to assist them and to protect others, that is, society.

Inter-Group Relationships. Just now we are passing through a similar development of thought and practice

as regards inter-group relations. "Self-determination" in international relations corresponds to the "inalienable rights" of individuals a century ago. Just as our ancestors learned that they had to draw a line between the normal and defective individuals before the law, so we are learning that international law must distinguish between groups of individuals primarily on the basis of their actions, that is, their development of a sense of responsibility. The analogy is not perfect for we must assume that any group has the inherent capacity to develop, an assumption which is not always true of the individual.

In earlier days a man might take to the wilderness or the woods and live an isolated career almost independent of society. Such a life is decreasingly possible today. Tribes, races, countries in the past have had at times but casual contact with other groups but that too has become almost impossible. We are living today in a world of closely related groups and our philosophy of group relations must change to fit the facts. It was said of old, "No man liveth unto himself," and today we must add, "Nor does any people." The old ideal that each group should be allowed to struggle along by itself, regardless of suffering or turmoil, until it learned self-control has become as absurd as the idea that a child should be allowed to grow up without moral training. The time is soon coming when no group of people will be allowed the exclusive jurisdiction of any spot of earth unless they so conduct affairs that the welfare of others is conserved. That it will take a long time to standardize these new relations is freely admitted. That there are dangers is equally evident. The point is that now nations as well as men must ask, "Am I my brother's keeper?" The welfare of Cuba may depend as much on the tariff

laws of the United States as on the labors of the Cubans.

If the outside world is to intervene the questions of when, where, how, will have to be settled. The individual is most affected by the actions of his neighbors. If a man on the adjoining place begins to shoot indiscriminately with a high-powered rifle I am immediately involved regardless of whether he intends to do me harm or not. In an organized society I invoke the law. Under frontier conditions I handle the problem myself. In the present state of world organization we must follow the program of the frontier. The important thing is the clear recognition that each community must so conduct itself as to offer no threat to the safety of others. The large groups have rights as well as the small. Those societies which desire to be considered as nations must show themselves able to maintain the responsibilities of nations.

I hear my Haitian friends say, "But we have long been recognized as a free and independent nation by the United States." True. The whale was long considered a fish, but its real nature was not changed by the mistaken classification of men. The difference between you and the whale is that you can become really free and independent if you will and that is what we should like you to do. We are not outsiders. You are a part of our problem because of your location. We have been confused in our attitude towards you as is shown by our indecision whether to call your island Haiti or Santo Domingo. We have neglected you in the past and for this we accept our full measure of blame but we are determined that the future shall tell another story. Your old programs of revolutions and indiscriminate borrowing of money must stop, not only because it checks your development but because

it has become a source of danger to us. Just now, to be sure, there is little danger of interference by another nation but we do not know what fifty years may bring forth and we have decided that it is easier to keep other nations out than to put them out.

Every American with whom I have talked would prefer to let the island go its way without interference. I have never met anyone who desires to destroy the sovereignty of either government and no one ever suggests that the island should be absorbed into the United States. America is ready to continue its guaranty of independence but it seems ready also to insist on certain reforms. Now if we may grant the sincerity of the government at Washington, and I see no reason to question it, what shall we do, for it is evident that we will not let other nations intervene.

A Suggested Policy. I believe the United States should again declare to the world:

(1) That it will maintain the integrity of Haiti against itself as well as against the rest of the world:

(2) That it asks for no territory from Haiti but assumes that in any future emergency Haiti will grant the use of any facilities needed as a return for the promise of the United States to protect it against invasion:

(3) That for the time being the United States proposes to maintain law and order in Haiti and to try to put the country in a position which would make possible an orderly future development.

Such a statement should at once be followed by the sending of a pro-consul to Haiti vested with full authority, to whom all other American representatives should be subject. Provisions should be made for the refunding of the Haitian debt and I personally feel that our tariff laws

should be modified to permit the entrance of Haitian (and Dominican) goods on the same terms as those of Cuba.

The objections to this policy as generally stated are that the Haitians do not want it and that we should find that closer economic relations would lead to a demand for permanent control, which would be for the interests of the supposedly wicked capitalists. In my opinion the great majority of the Haitians would welcome such a program and the fact that some would not should not be allowed to determine our actions. I do not think that Haiti is fitted for self-government at the present time. I do not ignore the dangers of this policy but I think they are less than those of the opportunist program of the past. The claim that our intervention in Haiti was dictated by financial interests can be made only by those who are ignorant of the facts. It should not be overly difficult to prevent improper exploitation in the future. Just now Haiti needs capital and needs it badly. The fact that we have not accomplished all that we should in Haiti and that we have done some bad things are in themselves no arguments whatever that we should now withdraw.

Difference in the Dominican Situation. The situation as regards the Dominican Republic is different in that we have offered to withdraw under certain conditions and we must keep our pledge if the conditions are accepted. While the Dominicans are further advanced than the Haitians their future is somewhat problematical and we may find ourselves forced to intervene again. I hope not, but I am not certain. I must confess that I find difficulty in understanding the offer to withdraw. The fact is that the United States made its first great blunder when it allowed Caceres to be over-

thrown and replaced by a revolutionary government. The second blunder came when it recognized the \$1,500,000 internal debt under Nouel. These two facts convinced the Dominican politicians that they could do as they pleased. We did not intervene when we should have done so. Assuming, as I have, that Washington felt justified in the original intervention it is not easy to see what changes have resulted which now justify withdrawal. If we entered to enable the establishment of a stable government in order that treaty pledges might be kept, before we leave such government should be more in evidence than it is now. If we entered because of disturbed conditions during the War why did we not withdraw long ago? As for myself, as elsewhere stated, I wish we might finish the public works program ere we leave. With this idea I know many Dominicans are in agreement.

If the United States decides that it must adopt a more constructive policy with reference to these countries today, to others tomorrow, perhaps, it should try to remedy certain weaknesses in our home situation. For instance, we should be very careful how we send to Haiti as our representatives American Negroes, regardless of their personal qualifications. Such action is not welcomed by the Haitians. They do not want to be mixed up in the race problem of this country.

A more serious matter grows out of the fact that five and six years ago at the request of the State Department our marines were sent to the island. During all this time Congress has never directly approved or disapproved the action. It is foolish to claim as has been done that Congress has not indirectly approved, for it has known the facts and has voted the necessary appropriations. I feel, however, that no department of government should

be allowed to involve the entire country in such fashion without the express approval of Congress.

The Selection of Leaders. It seems to me also that we should devise ways and means to attract into the State Department able men who might find there permanent careers. It does not make for our peace of mind to find the immediate control of such important matters in the hands of a succession of young men. An inexperienced man should not be in a position to determine whether the report of the commanding officer in Haiti or the Dominican Republic should or should not be shown to the Secretary of State. The men on the ground are vastly better informed of actual conditions than any office man can be, but we can at least make sure that a man of corresponding ability and experience sees his recommendations. It is, of course, the system and not individual men that I have in mind.

Furthermore I believe that more attention should be paid to the selection of civilian and military leaders with special aptitude for the particular tasks to which they are assigned. The Marine Corps is intended to be a fighting body and we should not ask it to assume all sorts of civil and political responsibilities unless we develop within it a group of specially trained men. I consider it a foolish and dangerous thing to send raw recruits, whether men or officers, into places where their actions have definite and important political results. I know that military men are not always to blame for the limitations under which they work. Because of some law the marines in Haiti are compelled to spend thousands of dollars for tents which rot out in a year instead of building at a fraction of the cost simple cabins of palm-boards which would be much more permanent and convenient.

Our Increased Responsibility. One of the results of recent years is the greatly increased responsibility of the United States. I have tried to indicate the difficulties we have encountered in the formulation of policies which will help us to carry this responsibility. I have tried to be both honest and fair. While I have been critical both as regards our activities and those of the Haitians and Dominicans I trust I have not been either hyper- or hypo-critical.

I look back with pleasant memories to my months on the island and I look forward towards the coming of better and more cordial relations between the respective governments. Everyone must sympathize with the desire of the Haitians and Dominicans to be free and independent and our constant effort should be to help them realize their desires by the cultivation of that sense of responsibility without which freedom and independence are empty terms.

Book Notes

THE following is a brief list of the best books on Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately a number are out of print and are hard to find. With one or two exceptions they deal with the economic, social or political life of the people. No attempt is made to list the many magazine articles of recent years but a few reprints in pamphlet form are included. One who desires to get details of recent events will not need to be told to look in the reports of the Departments of Navy, State or Commerce, the Bulletins of the Pan-American Union in our country; or similar publications of the other governments.

HAITI

Colonial times:

Moreau de St. Mery, M. L. E. *Description Topographique, Physique, Civile, Politique et Historique de la Partie Française de L'Isle de Saint Domingue*, 2 Vols. Philadelphia, 1797. A mine of information.

Stoddard, Lothrop. *The French Revolution in Santo Domingo*. New York, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1914.

Wimpffen, Baron, F. A. S. *de Saint Dominique à la Veille de la Révolution*. Edited by Albert Savine, Paris, 1910. (Louis Miebaud.)

An English edition was issued in London 1797 under the title, *A Voyage to Santo Domingo in the Years 1788, 1789, 1790*. Probably the best contemporaneous account.

Recent times:

Tippenhauer, Louis Gentil. *Die Insel Haiti*, 2 Vols. Leipzig, 1892. In many ways the best book on Haiti where the author was born and lives.

St. John, Spencer. *Haiti, or the Black Republic*. 2nd edit. N. Y., 1889. Extremely critical. Author an English official long resident in Haiti.

Aubin, Eugene. *En Haiti. Planteurs D'Aufrefois, Nègres D'Aujourd'hui*. Paris,

1910. Author formerly French Minister to Haiti. One of the very best recent accounts.

Pritchard, H. V. H. *Where Black Rules White*. London, T. Nelson & Sons, 2nd edit. 1910.

LaSelve, Edgar. *Le Pays des Nègres*. Paris, 1881. Good, illustrated account of visit with many historical references.

Vibert, Paul. *La République D'Haiti, son Present, son Avenir, Économique*. Paris 1895. Berger Levrault et Cie.

Kuser, J. D. *Haiti*. Boston, R. C. Badger. 1921. A sympathetic sketch of a recent visit.

The three following books by Haitians may be considered attempts to answer Spencer St. John for they attempt to portray the best in Haitian life and at times are too laudatory.

Prince, Hannibal. *De la Réhabilitation de la Race Noire*. Port-au-Prince, 1901.

Leger, J. H. *Haiti, Her History and Her Detractors*. New York. The Neale Publishing Co., 1907. There is a French edition also. Author was very prominent in Haiti.

Vincent, Stenio. *La République D'Haiti (Telle qu'elle est)*. Bruxelles, Société Anonyme d'Imprimerie, 1910. Illustrated description of country with many details.

The following are less general and deal with more detailed aspects. All were written by Haitians.

Marcelin, L. J. *Haiti, Ses Guerres Civiles-Leurs Causes, Leurs Conséquences Présentes, Leur Conséquence Future et Finale*. Paris, A. Rousseau, Ed. 1892. In a class by itself as a calm, critical study of fundamental political problems.

Féquièrre, Fleury. *L'Éducation Haitienne*. Port-au-Prince, 1906. A general survey of social and family matters. Last part on schools.

Marcelin, Frederic. *Bric-a-Brac*. Paris (Société Anonyme de Imprimerie Kugelmann) 1910. Political notes of about 1904 at the time of the bank scandal. Author was considered one of the ablest men of the country.

Magloire, August. *L'Erreur Révolutionnaire et Notre État Socialo Port-au-Prince 1909*. A thoughtful work.

Vival, Duraciné, *La Littérature Haitienne* (Essais Critiques). Paris, Sansot et Cie. 1911. Good brief account of Haitian writers.

There are a number of stories by Haitian writers which give an excellent account of Haitian society and which have decided literary merit as well. The best that I have read are:

Marcelin, Frederic. "Epiminondas Themistocle Labasterre."

Hibbert, Fernand. "Les Thazar" 1907, "Romulus" 1908, "Sena" and "Masques et Visages" (short stories) 1910, all published at Port-au-Prince. Author is now, 1921, Minister of Public Instruction.

Finally there remains to be mentioned a book which is anathema in Haiti but which is a collection of facts, largely humorous, collected by the author while a teacher in Haiti and which is worth reading.

Texier, C. *Aux Pays des Généraux*. Paris, C. Levy, 1891.

Haiti, Chapters in larger books, pamphlets, etc.

Franck, Harry A. "Roaming Through the West Indies." New York, The Century Co., 1920. The best recent sketch.

Inman, S. G. "Through Santo Domingo and Haiti." Pub. by Committee on Co-operation in Latin-America, 25 Madison Ave., New York City, 1920.

Johnson, James Weldon. "Self Determining Haiti." (A reprint of four articles.) *The Nation*, New York, 1920.

López, J. "La Civilizacion en Haiti." A very critical article on U. S. intervention. *La Reforma Social*, New York, Agosto, 1921.

"Renseignements Financiers, Statistiques et Économiques sur La République D' Haiti." Issued by the Banque Nationale de la République D'Haiti. 1920. Tabulated statement of loans, etc.

Secretary of the Navy, Annual Report, Washington, 1920. Reviews military phases intervention.

"Union Patriotique d'Haiti. Memoir of delegates on the Political, Economic and Financial conditions existing in the Re-

public of Haiti under the American Occupation." New York. *The Nation*, May 25, 1921. The most complete statement of Haitian complaints.

"Exposé Général de la situation de la République D'Haiti." Issued yearly at Port-au-Prince.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Early period:

Del Monte y Tejada, Antonio. *Historia de Santo Domingo*. Santo Domingo, 1890. (First pub. Habana 1893.) Contains journal of Columbus and outlines history down to 1794.

García, José Gabriel. *Compendio de la Historia de Santo Domingo*. 2nd edit. 3 Vols. Santo Domingo City, 1893, 1894, 1896.

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